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Differentiated Quality-of-Recovery and Quality-of-Protection in Survivable WDM 
Mesh Networks 
Samir Sebbah, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2010 
In the modern telecommunication business, there is a need to provide different Quality-of-
Recovery (QoR) and Quality-of-Protection (QoP) classes in order to accommodate as many cus-
tomers as possible, and to optimize the protection capachVy cost. Prevalent protection methods 
to provide specific QoS related to protection are based on pre-defined shape protection structures 
(topologies), e.g., p-cycles and p-trees. Although some of these protection patterns are known to 
provide a good trade-off among the different protection parameters, their shapes can limit their 
deployment in some specific network conditions, e.g., a constrained link spare capacity budget and 
traffic distribution. 
In this thesis, we propose to re-think the design process of protection schemes in survivable 
WDM networks by adopting a new design approach where the shapes of the protection structures 
are decided based on the targeted QoR and QoP guarantees, and not the reverse. We focus on 
the degree of pre-configuration of the protection topologies, and use fully and partially pre-cross 
connected p-structures, and dynamically cross connected p-structures. In QoR differentiation, we 
develop different approaches for pre-configuring the protection capacity in order to strike different 
balances between the protection cost and the availability requirements in the network; while in 
the QoP differentiation, we focus on the shaping of the protection structures to provide different 
grades of protection including single and dual-link failure protection. The new research directions 
proposed and developed in this thesis are intended to help network operators to effectively support 
i i i 
different Quality-of-Recovery and Quality-of-Protection classes. All new ideas have been translated 
into mathematical models for which we propose practical and efficient design methods in order to 
optimize the inherent cost to the different designs of protection schemes. Furthermore, we establish 
a quantitative relation between the degree of pre-configuration of the protection structures and their 
costs in terms of protection capacity. 
Our most significant contributions are the design and development of Pre-Configured Protec-
tion Structure (^-structure) and Pre-Configured Protection Extended-Tree (p-etree) based schemes. 
Thanks to the column generation modeling and solution approaches, we propose a new design ap-
proach of protection schemes where we deploy just enough protection to provide different quality of 
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C H A P T E R 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and Background 
The explosive growth of the Internet and the introduction of several new services and applications 
have created an increasing demand for communications in different domains. Besides the classical 
IP-based applications, such as web browsing, e-mails, Voice over IP (VoIP), IPTV, Internet games, 
Video on Demand (VoD), Peer-to-Peer (P2P) services, other services and applications with different 
stringent Quality-of-Service (QoS) requirements are becoming ubiquitous. Although several broad-
band technologies have been introduced during the last decades, fiber optics is still the primary 
technology for broadband connectivity, particularly for communications over long distances. Recent 
advances in optical signal processing and Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM) technology have 
created many opportunities for multiplexing of several Gigabyte-channels on a single hber link. The 
growth of the transport capacity of hbeis has been accompanied with the development of optical 
switching technologies which have enabled flexible and reconfigurable optical cross connects to si-
multaneously switch hundreds of wavelength channels. This, in turn, has stimulated many network 
operators to extensive optical WDM technology deployment during the last decades [RI98, LE98]. 
However, the huge bandwidth capacity biought by optical fibers and switching technologies in WDM 
networks have raised their vulnerability level to equipment failures. In WDM networks, a single net-
work outage resulting from a link or node failure, even for a short period of time, can lead to a 
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traffic loss of several terabits [Gro04a, VPD04]. 
Providing resilience against network failures is an important feature in many high-speed networks 
in order to meet the service availability requirements. As part of Service-Level Agreement (SLA) 
between network operators and their cooperative customers, operators commit to providing services 
with different availability guarantees, e.g., 99.999% for the duration of the service, and usually 
compensation if these are not met. Protection, which involves resource redundancy, e.g., fibers and 
switching nodes, has been the most widely used resiliency mechanisms in optical networks. In the 
design of protection schemes, there are many decision parameters that need to be considered before 
selecting a protection strategy to respond to a specific protection need. Although the main targeted 
parameter in the design of protection schemes is usually the recovery delay, other parameters such as 
the deployment cost, scalability, manageability, and flexibility are also targeted in some protection 
schemes. Indeed, the design objective of a protection scheme in WDM networks is usually a multi-
objective function, whose solution constitutes a trade-off among the different involved sub-objectives 
and parameters. 
Protection schemes in survivable optical networks, particularly in WDM networks, have evolved 
from dedicated to extensively shared protection schemes. The evolution has been motivated by 
the increasing cost of protection resources needed to provide high reliability and availability to the 
growing number of applications and services. However, reducing the protection capacity cost comes 
at the expense of several protection functionalities, among which are recovery delay and management 
complexity. Thus, many design strategies of protection schemes in the literature have focused on 
the trade-offs among the involved protection parameters [WAPD01. WSM02, RJ08, Sim07, HS07]. 
Either shared path, segment or link oriented, various pre-configured protection structures, e.g., 
linear paths [Muk92a, Muk92b], p-trees [MFB99, XCTT02], p-cycles [GS98], have been proposed in 
the literature to provide protection in survivable WDM networks. Each of these basic protection 
structures is associated with a cost in terms of protection capacity, and a recovery delay which 
depends on its pre-configuration. The pre-cross connectivity ahead of failures is a characteristic of 
some protection structures that enables them to provide protection with a limited reconfiguration 
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in case of a failure. Pre-defined shape protection structures that can be totally pre-cross connected 
ahead of failures include p-cycles and pre-cross connected trails (p-trails or PXTs) [CCF04a]. In 
totally pre-cross connected structures, there is a unique way to map each input port to each out-
put port at switching nodes. Thus, pre-mapping is performed ahead of any failure, and dynamic 
re-mapping is only performed at the end-nodes of failing links. However, as the protection capacity 
is only allocated following some pre-defined shape topologies, this approach can result in an extra 
cost due to the limitation of the allocation plan of the protection capacity. On the other hand, 
dynamically cross connected protection schemes, which involve dynamic cross-connection of protec-
tion capacity at switching nodes in case of a'failure, can enable more flexible capacity allocation 
planes. However, this approach has its cost in terms of recovery delay and management overhead. In 
partially pre-cross connected protection schemes, the number of cross connects that need dynamic 
reconfiguration at switching nodes and along backup paths is optimized. This approach can achieve 
a good balance between capacity redundancy and recovery delay. 
Those differently pre-configured protection schemes offer different availability guarantees, and 
require different network resource redundancies. Meanwhile, there is a trend in the design of surviv-
able optical networks toward solutions that will support a variety of applications and services with 
different availability requirements and costs. Indeed, not all the supported services need the same 
level of availability, and not all the customers can afford to pay the price of a high service availability. 
Tough, differentiation of quality of recovery can be a solution for both network operators and cus-
tomers in order to minimize the protection capacity cost and receive affordable services, respectively. 
On the operator side, optimization of the protection budget to provide a larger portfolio of services 
at different rates is an important issue in order to provide competitive services. 
Another concern in the design of protection schemes, not much considered, is the ability to provide 
multiple guarantees of protection, also called Quality-of-Protection (QoP). Mostly designed protec-
tion schemes are optimized to protect against single-link failures [TMP05. GC05. TN94, MCL+03. 
HLS07]. However, since the link-failures are not really independent and do not come one at a time. 
providing protection against dual-link failures is going to be the next protection level to improve the 
3 
network availability after a guaranteed 100% single-link failure protection. 
Man}^ factors can motivate the need for providing resiliency against dual-link failures in modern 
communication networks. Single-link failure recovery schemes guarantee 100% protection in case 
of a link failure within a short recovery time (few milliseconds to few seconds depending on the 
protection scheme). However, before the physical repair of the failure, it may happen that a second 
failure occurs, thus, leading to a dual-link failure. Another motivation for investigating dual-link 
failures is related to the Shared Risk Link Group (SRLG) concept, i.e., a set of optical fiber links 
that share the same risk of failure. We can also think of network applications and services that are 
mission-critical, and hence, require 100% availability (say, e.g., tele-surgery) which is not necessarily 
guaranteed by a 100% single-link failure protection scheme. However, to provide resiliency against 
all single-link and dual-link failures, it takes an amount of protection capacity proportional to the 
targeted QoP level (see Chapter 9). In such a case, differentiation of QoP can be the solution for 
saving protection capacity and providing different guarantees of protection as they are needed. Such 
as in the differentiated QoR approach, in differentiated QoP, not all users can afford to pay the 
same price of a high QoP given the associated cost, and network operators should be able to provide 
different classes of protection to support different users and services with different requirements. 
1.2 Research Agenda 
Although the recent trends toward the integration of voice and data services have opened up many 
interesting areas for research, not much work has been done on QoR and QoP differentiation in 
survivable WDM networks. The associated design problem of protection schemes taking into account 
different recovery and protection requirements is a multi-dimensional problem that requires efficient 
optimization and planning tools. Some research efforts have been made in recovery differentiation 
[GS02, SM04, AKM03, BKLS01, DSST99] where authors have combined some QoS parameters 
related to recovery and protection. But, only few efficient design methods have been proposed to 
optimize those designs, accurately evaluate and compare their cost with different network scenarios. 
and elaborate design strategies that consider the available spare capacity budgets and switching 
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technologies. Furthermore, not much research has considered combination of different protection 
schemes and logical topologies in order to provide QoR and QoP differentiation in survivable WDM 
networks. This thesis seeks to help redress this balance by proposing efficient and scalable design 
methods of protection schemes in order to support QoR and QoP differentiation in survivable WDM 
networks. 
1.2.1 Research Approach 
Our design approaches of survivable WDM optical networks supporting QoR and QoP differentia-
tions are based on the shape and connectivity of their protection topologies and oriented to optimize 
the availability of the supporting networks. Existing protection schemes providing some QoR and 
QoP guarantees are based on pre-defined shape protection structures, which by their shapes (logical 
topology) support different protection parameters. For example, p-cycles for recovery delay, and 
p-trees for local recovery. In this thesis, we propose to re-think the design process of protection 
schemes in survivable WDM networks by adopting a new approach where we decide the shape of 
the protection structures based on the QoR and QoP guarantees, not the reverse. In this approach, 
protection structures (p-structures) of different forms are considered as potential candidates to pro-
vide protection, provided that they can effectively meet the different QoR and QoP requirements. 
We will adopt this design approach in almost the entire thesis. 
Our QoR differentiation is based oh service availability differentiation. To optimize the network 
availability, while minimizing the cost of the protection budget, our approach is to develop pro-
tection mechanisms based on fully pre-cross connected p-structures, partially pre-cross connected 
p-structures, and dynamically cross connected p-structures. Those protection approaches achieve 
different trade-offs among recovery delay, management and signaling overhead, and cost. 
Regarding QoP differentiation, provided through single-link and dual-link failure recovery, our 
approach is based on optimization methods that adapt the shapes of the protection topologies to 
survive the different failure models associated with the different QoP grades. In our approach, dual-
link failures are not improbable and can happen with a given probability. Protection topologies 
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adapted to survive the failure model are elaborated to provide routing diversity in case of any 
failure. Their shapes are decided based on the failure model. 
1.2.2 Research Objectives 
Our objectives of this research thesis are to: 
• Propose new design approaches of protection schemes, which are cost effective, can provide 
protection within different network conditions and constraints, and can effectively provide 
different QoR and QoP guarantees. Though, the spare capacity budget and switching capa-
bilities of nodes will be considered as design constraints. For QoR and QoP differentiations, 
we propose a multi-availability framework for the design of protection schemes based on fully 
pre-cross connected, partially pre-cross connected, and dynamically cross connected protection 
structures, which guarantee different network availability levels and require different protection 
costs. 
• Propose a new design approach of protection schemes in order to provide different QoR and 
QoP guarantees by using different ^-structures. This approach puts the focus on the targeted 
parameters, and then select the most flexible and effective protection structures, independently 
of their shapes. Though, for example, fully pre-cross connected schemes are built using all 
possible p-structures that can be fully pre-cross connected ahead of any failure, independently 
of their shapes. This in turn, guarantees to select the most flexible structures that, at the 
same time, will satisfy other design constraints, i.e., link spare capacity budget and traffic 
distribution. 
• In order to be efficient and flexible within different design conditions and constraints, our 
designs will be based, for both the modeling and the optimization aspects, on a large scale op-
timization approach named Column Generation (CG). This optimization approach has many 
advantages, among scalability, efficiency, and flexibility. Though, in this thesis we develop 
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different optimization methods to meet different cost models and satisfy different design con-
straints. 
As the reader will see, all the objectives have been reached and results, which have been obtained, 
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1.3 Thesis Organization 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the research plan of the thesis. The entire thesis is divided into three mam 
units: Background, QoR differentiation, and QoP differentiation units. , 
Chapter 2 provides a brief introduction to transport networks. Two network models illustrating 
the organization and evolution of transport networks are presented. Three optical architectures of 
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switching nodes - Optical-Electrical-Optical (OEO), transparent, and translucent - are described 
and compared in terms of scalability and operating cost. The fundamentals of optical control planes 
including architectures, MPLS/GMPLS techniques are discussed. The focus is placed on GMPLS, 
and features such as automated provisioning, traffic engineering, link management, routing, and 
signaling. Finally, the engineering process of WDM systems is briefly reviewed by presenting the 
involved physical components, discussing the power budgeting problem, and different other design 
considerations. 
Chapter 3 provides background information on survivability in optical networks. First, after a 
short review of some concepts in the domain, we discuss in details the recovery process in case of 
a failure. The whole time it takes from the failure appearance to the time of traffic switching is 
illustrated in a temporal recovery diagram. The spare capacity requirement, signaling overhead, 
and state overheads, which are among the characteristics of protection schemes are also discussed. 
In this chapter, we also present the evolution of protection techniques and protection topologies 
in mesh networks. A brief discussion about multi-layer protection is given with some reviews of 
existing multi-layer protection approaches in the literatures. Finally, we discuss three different 
types of protection schemes depending on the pre-configuration of their topologies: The fully pre-
cross connected, partially pre-cross connected, and dynamically cross-connected protection schemes. 
A comparison of some of their protection parameters is presented. 
Chapter 4 gives a basic background on optimization in survivable WDM networks. In the first 
part of this chapter, we review some basic concepts in graph algorithms, and some algorithmic 
approaches to p-cycles and p-trees searching. In the second part, we focus on Integer Linear Pro-
gramming (ILP) and Column Generation (CG) optimization techniques. After a review of some ILP 
solution methods, we present a short introduction to CG modeling and solution approaches. 
Chapter 5 proposes efficient and scalable optimization methods based on CG in order to design 
survivable WDM networks based on simple and non-simple p-cycles in the context of Protected 
Working Capacity Envelope (PWCE). This chapter is divided into two parts associated with simple 
p-cycles and non-simple p-cycles, respectively. In the first part, we focus on optimization techniques, 
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and propose an efficient method to maximize the size of the PWCE using different link spare capacity 
budgets. We compare our approach to a set of ILP-based methods using different enumeration 
strategies of the candidate p-cycles. In the second part, we propose a new optimization method 
to extend the solution space of p-cycles and include non-simple p-cycles. Therein, we evaluate the 
added-value of the non-simple p-cycles with different link spare capacity budgets. 
Chapter 6 proposes a new design approach of protection schemes based on hybrid protection 
structures, we named, pre-configured protection extended-trees (p-etrees). Starting from a p-tree, 
a p-eiree is formed by potentially re-shaping the protection topology of the initial p-tree. The 
resulting protection pattern of this re-shaping process can be a p-cycle, a p-tree, a p-trail, or any 
hybrid structure of these protection structures/The motivation behind this construction is to allow 
those complementary structures to supply their mutual needs and offset their mutual disadvantages. 
Indeed, the capacity efficiency of p-cycles and their recovery delay can offset the capacity inefficiency 
and recovery delay of p-trees, and the scalability and flexibility of p-trees can offset that of p-cycles. 
Chapter 7 extends further the solution space of the potential protection structures to include 
all possible patterns. In this chapter, we propose design methods of protection schemes based on 
p-structures in the context of PWCE. In contrast to the previous protection schemes, in this chapter 
we do not concern ourselves with the pre-cross connectivity of the protection structures. We focus 
on the sharing of the protection capacity, and propose two design strategies to maximize the size 
of PWCEs on a hop-by-hop basis and on an end-to-end basis. In the end-to-end basis, we propose 
an optimization method based on CG in order to maximize the protected flow circulation among 
switching nodes. 
Chapter 8 proposes a design framework of protection schemes in order to provide different 
Quality-of-Recovery (QoR) classes in survivable WDM networks. Three recovery classes are as-
sociated with three protection approaches using differently pre-configured protection structures. In 
this chapter, we generalize the p-structure approach, and design protection structures that can 
be fully pre-cross connected ahead of failures, partially pre-cross connected ahead of failures, and 
dynamically cross connected in case of a failure. 
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Chapter 9 proposes a design framework of protection schemes in order to provide different 
Quality-of-Protection (QoP) classes in survivable WDM networks. Different classes of protection 
are associated with different protection levels against single-link failures and optimized dual-link 
failures. In this chapter, we consider both the p-cycle and the p-structure based schemes. We pro-
pose CG modeling approaches that re-shape the p-cycle patterns in order to meet different dual-link 
failure protection scenarios, and study the required spare capacity budget for that. With the p-
structure scheme, our objective is to identify the most efficient patterns in order to effectively meet 
the different requirements of protection. 
Chapter 10 concludes the thesis and presents some future research directions. 
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C H A P T E R 2 
Background on Optical W D M 
Networks 
2.1 Definition and Evolution of Transport Networks 
A transport network can be regarded as a set of equipment and facilities such as switching devices 
(routers, switches, multiplexers • • •) and transmission medias (copper cables, optical fibers. Hertzian 
waves - - •) carrying client signals. The set of network equipment and facilities, usually referred to 
as network elements (NEs), provide and support features, functions, and capabilities, which are 
necessary for transmission of information over the transport network [FCC96]. 
In order to respond to the increasing needs for high-bandwidth services, fiber-optics technology 
and WDM switching have been largely deployed in metropolitan and long-haul transport networks 
[RI98. LE98]. Fiber-optics technology can effectively meet the increasing demand for high bandwidth 
services, thanks in part to its huge bandwidth, low signal attenuation (around 0.2 dB/km). and low 
power and space requirements. WDM is the favorite multiplexing technology in multi-wavelength 
optical networks because it supports a cost effective transmission of a large number of concurrent 
transmissions of optical channels. Huge bandwidth capacit}' can result from multiplexing of several 
wavelengths on a single strand of fiber, e.g.. a hber that can support up to 160 channels operating 
at 40 Gb/s would yield an aggregate of 6.4 Tbps. 
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There has been a growing trend toward integration of different types of networks (i.e., data, 
voice, and multimedia/video) in the recent telecommunication business. The key driver behind 
integration is the reduction of the capital equipment costs by avoiding multiple overlay networks 
and reducing inherent Administration, Operation, Maintenance and Provisioning (OAM&P) costs. 
However, as transport networks grow in geographical size, connectivity, and capacity, it becomes 
increasingly impossible to manage them with any degree of reliability or cost effectiveness. Hence, 
logical decomposition of the whole network into smaller networks in order to simplify its AOM&P 
has been adopted. 
2.1.1 Geographical Hierarchy of Transpor t Networks 
Based on their geographical scope, transport networks can be divided into three categories: access 
(spanning about 1 to 10 km) metropolitan (covering about 10 to 100 km), and long-haul (extending 
to 1000s km). These categories are illustrated in the three-level hierarchy in Figure 2.1 (adapted 
from [Sum05]). 
The access network is the portion of the network that connects end-users (customers) to the 
edge switching elements in the transport network. Residential cable networks, cellular networks, 
Gigabit Ethernet networks, Corporate LANs, and regional ISPs are some typical access networks. 
The Metropolitan Network (MAN) is the portion of the transport network that interconnects central 
offices (COs) within suburban or urban areas. MANs are typically the networks that collect the traffic 
from the access networks and route it onto the long-haul transport network. Inter-metropolitan 
connections also exist in order to perform local traffic routing. The long-haul core transport network 
provides connections between metro networks through regional and international gateways. 
2.1.2 Layered Architectural Model 
The demand for high bandwidth in transport networks increases from the access networks to the 
long-haul networks. This hierarchical organization and the ever-increasing demand for high band-
width have shaped different technological aspects of transport networks. Another useful network 
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Figure 2.1: Hierarchical Transport Networks 
classification is illustrated by the three-layered model in Figure 2.2. At the top of this hierarchical 
model is the service layer where the different applications and services such as voice, video, and data 
are offered. The intermediate layer is the service infrastructure layer where routing, multiplexing and 
switching of upper layer services are performed. This layer includes Internet Protocol (IP) routers, 
Ethernet switches, and Time Division Multiplexing (TDM) facilities. At the bottom of the hierarchy 
is the transport layer which constitutes a hierarchy of transport sub-layers on top of a physical layer 
e.g., WDM-based Optical Transport Network (OTN). In this layer, multiplexing of finer granularity 
services is performed in order to optimize the transport capacity of the optical layer. 
In this hierarchical architecture, each sub-layer is characterized by the granularity at which the 
bandwidth is managed. With the introduction of several high bandwidth services and the integration 
of multiple data and multimedia networks onto a single transport infrastructure, the multiplexing 
and switching facilities have greatly evolved over the time in order to meet the increasing demands of 
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Figure 2.2: Transport Infrastructure Layers 
high bandwidth. The 1.5Mb/s sub-layer was introduced in order to ease bandwidth management and 
meet the needs of elementary services in terms of bandwidth. Similarly, higher bandwidth services 
were introduced and the fiber optics technology made it possible to carry signals at 51.84Mb/s 
(SONET STS-1). Multiple SONET STS-1 signals are multiplexed together to form higher rate 
SONET signals, giving a SONET hierarchy rate. In Figure (2.2) three STS-1 are multiplexed to 
form an STS-3 of 155.52 Mb/s. The optical instance of a general STS-N signal is called the Optical 
Carrier level-N, or OC-N. However, the rapid growth of the service and service-infrastructure layers 
have urged the development of new transport standards. Moreover, IP and ATM switch vendors 
are already introducing switching solutions at several Gb/s to Tb/s [KCY+03], and the capacity 
of the new Ethernet standard has reached the threshold of lOOGb/s [D'A09]. Furthermore, some 
specific users may require to directly access the optical layer as illustrated in Figure (2.2). Such 
a capability is desirable in some situations to transfer large and steady streams of protocol and 
format-independent data. The WDM layer complements the transport hierarchy by providing coarse 
granularity bandwidth (wavelengths) management to the finer granularity sub-layers. A wavelength 
in the WDM layer is not constrained by a fixed-rate, or multiplexing protocol; it can carry any 
14 
protocol, such as SONET, IP, and Ethernet, and any bit-rate, such as, 155.5Mbs, 1.25Gb/s and 
40Gb/s. Furthermore, the protocol and the bit-rate of the streams carried on a given wavelength 
can be adapted dynamically without changing much the transport infrastructure. 
In order to provide more efficient use of the transport capacity in the WDM layer by the upper 
layers, the ITU has recently developed a new hierarchical transport paradigm, called the Optical 
Transport Network (OTN) [Uni03, UniOl]. The hierarchy and formats are defined in the ITU 
standard G.709 where the basic frame is called an Optical channel Transport Unit (OTU). The bit 
rate of the OTU hierarchy is slightly higher than the ones of the classical SONET/SDH, the basic 
OTU1 offers a rate of 2.67 Gb/s, and the OTU2 and OTU3 offer 10.71 and 43.02 Gb/s, respectively. 
Compared to SONET/SDH, OTN provides efficient and flexible switching and multiplexing of high-
bandwidth services and stronger forward error correction (FEC) capabilities. It is envisioned as a 
step forwards network convergence, where operators can support a large portfolio of services with a 
single technology rather than multiple overlapping networks. Furthermore, OTN can greatly improve 
the network survivability by reducing the number of opto-electrical devices, which constitute a major 
source of equipment failures. 
2.2 Optical Switches 
An optical switch is a device that enables signals in optical fibers to be selectively shifted from 
one circuit to another. It is composed of an Optical Line Terminal (OLT), which is formed of 
transponders, wavelength multiplexers, and optionally, optical amplifiers, and a switching matrix, 
also known as an Optical Cross Connect (OXC) or switch fabric. The main function of an optical 
switch is to map input/output channels in order to enable optical circuits (see Figure 2.3) through 
the switch. The established circuit at all the switch nodes from the source to the destination of a 
communication is known as a lightpath [CFZ96]. 
Figure 2.3 shows different types of optical switches, i.e.. different OXC and configurations for 
interconnecting OXCs with OLTs in a switching node. The switch fabric where the input/output 
ports are mapped is the heart of the optical switch. There is a broad class of optical switches, 
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and they are usually named after the operating domain of their switch fabric and OLTs. However, 
contrary to what the name "optical switch" may let suppose, these switches do not necessarily have 
a switch fabric that operates on optical signals. Rather, the term optical switch refers to the switch 
where the ports operate on the granularity of a wavelength or waveband (group of wavelengths). 
Based on the domain of operation of their interconnected components, optical switches can be 
divided into three categories: O-E-0 switches, transparent switches, and translucent switches. 
(a) O-E-O Switch: Electrical Switching Core 
(b) O-E-O Switch Optical Switching Core Surrounded by 
O-E-O Converters 
(c) O-E-O Switch- Optical Switching Core Directly Con-
nected to Transpondeis in WDM Equipment 
Optical 
Switch Fabric 
(d) Transparent Switch 
(e) Translucent Switch 
Figure 2.3: Optical Switch Architectures 
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2.2.1 O-E-O Switches 
An optical switch based on O-E-O, also known as opaque switch, is shown in Figures 2.3-(a)(b)(c). 
These three architectures are all opaque architectures, i.e., optical signals are converted into the elec-
trical domain as they pass through the switching node. In these three configurations, the OXC can 
be either electrical or optical, i.e., signals are either switched in the electrical domain or the optical 
domain. The electrical OXC of Figure 2.3-(a) provides some functionalities that are not available 
in the optical OXC of Figures 2.3-(b)(c), such as, grooming of low fine granularity wavelengths and 
Time Division Multiplexing (TDM) of different speed streams. 
An optical switch is considered as an O-E-O device if the optical signals passing through undergo 
optical-electrical conversion, i.e., one of its component is equipped with converters and transpon-
ders, either its OLTs, or OXC. There are some advantages inherent to the switching technique in 
the O-E-O architecture. First, converting the optical signal to the electrical domain and back to 
the optical domain helps in regenerating the signal. Optical signals experience degradation as they 
are transmitted along a fiber. By regenerating the signal through electrical conversion, the O-E-O 
technique enables re-amplification, re-shaping, and re-timing (3R) of the optical signal. Second, it 
improves the performance monitoring of the signal, by allowing efficient error correction and accu-
rate failure location. Third, O-E-O provides flexible wavelength allocation by allowing wavelength 
conversion at the switching nodes. Wavelength continuity, which is the constraint that imposes to 
the output wavelength of a signal to match its input wavelength, is a challenging issue in optical 
switching networks. The problem of provisioning connections with wavelength continuity and lim-
ited wavelength conversion constraints is a challenging issue that has attracted many researchers 
[ZJMOO, BM96]. In the O-E-O architecture, optical switches electrically process and switch the 
received lightpaths, thus wavelength conversion is implicitly enabled. Furthermore, traffic grooming 
and traffic engineering are among other functionalities that are enabled in the O-E-O architecture. 
However, because every wavelength is terminated at every switching node poses serious problems 
of scalability, maintenance, and reliability. Indeed, as capacity grows, such an architecture could 
potentially require hundreds of transponders at each node. Which implies larger spaces at the site 
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housing the equipment, and more power to operate the electrical equipment and dissipating the heat 
created by them. In addition, capacity upgrade is a costly operation that usually requires updating 
of many facilities. For example, an interface that supports a lOGb/s typically does not also support 
a 40Gb/s signal. Furthermore, all the equipment required in the O-E-O architecture is potentially 
prone to failures. This increase the network vulnerability, though, decrease its reliability. 
2.2.2 Transparent Switches 
The term transparent switch (also called photonic or all-optical switch) refers to an optical switch 
where the switch fabric operates on optical signals and the incoming optical lightpaths do not 
undergo optical-electrical-optical conversions. Figure 2.3-(d) illustrates an example of a photonic 
switch that is used to switch optical signals in the optical domain. 
In this architecture, the interfaces of the switch fabric are removed as the signals are optically 
switched. Only a couple of technologies used in the fabrication of photonic switches have appeared in 
deployed optical networks. The leading technology is based on 3D Micro-ElectroMechanical Systems 
(MEMS). 3D MEMS uses control mechanisms to dynamically tilt mirrors in multiple directions (3D) 
Due to their physical properties, i.e., low loss, cross-talk, polarization effect, power consumption 
• • • (see Table 2.1), MEMS is currently holding the promise of providing and managing all-optical 
switches that support a large number of optical lightpaths without converting them to electrical 
and back to optical again [MK03]. This is especially attractive in transport networks where a high 
(( 
percentage of traffic is expected to pass through different switch nodes to its destination. 
i 
The benefits of all-optical includes deployment and operating costs. The deployment and opera-
tional costs, also known, as CAPital Expenditure (CAPEX) and OPerational Expenditure (OPEX) 
are the two budgets that all network operators want to minimize through deployment of all-optical 
architectures. Photonic switches are bit-rate and protocol independent, ie., they can support dif-
ferent wavelengths and transport protocols These features have improved the flexibility of optical 
networks by allowing wavelength service allocation without the intervention of a human operator 
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Table 2.1: Optical Switches: Photonic Fabrics 
different physical impairments, all-optical switching fabrics induce power losses ranging from 5 to 
15 decibels (dB), depending on the technology used to implement the switching function, the size of 
the fabric, and the architecture of the switch [RSS09]. At this time, engineering of an optical system 
that can handle all the network impairments and provide end-to-end lightpaths with a guaranteed 
r 
quality is a very challenging issue. 
2.2.3 Translucent Switches 
Figure 2.3-(e) illustrates a translucent optical switch where an O-E-O and transparent fabrics are 
combined together to form a translucent optical switch. These two architectures can be used to 
mutually offset their disadvantages in terms of scalability and flexibilhYy. By combining both the O-
E-0 and photonic fabrics in building switching nodes, operators can extend the optical signal reach 
limitation, and minimize the CAPEX and OPEX related to electronics. The translucent architecture 
brings another degree of flexibility to modern transport networks by allowing both bandwidth-based 
services through O-E-O switching fabrics and bandwidth-based services through photonic switching 
fabrics. Together the two switching architectures will provide scalability, manageability, and higher 
flexibility in bandwidth allocation. 
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2.3 Optical Control Planes 
In Figure 2.2, we present a hierarchical optical network from the point of view of services and 
infrastructures. The focus in this figure, is on the optical transport layer and on the transport in 
the logical layers (e.g., IP, MPLS). In addition to these transport planes, in optical networks, we can 
distinguish two other planes: control and management planes. In an optical transport network, the 
transport plane deals with the physical transport of traffic, the control plane provides the intelligence 
required in the provisioning of connections and their maintenance, and the management plane deals 
with performance monitoring, failure, security, and accounting management [BRS03]. 
The current development in optical network control/management has been motivated by the 
need for unified procedures to coordinate the multivendors equipment. Therefore, an optical switch 
is very often equipped with a controller in order to coordinate its actions with other switching 
nodes. To achieve an interoperability among the multivendor equipment, the following facilities are 
required: 
* • A routing protocol for topology and resource discovery, route computation, and state informa-
tion maintenance. 
• A signaling protocol to set up, maintain, and tear down connections, 
• A signaling network that will support the signaling protocol. 
There are three interaction-models between the logical layers (e.g., IP) and the optical layer 
elements that are responsible of providing end-to-end connectivity. These models are the overlay, 
peer, and hybrid ones (see [RPS+00] for further readings). These interaction models are different 
from each other in the way that the routing and state information are shared between the two layers. 
However, another interaction model is the one between the control entities in the control plane. A 
standardized method to routing and signaling is an important for automated service provisioning, 
interoperability, and scalability. In IP networks, a standardized control plane, based on MPLS, has 
already been widely used, and a Generalized version of MPLS for optical networks that include 
advanced mechanisms for resource advertisement, signaling, and routing is also available. 
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2.3.1 Control Plane Architecture 
Management and control of large networks are not easy tasks, and decomposition of the entire domain 
into smaller administrative domains is usually performed in order to simplify their administration. 
Figure 2.4 shows an optical network divided into two control domains, each with its control layer 
and interfaces (adapted from [SRB03]). The User-Network Interface (UNI) is the control interface 
between a node in the optical network and a node in the client network. Network-Network Interface 
(NNI) is the interface between two control nodes belonging either to the same (Interior) control 
domain (I-NNI) or different (Exterior) control domains (E-NNI). The control plane connectivity 
is not necessarily the same as the optical transport plane, i.e., switching nodes that are physical 
adjacent in an optical network are not necessarily adjacent in the control network. Furthermore, not 
all optical transport nodes are equipped with a control node, and not all control nodes can make 
decisions. For example, in a centralized control architecture, a single control node makes decisions 
and dictates "them to other switching nodes. 
Figure 2.4: Control Plane Architecture 
In the control plane, when a request for a connection is received at a given network node, the 
local routing agent will check its routing databases to find out about the availability of resources 
before initiating the connection. Keeping track of the availability of resources (either local or global) 
is performed through exchange of routing information (e.g., availability) between the control agents. 
Once the availability of resources is verified, a standard signaling protocol is used to establish the 
computed end-to-end path in the network. The MPLS and GMPLS are two standards that have 
been widely used for network control. 
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2.3.2 Multi Protocol Label Switching 
MPLS was originally developed for connectionless IP in order to support connection-oriented commu-
nications in packet-switched networks. However, as its name implies, it can operate in conjunction 
with different other protocols. It is used to provide automated provisioning, and to address the 
issues of scalability, QoS, and traffic engineering in IP networks. MPLS simplifies provisioning by 
introducing new scalable switching mechanisms, which enabled multiple features such as Virtual 
Private Network (VPN) and multicasting. 
As opposed to IP networks where routing is performed through a heavy header processing, MPLS 
routing is performed through label swapping (replacing) at every router. To initiate an MPLS 
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session, traffic entering an MPLS network is first encapsulated in special labels at the first MPLS 
node (switching nodes in MPLS are also known Label Switching Router (LSR)) in the network. 
A sequence of labels, appended and swapped to and from a packet at each LSR from its source 
to destination define a Label Switched Path (LSP). The assignment of packets to LSPs is based 
on the concept of Forwarding Equivalence Class (FEC), which is a set of packets that share, for 
example, the same destination or QoS requirements. The establishment of LSPs is performed by 
exchanging information among the LSRs by using a label distribution protocol. An example of label 
distribution protocol used in MPLS is the Label Distribution Protocol (LDP), which assigns labels 
to LSPs based o,n the destination address of the flow. An extended version supporting QoS and 
Class-of-Service (CoS) features is the Constraint-based Routing Label Distribution Protocol (CR-
LDP). The Resource Reservation Protocol with Traffic Engineering extension (RSVP-TE), which is 
an extension of the RSVP protocol in IP networks, has been adopted in MPLS in order to guarantee 
QoS requirements and to meet the traffic engineering objectives. 
2.3.3 Generalized Multi Protocol Label Switching 
GMPLS has extended the control plane in MPLS to support wavelength routed optical networks as 
well as many other types of networks [FB06]. In addition to some specific packet-switching protocols 
(e.g.. packets in IP, cells in ATM) supported in MPLS. GMPLS supports labels adapted to arbitrary 
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technologies in the physical layer. For example, labels can be associated with time slots in TDM 
and SONET/SDH, with wavelengths and wavebands in wavelength/waveband switching networks, 
and with ports in fiber routing (space) networks. Such an extension makes it possible to manage 
network elements, provision connections with automated protection and restoration across network 
boundaries, and support traffic engineering. In the migration process from MPLS to GMPLS, the 
control plane has been dissociated from the data plane in GMPLS, and the signaling, routing, and 
label distribution protocols in MPLS have been extended to support dynamic routing of protec-
tion/restoration capabilities in mesh networks, and link management has been added in GMPLS as 
a new management feature. GMPLS has three main components. 
Link Management in GMPLS 
GMPLS supports link management, a new function, which includes neighbor discovery and manage-
ment of signaling mechanisms for provisioning and fault recovery. Automated neighbor discovery 
is important for acquiring the topology and other state information needed for signaling and provi-
sioning of connections. In addition, any change in the network topology or resource availability can 
be quickly advertised to all routing nodes in the network. This, in turn, guarantees that connections 
will be efficiently provisioned with up-to-date state information. Link Management Protocol (LMP) 
is the mean used for implementing the neighbor discovery functions in GMPLS. The control network 
can be set up in-band (e.g.. using the SONET overhead bytes) or out-of-band in transparent net-
works through a dedicated control wavelength. In order to manage the number of advertised control 
messages in the network, GMPLS uses a summarization technique known as "link bundling". In link 
bundling, all links having the same routing properties are grouped in a single logical group called a 
"bundle"' or "traffic engineering" (TE) link. 
Routing in GMPLS 
The routing algorithms initially used in IP networks are currently used in GMPLS. However, some 
new extensions and considerations have been added in optical networks. Among the most impor-
tant considerations, there is failure-protection and link properties. The routing process in GMPLS 
23 
has been extended to include the concept of Shared Risk Link Group (SRLG) in the network; and 
several link properties are included, e.g., transmission impairments, wavelength conversion avail-
ability, switch cross-talk. Such extensions have made routing more complex in GMPLS than in IP 
and MPLS networks, i.e., involves more routing information, and complex routing strategies. These 
aspects of routing in GMPLS are still under exploration. 
Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) has many attractive features, which make it the most used 
routing protocol as an Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP). Some problems have been addressed in 
GMPLS to extend it to include routing in optical networks using an enhanced version of OSPF 
with Traffic Engineering (OSPF-TE). Though, link bundling has been proposed to minimize the 
number and size of exchanged Link State Advertisement (LSA), specific optical network routing 
information (number of wavelengths, channels) and protection (SRLG, link protection type) are 
added, and routing information related to transparent optical networks, e.g., wavelength continuity, 
signal quality are also advertised. 
Signaling in GMPLS 
GMPLS signaling involves establishment, maintenance, and releasing of service connections [Ber03a] 
in optical networks. Current GMPLS implementations are typically based on RSVP-TE. In GMPLS, 
the Path and Resv messages used in MPLS are still used in provisioning connections. Figure 2.5 
shows a typical connection provisioning session in MPLS (used also in GMPLS). A source node 
of a connection issues a path message to the destination to indicate the traffic requirements of 
the communication session. The intermediate routers that process the message create a path state 
(including information about the sender, traffic characteristics, QoS, identity of the previous hop) 
for the session, and forward the message to the next hop. At the destination node, a Resv message 
is sent back to the previous node along the path message in order to reserve the required resources. 
Each intermediate node on the reverse path also reserves the resources and forward the Resv message 
to its reverse node. After the reservation is completed, the data starts to flow on the established 
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Figure 2.5: Path and Resv Message flows in RSVP 
Optical networks can accommodate a variety of multiplexing and switching technologies, e.g., 
SONET/SDH, wavelength and waveband. To support those different technologies, new label formats 
and requests are added in RSVP-TE (see [ASBB+01] for further reading). GMPLS signaling in 
protection capacity networks is reviewed in Section 3.2.1 with an illustrative example of the signaling 
process. 
2.4 Engineering of Optical Fiber Systems 
The problem of engineering a WDM transmission system involves several physical components, 
different design constraints, and a variety of variables in the objective function. Figure 2.6 shows 
a diagram of the main components of a unidirectional WDM link. Therein, the transmitter is 
composed of a set of lasers emitting WDM signals on each wavelength. The different WDM signals 
are combined by a multiplexer onto a single WDM link (fiber). An optical amplifier is usually used 
to boost the signal transmission power. Depending on the distance, the multiplexed optical channels 
may be amplified by an in-line amplifier. Usually, at each power amplification, the amplified signals 
. are passed through a dispersion-compensating module. At the receiver end, the optical signals are 
usually re-amplified before they are de-multiplexed and passed each to a separate photodetector 
receiver. 
As an input, fiber designeis dispose of a set of optical components such as transmitters, fibers, 
receivers, amplifiers ... each characterized by a set of different parameters and by their costs; and 
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Figure 2.6: Point-to-Point WDM Link 
should meet a limited budget (low cost), guarantees a minimum QoS (e.g., bit error rate less than 
10~12); and a minimum level of reliability (e.g., should operate without interruption for at least 
3 years). However, whatever the complexity of the engineered system, the involved variables are 
resumed as follows [Hec98]. 
• Light source output power 
• Coupling losses 
• Spectral linewidth of the light source 
• Type of fiber (single or multimode) 
• Fiber attenuation and dispersion 
• Fiber core diameter 
• Operating wavelength 
o Optical amplifiers 
• Switching requirements 
• Receiver sensitivity 
• Number of couplers, connectors, and splices 
• Wa^ elength spacing and number of wavelengths. 
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2.4.1 Power Budget ing 
Designer of optical physical layers must consider the effect of a number of system impairments. A 
design of an optical communication system requires a careful budgeting of the power for the different 
impairments in the system. In power budgeting, a designer will deal with the needed power budget 
in order to cover all optical transmission losses and convey the optical signal to its destination with 
the required bit error rate . T h e simplest form of the power budget can be writ ten as follows [Hec98]: 
Powerrx — Poweriost + Power-Gam amplifiers = Power Sensitivitynx + Power SafetyJAargm 
where the power unit is decibels or any other related unit such as dBm. 
PowerTx'- Transmit ter power used in launching the optical signal. 
Poweriost\ All losses in the system, e.g., fiber loss, coupling loss, connector loss, • •. 
Power-Gamamphfiers'. Power gain of the used amplifiers. 
Power Sensitivity RX: Power sensitivity of the receiver. Below this level, the signal may not 
be readable, or meet the minimum bit error ra te . 
Power Safety-Margin: Power margin which is used in compensation for signal fluctuation 
and repair. It is used to avoid tha t the power signal fall below the receiver sensitivity. 
These characteristics of optical components and their related impairments are covered below. 
Optica l T r a n s m i t t e r s 
The key design parameters related to an optical t ransmit ter is its output power. T\Tpical lasers send 
out about lmW to 10mW7 of power. Typically, some power amplifiers are used' to boost the power 
level of the signals, this typically can be up to 50 mW. Laser sources are physically limited by their 
peak transmission power. However, this is not the only limiting factor, bu t other impairments due 
to nonlinear effects in fibers also set a limit on the peak power of t ransmit ters . 
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Optical Receivers 
The key parameters of an optical receiver are its sensitivity and overload parameter. The sensitivity 
is the average power required to achieve a certain bit error rate at a given transmission rate. The 
overload parameter is the maximum input power a receiver can support. A typical sensitivity and 
overload parameter of an avalanche photodetector (APD) receiver operating at 1.55/xm and 1 Gb/s 
are -24 dBm and -6dBm, respectively [RSS09]. On the receiver side, there are different trade-offs 
among received power, signal rate, and bit error rate. As data rate increases, the receiver will need 
more input power to support the specified bit error rate. However, an increase in power is not always 
the solution to keep the bit error rate low, too much power can overload the receiver and lead to 
high error rate too. 
Optical Amplifiers 
Amplifiers are essential components in optical transmission systems to compensate for the different 
system losses by boosting the signal power. The most widely used is the Erbium-Doped Fiber 
Amplifier (EDFA) operating in the C—band. The advantage of EDFAs is that they are capable of 
amplifying many channels, e.g., parallel WDM channels. However, an amplifier like other active 
components is not a perfect device. There are some imperfections optical network designers should 
consider when using amplifiers. In addition to providing power gain, amplifiers introduce noise 
too. Furthermore, for high input power, amplifiers tend to saturate and their gain drops. Other 
limitations include uneven amplification over the entire passe-band. Thus, some specific wavelengths 
see more gain than others. 
Optical Fibers 
There are two categories of optical fibers: single-mode and multi-mode fibers. Single-mode fibers 
are manufactured with a small core size, approximately 8 to 10 jam in diameter. Multi-mode fibers 
are manufactured with a core size of 50 to 62.5 pm in diameter. This standard is important for 
interoperability among different industrials. The key optical performance parameters for fibers are 
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attenuation and dispersion. 
Attenuation is the reduction of the signal strength over the length of the fiber, and it is measured 
in decibels per kilometer (dB/km). Optical fiber offers superior interference immunity to signal, e.g., 
a typical value of 0.35 dB/km at 1300 nm for standard single-mode fiber over other transmission 
media. This enables signal transmission over longer distances while reducing the signal regeneration 
and amplification. This, in turn, helps in reducing the engineering cost and improving the signal 
quality. Attenuation is caused by several factors, but mainly by scattering and absorption. The 
scattering of light is due to molecular irregularities (compositional fluctuations) in the glass structure. 
Light absorbed is another attenuation factor caused by residual materials composing the fiber, such 
as metals or water ions. 
Dispersion is the time distortion of an optical signal which typically resulting in pulse broadening. 
In a digital transmission, dispersion limits the maximum data rate, the maximum distance, or the 
information-carrying capacity of a fiber link. Chromatic dispersion, which is the most common 
dispersion, occurs because the refractive index of the fiber is different for all wavelengths. Thus, 
different wavelengths of the same mode may travel at different speeds, and thereby may cause pulse 
spreading. 
2.4.2 Fiber Optics Impairments and WDM Systems 
Fiber dispersion and attenuation are more complex issues when the fiber transmits signals of different 
wavelengths. Because, their effects vary with the transmitted wavelengths, i.e., although they share 
the same fiber, they will not necessarily experience the same attenuation and dispersion. 
Fiber attenuation varies significantly across the usable waveband from 1280 to 1650 nm. At-
tenuation is about 0.35db/km in the 1310-nm compared to the minimum near 0.2 bB/km in the 
EDFA. This difference in wavelength attenuation has an impact on WDM systems operating on the 
entire light-band range. Light dispersion depends also on the used wavelengths, and engineering of 
dispersion compensating mechanisms should take into consideration the whole used light-band with 
their different wavelength dispersions. 
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Nonlinear effects are proportional to the power density of the signals transmitted in a fiber and 
to the length of the fiber. Long-haul WDM networks are the most affected networks by these effects, 
because the power density increases with the number of wavelengths. 
2.4.3 Inter-Channel Spacing in WDM Systems 
Inter-channel spacing is a WDM design choice that needs a careful engineering. The transmission 
capacity of a WDM system depends on the number of usable wavelengths, their capacity, and 
spacing between them. The number of available wavelengths-depends on the available amplifiers in 
the systems, while their spacing greatly on their capacity. We know that the spectral bandwidth of 
optical channels increases with the data rate it carries. Though, high-speed signals cannot be packed 
as tight as low-speed signals. However, and in order to take advantage of the optical amplifiers used 
in the system, optical channels should be within the pass-band of the amplifiers. For example, the 
C-band EDFA amplifiers are typically from 1530 to 1565 nm. 
2.4.4 Photonics Networking 
The different aspects of optical system design discussed above apply for point-to-point links as well 
as photonic networks. However, designing a photonics network is more challenging than a point-to-
point link for the following reasons [RSS09]: 
© Since photonic lightpaths traverse multiple links and nodes, their optical reach is longer than 
the reach of a point-to-point link. Thus, end-to-end lightpath engineering involves more con-
straints than a point-to-point link, such as, losses, and dispersions, which are not reset at each 
node as in point-to-point link systems. 
• The variation of signal power and signal-to-noise ratios among different lightpaths traveling 
through different numbers of nodes and having different lightpath lengths is a new challenging 
issue in photonic networks. 
• Rapid and dynamic equalization of the amplifier gains will be needed to compensate for fluc-
tuation in optical power as lightpaths are taken down or set up, or in the event of a network 
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failure. This issue needs to be considered more carefully because it is the key to any dynamic 
provisioning of working or protection capacity strategy. 
2.4.5 Discussions 
As seen in this section, in order to set up a single point-to-point link, one needs to carefully engineer 
a system that involves several components and parameters. In today's optical networks, establishing 
a single optical link is not a trivial task, and it is largely a manual process. There are so many im-
pairments that need to be set to an appropriate level for a communication before the communication 
starts. 
In the literature, and in order to simplify network design, the tendency is to abstract all those 
imperfections related to the optical fiber system. The general assumption is that the WDM trans-
mission system can automatically support hundreds of wavelengths, and dial-up end-to-end optical 
paths by simply concatenating optical links (all optical) on the fly to form working and protection 
paths However, with the current state-of-the-art of optical fiber and switching, it is not realistic to 
assume that on-the-fly concatenation of optical links by cross connecting them at optical OXC will 
result in reliable optical paths that can be used to carry data with the required QoS requirements 
(e.g., 1 0 - 1 2 bit error rate). Indeed, without relying on O-E-O conversion at switching nodes, it is a 
difficult problem to connect optical channels with the firm guarantee of immediate quality in WDM 
networks. 
This is why in this thesis, we support pre-configuration and fully pre-cross connection of protec-
tion capacity in order to provide reliable backup paths and fast service recovery in WDM networks. 
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C H A P T E R 3 
Background on Optical Network 
Survivability 
Communication services are taking a paramount place in our social and business daily lives. Our 
dependence on them has been accentuated by the increasing number of domains where they have 
been introduced and taking an important role. For example, telephone services serve as a distance 
transcendent communication and their interruption, even temporary, can cause a social turmoil and 
business losses. Indeed, in some businesses, disruption of a communication service can suspend 
critical operations. This in turn, can lead to significant revenue losses for the customer, which 
are reclaimed from the service provider. Guaranteed availability is one of the important clauses of 
Service Level Agreements (SLAs) between customers and service providers. An SLA can include 
stringent constraints regarding different service requirements, and include compensations if they are 
not met. Though, service interruption is detrimental to both customers and service providers. 
Several communication services are supported through different telecommunication network fa-
cilities whose reliability is necessary in order to provide reliable services. Communication networks 
are prone to a wide variety of failures, usually caused by natural disasters (earthquakes, fires, and 
floods) [Bal96]. software bugs [Gry04], and human errors [Kuh97]. Though, survivability against 
failures is an important feature in many telecommunication networks, but it is a critical issue in 
high-bandwidth WDM optical networks. Because a large number of high-capacity channels are mul-
tiplexed on a single fiber optic and the number of customers that can be affected by a failure is 
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extremely high. 
There are a variety of recover}^ mechanisms used in building protection schemes in survivable 
optical networks. The main differences between those mechanisms are the required amount of 
spare capacity and equipment, the recovery speed, the operational complexity, and the number 
of simultaneous failures that can be recovered. It is common to use a combination of protection 
mechanisms in order to provide protection with different guarantees, and effectively accommodate as 
many customers as possible. For example, some demands may have stringent requirements regarding 
the recovery delay (e.g., less than 50ms), and others high service availability (e.g., 99.999%, or less 
than 5 minutes/year of unavailability). 
In this chapter, we briefly review the state of the art in survivability in optical networks by first 
introducing some vocabulary and concepts. Next, we review existing survivability mechanisms in 
optical WDM networks. A particular attention is attached to recovery mechanisms, which provide 
differentiated quality-of-recovery and quality-of-protection. 
3.1 Basic Concepts 
3.1.1 Optical Network Failures 
Fiber cuts are considered to be the most common failures in fiber-optic networks. One of the reasons 
why underground fibers are susceptible to failure is due to the fact that they are buried in the 
same public right-of-ways as other transport utilities (water and gas pipes, television cables). This 
increases working activities (digging, construction work) around the fibers and their susceptibility 
to failure. Typically, and not a long time ago, a cable cut happened every 50 to 200 days per 1000 
km of cable [MCL+03, BDH+00, WAPD01]. In addition to cable cuts, switching node failures are 
not unusual and can be moie harmful than fiber link failures. Because a node failure can involve 
more fiber links, though, carry more traffic than a fiber link (see [MCL+03, WAPD01] for typical 
failure frequency of SONET DXC, WDM OXC. and (O)ADM node equipment). 
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3.1.2 Reliability and Availability 
Reliability of a network element (e.g., a link, a node) is defined as the probability that it will be 
found fully operational during a certain time frame [ITR94]. Though, the reliability of a component 
accounts for the time that it will take to fail while it is operating, and does not reflect how long 
it will take to get the component under repair back into working condition. Reliability of network-
components are usually estimated by their manufacturer based on experiments. Availability is the 
instantaneous part of reliability, i.e., the probability that a system is operating properly when it is 
requested for use at a given time. Though, the availability of a given system is equal to the probability 
that the system is not failed or undergoing a repair action. In other words, the percentage of time 
the system is operational. It is usually noted A, and defined as follows [Col87]: 
Up — Time 
Up — Time -h Down — Time 
_ MTBF 
~ MTBF + MTTR 
where 
MTBF: Mean Time Between two Failures. 
MTTR: Mean Time To Repair. 
The MTTR is a generic term, and it includes all the time intervals during which the service is 
not available including the restoration time. Typical MTBF and MTTR values in optical networks 
can be found in [MCL+03, BDH+00, WAPD01, JM98]. 
3.1.3 Shared Risk Group 
A shared risk group is a set of components (e.g., fiber links, switching nodes) that share the same 
risk of failures- This concept is closely related to the concept of routing diversitv. Two lightpaths, 
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routed through a set of nodes and links, are said node/link disjoint if they do not share any common 
node/link. However, to insure that there is no shared risk group of failures, the lightpaths have to 
be not only routed through different fibers, but also through different underlying ducts. An example 
of Shared Risk Link Groups (SRLGs) created by routing different fiber links through shared ducts 
are illustrated in Figure 3.1. Links 1 — 4 and 1 — 2 share a routing tunnel along a portion of their 
length, though the shared risk link group SRLG\. Another SRLG2 appears at the bottom of the 
figure which includes links 1—4 and 3 — 4. 
1 SRLGi 2 
Figure 3.1: Shared Risk Link Group 
In Figure 3.1, the physical routing of some optical links differs from their logical routing coun-
terparts. Physical routing of links is usually dictated by different external constraints, e g., sharing 
existing pipelines in cities or minimizing design costs. 
3.1.4 Capacity Redundancy 
Before defining the capacity redundancy, we need to define its two associated capacities: Working 
and spare capacity. Working capacity is defined as the bandwidth used to carry traffic in the nominal 
situation, i.e., no failure. Spare capacity is the bandwidth reserved for recovery in case of a failure. 
The spare capacity redundancy, which is the inverse of capacity efficient, is defined by the ratio of 
the whole spare capacit}' over the whole working capacity. The required amount of spare capacity m 
order to provide protection m case of a failure is an important parameter in the design of effective 
recovery schemes. 
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3.2 Recovery Mechanisms in Optical Networks 
As to limit the interruption time of communication services, most modern telecommunication oper-
ators use so-called recovery mechanisms. These mechanisms are used in case of a network failure to 
divert the affected optical lightpaths to protection paths (failure disjoint) in the network. 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the basic principle of the recovery process under single-link failure scenario. 
The working path (also known as primary path) and the recovery paths (also known as secondary 
or backup path) are node and link disjoint, i.e , they do not share any link or node Though, no 
single link or node failure in the network, except nodes S and D, can affect both of them. Under 
Figure 3.2: Principe of Recovery Scheme 
normal conditions (i.e., no failure), traffic from S to D is carried along the working path In case of 
a failure, e.g., link failure as illustrated in Figure 3.2, the recovery scheme activates the protection 
path and then switches the traffic onto the protection path. 
r 
The recovery process m Figure 3.2 is a generic scheme. Different aspects and functionalities 
characterize a recovery scheme, e.g., the protected and protection entities, the recovery process, and 
the underlying technology. For example, based on the protected entities, e.g., links, segments, or 
paths, three classes of recovery schemes can be formed: link, segment, or, path protection. Each of 
these schemes has its own recovery mechanism and can be managed at the optical layer as well as 
at other upper layers. 
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3.2.1 Recovery Cycle 
Although a variety of recovery schemes exists, they all operate according to the same recovery cycle 
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Figure 3.3: Recovery Cycle 
adjacent nodes of the failed component find out about the failure. This time depends, for example, 
on the signal propagation delay, on the speed of the physical layer in failure monitoring, detection, 
and signaling to the upper layers Once the failure is detected, the node that detected the failure may 
wait for a hold-off time in order, for example, to allow failure recovery coordination among layers. 
For instance, in an IP-over-optical network, a hold-off time may be observed by the IP layer in order 
to give a chance to the optical layer to recover from the failure. After a hold-off time, if the failure 
still exists, the adjacent node to the failure starts sending notification messages to selected nodes that 
will be involved in the recovery process. Next, and during the recovery operation time, the notified 
nodes set up the backup path. This time interval may include routing state information exchange, 
signaling, routing, and management operations. However, these operations are not all necessary if 
the backup path is pre-configured ahead of failures In fully pre-cross connected protection schemes, 
where protection paths are set up ahead of any failure at all involved switching nodes (see Section 
3.5.1), these two last steps are performed ahead of any failure, though not included in the recovery 
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cycle. After the last recovery operation, the traffic starts to use the backup protection path. 
3.2.2 Protection and Recovery Parameters 
Depending on the underlying technology, the targeted availability, the supported users and applica-
tions, and many other considerations, a variety of protection schemes exist to meet different recovery 
requirements. In building protection schemes, a trade-off has to be found among different protection 
parameters including the recovery time, spare capacity requirements, and management and signaling 
complexity. In the next section we elaborate further on those parameters, and on protection schemes 
taking into account those parameters. 
Recovery Time 
As illustrated in Figure 3.3, recovery time is the whole time it takes between a network failure 
appearance and the time the traffic flows on the backup protection path. In addition to providing 
protection, the recovery time is the design objective of several protection schemes. Typically, the 
shorter the recovery delay, the higher is the network availability. In fully pre-configured and pre-
cross connected protection schemes the protection capacity is deployed and pre-cross connected, 
respectively, ahead of any failure. Though, the recovery delay, in case of a failure, resumes to a limited 
signaling and switching of the traffic onto the backup path. On the opposite side, recovery schemes 
based on dynamic restoration involve the longest recovery delay. Indeed, dynamic restoration usually 
includes a link-disjoint path calculation (in path protection), protection capacity establishment, i.e , 
reservation/confirmation, and switching of traffic. 
Backup Capacity Cost 
The required amount of protection capacity (backup capacity budget) to protect against some net-
work failures is an important parameter in the design of effective protection schemes. This param-
eter defines the protection scheme cost. The backup capacity requirement of protection schemes 
may depend on the shape of the protection building blocks, eg., linear paths, rings, trees. In 
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order to minimize the backup capacity requirement to provide a specific protection level, shar-
ing of the protection capacity among disjoint failure working paths is the most used mechanism 
[OZZ+04, THV+08, XXQ03, HM02]. 
Recovery Scope 
One of the characteristics of a recovery scheme is its recovery scope. A recovery scheme can be 
designed to recover from specific failure scenarios, e.g., single, dual, or multiple link or node failures. 
The recovery scope is usually decided based on the targeted availability. A high network availability 
may require recovery mechanisms to recover from a wider range of potential failures. 
State Overhead 
As the protection topology grows (protection paths) and advanced protection capacity sharing mech-
anisms are used, the amount of state information (overhead) required to accurately maintain the 
protection topology (e.g., sharability of protection links among working paths, backup capacity 
availability) also grows. In shared capacity protection schemes, in addition to the availability of the 
protection resources and the working-protection relationship, failure-disjointness of working paths 
is an important information in order to maintain an accurate state information regarding sharing 
of protection capacity. This parameter is used as a criterion to assess the scalability of different 
recovery schemes. 
Signaling Requirements , 
This parameter is related to the recovery delay. Some recovery schemes may require more protec-
tion signaling than others, for instance, in failure notification and recovery, though, involve longer 
recovery times (see Figure 3.3). Recovery schemes involving high signaling require more resources 
(CPU time, bandwidth), and more management overheads. The signaling requirement is another 
criterion used to assess the performance and scalability of recovery schemes. 
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Stability 
Dynamic and reconfigurable recovery schemes involve reconfiguration of the protection topology in 
order to provide protection against different failure scenarios. Though, they are usually more flexible 
and cost effective over static schemes. However, and as seen in Section 2.4, dynamic reconfiguration 
of a lightpath does not necessarily guarantee its integrity, e.g., BER < 10~12, within a specific time 
interval, especially in photonic networks. 
Recovery Classes 
In some recovery schemes, it is possible to provide different guarantees (classes) of recovery for 
different classes of traffic with different recovery requirements [SGZ04] This is a useful feature, 
because not all the users need the same guarantees, and not all are ready to pay for the associated 
prices. Though, recovery differentiation is another important parameter to judge the performance 
of a recovery scheme. 
Protection Classes 
Like recovery classes, providing different protection classes is a feature that enables a single pro-
tection scheme to survive different failure scenarios based on the user and traffic profiles [OM04, 
GS02, XCT03]. For instance, providing an availability equal to 98.99% through a protection scheme 
that guarantees 100% single link failure protection, and an availability equal to 99.99% through a 
protection scheme that guarantees 100% single link and 80% dual link failure protection. Though, 
protection schemes providing different protection classes are suited in order to effectively accommo-
date many types of users and applications. 
3.3 Protection Techniques 
Protection mechanisms can be implemented in the optical layer, or any other logical layer, e g.. 
SONET/SDH, IP, ETHERNET, or MPLS [VPD04]. Any network laver. capable of reconfiguring 
the logical protection topology, for instance, wavelength routed WDM layer. SONET/SDH layer, 
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or IP layer, can provide network protection. Indeed, it is solely required to have a working path 
and a backup path, which should be failure-disjoint, in order to provide protection at any specific 
layer. Upon a failure, a recovery process is initiated to activate the backup path at its associated 
layer. Different layers have different types of technologies, though different switching techniques 
(e.g., SONET/SDH) and switched entities (e g., wavelength). 
The protection technique in the optical layer is usually link-oriented. Examples or link-based pro-
tection schemes include Automatic Protection Switching (APS), Unidirectional Path-Switched Ring 
(UPSR), Bidirectional Line-Switched Ring (BLSR), generalized loop-back networks [MBF+02], p-
cycles [GS98], and pre-configured trails [CCF04a]. These protection schemes involve pre-configuration 
of the backup paths and usually pre-cross connection of switching nodes ahead of failures. 
The protection technique in the logical layer is very often path-oriented and segment-oriented. 
Examples of path and segment protection schemes include Shared Backup Path Protection (SBPP) 
[NBWS04], Shared Backup Segment Protection (SBSP) [XXQ03], and flow p-cycle [GS03]. In these 
protection schemes, failure detection and failure notification are usually performed at the two failure 
adjacent-nodes, but traffic switching at the two end-nodes of the protected entities, i.e., source and 
destination of a working path in SBPP, and upstream and downstream nodes of a working segment 
in SBSP. These schemes have the advantage of spare capacity efficiency over the link protection 
schemes [RSM03]. However, very often, they require longer recover times and more complex recovery 
operations. Indeed, the backup path/segment is not necessary pre-deployed, i.e., it is either pre-
computed, but only reserved after a failure, or reserved but only configured in case of a failure. This 
in turn, will necessitate a signaling process to reserve the backup path/segment, and to set up the 
switches along the backup path/segment. 
Although each of the higher layers may have its own protection and restoration mechanism, it is 
highly attractive to provide protection at the optical layer for the following reasons [GROOa. GROOb, 
GRS98. CLB98]: 
• Speed: Recovery at the optical layer is much faster because the nodes can act quickly upon 
the occurrence of failures and do not wait for upper-layer signaling. 
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• Simplicity: It needs less coordination, less management and signaling overheads than recovery 
at higher layers. This is due to the number of protected entities in the optical and logical 
layers, i.e., a few wavelengths vs. millions of connections. 
• Effectiveness: Protection at the optical layer makes a more efficient use of protection capacity 
because of resource sharing among different service layers. 
• Transparency: The wavelength protection technique is independent of the protocols and ap-
plications used in the higher layers. 
3.3.1 Automatic Protection Switching Technique 
Automatic Protection Switching (APS) is typically used to handle link failures in the optical layer. 
It has three main architectures: 1 + 1, 1 : 1, and 1 : N [Wu92]. Figure 3.4 illustrates these three 
protection architectures. In 1 + 1 APS, each working link is provided protection by a parallel backup 
(a) 1+1 APS (b) 11 APS (c)1NAPS 
Figure 3.4: Automatic Protection Switch 
link. At the source node, the signal is launched on both the working and backup links. The receiver 
at the destination node .compares the two signals and chooses the best one (e g . BER < 10~12). 
With such an architecture, if one link fails, the destination node is still able to receive the signal 
on the other link. In IT APS. the source and destination nodes switch to the protection link only 
when a failure on the working link is detected Under normal operations, the protection link is 
either idle or used to cariv low-prioiity tiaffic In 1 N architecture, N failure disjoint working 
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links share a single protection link However, unlike m l 1 APS, in order to guarantee 100% single 
link protection, the traffic switched to the protection link must be switched back to the working link 
after it is repaired In general, an M N APS protection refers to a scheme m which M protection 
links are shared among TV working links This generic scheme can suivive mm{M, N} simultaneous 
link failures 
3.3.2 Self-Healing Ring Technique 
In a ring network, the working and protection logical topologies are restricted by the physical 
topology of the netwoik The ring protection technique is more flexible than APS because it can 
handle both link and node failures The development of high speed add/drop multiplexing (ADM) 
technology has simplified protection switching and made SHR a \ery attractive approach to provide 
survivability Unidirectional SHR (USHR) and bidirectional SHR (BSHR) are two types of SHRs 
techniques 
Unidirectional Self-Healing Ring (USHR) 
Figure 3 5 (a) shows a USHR architecture In USHR, the logical nng topology carrying normal 
traffic goes around the ring physical topology in one direction In case of a failure, the working 
traffic is switched onto the logical ring topology in the opposite dnection USHR protection can 
(a) USHR (b) Line protection USHR (c) Path protection USHR 
Figure 3 5 Umdnectional Ring Protection Technique 
be performed in two different va}s Line piotection switched USHR and path protection switched 
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USHR. In line switched USHR, as illustrated in 3.5-(b), it is up to the two failure-adjacent nodes to 
switch the affected traffic onto the protection ring. Therein, a failure on a link (two fibers) between, 
e.g., nodes 2 and 3, is recovered from at node 4 by switching the traffic onto the protection fiber, and 
at node 3 by switching the traffic back from the protection to the working fiber. This architecture 
can also survive any node failure. 
Path protection switched USHR is basically a 1 + 1 protection scheme because the optical signals 
are transmitted on both fiber rings. A link failure m this case cannot affect both the working and 
protection fibers. Though, the destination node monitors the two signals and chooses the best. 
As shown in 3.5-(c), the link cut between nodes 2 and 3 will affect all the traffic toward node 3 
on the working ring, but not on the reverse protection ring. Thus, node 3 will choose those signals 
transmitted toward it on the protection ring as the best signals. As no signaling or dynamic switching 
is required, path protection switched USHR is considered the fastest SHR scheme. 
Bidirectional Self-Healing Ring (BSHR) 
Unlike UPSR, in BSHR, working traffic flows in both directions. The typical architectures of BSHR 
are two- and four-fiber line protection BSHR/2 and BSHR/4. In BSHR/2, as shown in Figure 3.6-
1 1 
(a) BSHR/2 (b) BSHR/4 
Figure 3.6: Bidirectional Ring Protection Technique 
(a), half of the total capacity on each ring is reserved for protection. As a line switched approach, 
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when a failure occurs, the two nodes adjacent to the failed component will loop the affected traffic 
using the reserved capacity on both rings. In BSHR/4, as shown in Figure 3.6-(b), two fibers are 
dedicated as working fibers, so the capacity on them can be completely utilized. Upon a failure, the 
nodes adjacent to the affected component will simply switch the affected traffic onto the protection 
fibers. 
The evolution of communication traffic patterns has greatly re-shaped the physical topology of 
modern telecommunication networks, which has led to mesh topologies. Protection in mesh networks 
is usually more complicated than point-to-point APS or ring networks. To re-use the simple and 
easy recovery mechanism of rings in mesh networks, there has been a proposition to directly deploy 
protection rings in mesh networks [SGM93]. In this approach, called ring cover, a set of rings that 
covers every link in the mesh at least once is found. However, the major drawback of this solution 
is its capacity redundancy, i.e., need for a large amount of spare capacity to get 100% protection 
guarantee [EHS00]. 
3.3.3 Mesh-Based Technique 
Mesh topologies using optical cross-connects (OXCs) have started to emerge with the extensive 
deployments of WDM s\ stems. Design of protection schemes in mesh topologies is more challenging 
than in ring topologies, as it involves hard combinatorial problems, especially, when the network 
size and connectivity increase. The most studied protection parameter and failure scenario in the 
design of protection schemes in survivable WDM mesh networks have been protection redundancy 
and single-link failures, respectively. Proposed solutions for efficient use of protection capacity fall 
under two categories: protection and dynamic restoration. Dynamic restoration involves reservation 
of protection capacity only in case of a failure, though, no spare capacity is pre-reserved. However, 
dynamic restoration is usually complex, i.e.. requires up-to-date state information and extensive 
signaling, and its restoration time is much longer than protection. In addition, and as seen in 
Section 2.4. from the engineering point of view, engineering of an end-to-end backup path requires 
a delay befoie it can achieve a specific signal quality (e.g., BER < 10 - 1 2 ) . 
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Protection is by far the most studied resiliency approach in WDM optical mesh networks. In 
order to provide protection against single-link failures, we will present in the next sections the three 
proposed pre-configured protection approaches: Link based protection, path-based protection, and 
segment-based protection. 
Link-Based Protection 
In link-based protection, a backup path is reserved for each working link. In case of a link failure, 
traffic is rerouted around the failure by using a backup path associated to the working link. As an 
example, in Figure 3.7-(a), in case of a link failure between nodes 3 and 4. the affected traffic will be 
rerouted around the backup path 3 — 1—4. Here, nodes 3 and 4, i.e., end-nodes of the failed link, 
1 1 
<$- >- Protection Path 
(a) Dedicated Link Protection (b) Shared Link Protection 
Figure 3.7: Link Protection Scheme 
are responsible for traffic recovery. However, as protection capacity is reserved, recovery in this case 
is limited to end-to-end protection capacity configuration and traffic switching. In link protection, 
and in order to correctly switch the traffic in case of a failure, each switching node needs to maintain 
at least a local representation of the protection topology (a local routing database of the protection 
topology), and be able to perform failure monitoring and detection. 
Link-based protection schemes can be further classified as dedicated or shared link protection. 
Dedicated link protection means that a protection channel (wavelength) path is exclusively reserved 
to protect each working channel link Therefore, if two protection paths of two different working 
links overlap at some links, then, different wavelengths must be assigned to them on the overlapping 
links As an example, consider Figure 3.7-(a). The illustrated working path 3 — 4 — 5 is provided 
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link protection by the backup paths 3 — 1 — 4 for link 3 — 4, and 4 — 1 — 5 for link 4 — 5. These two 
backup paths overlap on link 1 — 4, thus, two different wavelengths, say Ai and A2, are allocated to 
protect the two working links. The main drawback of dedicated protection, particularly dedicated 
link protection, is its protection capacity inefficiency. Indeed, in Figure 3.7-(a), six backup channels 
are required to protect only three working channels, which makes the scheme 200% capacity redun-
dant. On the other hand, dedicated link protection may offer protection against failures of multiple 
links. For example, in Figure 3.7-(a) 100% protection is guaranted even when all working links fail 
simultaneously. 
Shared link protection allows different protection paths to share a backup wavelength on common 
links if the corresponding protected working channels are failure-disjoint, i.e., link or node disjoint. 
Figure 3.7-(b) shows an example of a shared link protection scheme. Protection paths 6 — 2 — 1 — 5 
and 4—1 — 5 (used to protect working channels on links 6 - 5 and 4 — 5, respectively) are sharing 
a wavelength channel on link 1 — 5. In case of a link failure, a dynamic mapping of the protection 
links is required at node 1 in order to isolate (set up) the appropriate backup path. Though, more 
signaling is required and larger state information is needed than in dedicated protection. 
Pa th -Based Pro tec t ion 
Path-based protection refers to the reservation of a protection path, failure-disjoint with the working 
1 
path it protects, for each end-to-end working path. In contrast to link-based protection, where only 
the two end-nodes of a protected link that are involved in the recovery process (monitoring and 
traffic switching), in the path-based protection more switching nodes are involved in the recovery 
process. Indeed, failure monitoring and notification are performed at intermediate nodes of the 
backup paths, and backup path signaling and switching are initiated at the end-nodes of failing 
paths. Indeed, upon failure of a link, the adjacent-nodes to the failing link notify the source and 
destination of all involved wavelength-paths, which in turn, activates their corresponding backup 
paths and then switches the traffic. 
Similar to link-based protection, path-based protection can be dedicated or shared. In dedicated 
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< - > Protection Path 
(a) Dedicted Path Protection (a) Shared Path Protection 
Figure 3.8: Path Protection Scheme 
path protection, a backup path is exclusively reserved for each end-to-end working path. In this case, 
like in link protection, overlapping protection paths use different wavelengths, even if the working 
paths are link/node-disjoint For example, Figure 3.8-(a) shows two link/node disjoint working 
paths, Wi = 2 - 6 - 5 and W2 = 3 - 4 - 5 protected by P1 = 2 - 1 - 5 and P2 = 3 - 1 - 5. 
respectively. The two protection paths overlap on link 1 — 5. However, because they are dedicated 
protection paths, they are allocated each a different wavelength on link 1 — 5. The positive aspect of 
dedicated path protection is that it enables recovery not only from single-link failures, but also from 
some multi-component failures, e.g., multi-link and multi-node failures. However, as a dedicated 
approach, it requires larger protection capacity compared to shared protection. 
Shared path protection allows the use of the same wavelength on a shared-link if the protected 
working paths are link-disjoint. Thus, it results in a more efficient use of the protection capacity. An 
example of shared path protection is illustrated in Figure 3.8-(b) where the two previous protection 
paths Pi and P2 share the same wavelength on link 1 — 5. 
Regarding the recovery delay, it is different whether the protection is dedicated or shared. In 
dedicated protection, the end-to-end backup path can be set up at all intermediate nodes before 
any failure. In case of a failure, the two end-nodes of the affected paths will only need to switch 
the traffic onto the backup paths when they receive the failuie notification In shared protection. 
depending on the configuration of the protection capacuy. re-configurations at intei mediate nodes 
may be required in order to isolate (set up) a backup path. In Figure 3 8-(b). a dynamic switching 
will be required at node 1 in order to isolate any of the two backup paths- connect either link 2 — 1 
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or 3 — 1 to link 1 — 5. 
In the design of protection schemes, there is a clear trade-off between the capacity cost^and the 
recovery delay. The comparison between link and path protections, shows that path protection is 
more capacity efficient than link protection, but in terms of recovery delay, link protection achieves 
faster recovery delay and requires less management and signaling overheads [RM99]. 
Segment-Based Protection 
Segment protection can be seen as a compromise between link-based and path-based protection 
techniques. Indeed, the basic protected entity is a segment, which is usually shorter than an end-
to-end path, and longer than a single hop link. Examples of segment protection schemes include 
Shared Backup Segment Protection (SBSP) [HM04, THV+08, XXQ02, SG04a, XXQ03], and flow 
p-cycles [SG03c, SG03b]. 
Figure 3.9 illustrates a segment protection scheme. The overlapping protection segments 2 — 1 — 4 
and 3 — 6 — 5 provide 100% protection against any single link or node failure. In case of a link failure. 
Working Path 
<4 - p> Protection Path 
Figure 3.9: Segment Protection Scheme 
a notification will be sent to the upstream and downstream of the affected working segments, which 
in turn, initiate the recovery process. Recall that protection segments can also be non overlapping, 
in which case, they lose their node protection capability. Compared to path protection, segment 
protection can provide faster recovery delay because recovery is performed at intermediate nodes. 
which are usually not far from the failure location. Regarding capacity efficiency, shared segment 
protection achieves better capacity efficiency than shared link protection [XXQ02]. 
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3.4 Multi Layer Protection 
So far, we have only discussed protection techniques to provide recovery in case of a failure at one 
network layer (technology). However, in a realistic multi layer network, recovery is usually carried 
simultaneously at different layers. For instance, in an IP over OTN architectures, IP restoration 
could be used to recover from IP router failures, and point-to-point optical protection could be used 
to recover from fiber link failures. 
Some of the high-layer services, such as SONET and ATM, have their own protection mech-
anisms, and some others have no recovery mechanisms incorporated in their layers. The optical 
layer protection, although highly efficient against failures in the optical layer, cannot protect against 
failures at higher layers. In order to provide protection against failures at the high-layers, addi-
tional recovery mechanisms must be implemented at those layers as well. Integration of recovery 
mechanisms at multiple layers raises the issues of assigning recovery functions to each layer and 
coordinating the whole recovery process. Based at which layer the recovery process is initiated. 
and the interaction between the different layers, a set of rules, named escalation strategies [Dem99], 
have been proposed in order to coordinate the multi-layer recovery operations. Based on the layer 
at which the fault recovery process is initiated, two escalation strategies have been proposed in 
[Dem99]: the bottom-up strategy and top-down strategy. These strategies have a common feature 
which resides in the fact that a fault is never resolved in different layers at the same time. To achieve 
this, a chronological recovery order is imposed for the different layers, and a set of racing recovery 
conditions is defined in order to coordinate the multi-layer recovery operations. The chronological 
order of recovery at the different layers can be established through a hold-off timer (see Figure 3.3). 
In the bottom-up strategy, recovery starts at the optical layer, and escalates upward upon expi-
ration of the hold-off timer. For instance, in case of a failure in the optical layer, the recovery process 
can be started in the optical layer immediately, whereas the logical layer (e.g., IP layer) observes 
a hold-off time before initiating its recovery process. If the failure is recovered in the optical layer 
before the hold-off timer expires, the upper layer will not initiate a logical layer recovery. In the 
top-down strategy, recovery always starts at the uppermost client layer and escalates downward. 
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The disadvantage of this approach is the potentially large number of traffic streams that must be 
restored at the logical layers. 
3.5 Pre-configured Protection Structures 
The performance of a protection scheme in providing recovery in survivable optical WDM networks 
depends greatly on the shape of its logical protection topologies. In mesh WDM networks, protection 
schemes are built by a combination of a variety of wavelength protection topologies including, for 
example, rings, cycles, linear paths, trees, stars. Individually considered, each of these pre-configured 
protection topologies is characterized by some protection parameters including, for example, its 
protection capacity budget (cost), protection capability, recovery speed, required management and 
signaling overheads, and ability to survive single and multiple failures. 
Different protection blocks (logical topologies), ranging from simple linear paths to highly-
connected topologies, can be used to provide protection in survivable WDM mesh networks. Con-
trary to ring topologies, mesh topologies enable advanced protection structures, though, efficient 
sharing of the protection capacity. In this section, we review some design approaches of link-based 
protection using pre-defined shape protection structures, and study their advantages and disadvan-
tages. We focus more on the degree of pre-configuration of the protection structures, and discuss 
their recovery delays and protection capacity costs. 
3.5.1 Fully Pre-Cross Connected Schemes 
The concept of pre-cross connected protection extends the pre-configuration of protection capacity 
from backup capacity reservation to end:to-end setup of the protection paths, i.e., backup capacity 
is reserved and switched or cross-connected at all optical nodes along the backup paths. This feature 
is very important, especially in photonic and translucent networks, in order to optimize the CAPital 
and OPerational Expenditures (respectively CAPEX and OPEX). Indeed, not all signals need to 
be dropped at all intermediate nodes along their way to destination. Bypassing some signals coming 
along some ports can help in saving on transponder costs, power, and reduces the vulnerability of 
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the switching nodes. Above all, pre-cross connectivity guarantees reliable end-to-end backup paths 
ahead of failures, i.e., backup paths are guaranteed to be in a good condition before their use. 
Examples of pre-cross connected structures include pre-cross conencted cycles (p-cycle) [GS98] and 
pre-cross connected trails (p-trails) [CCF04a]. 
The p-cycle based approach is an extension of the self healing ring protection. Like any cyclical 
structure, a p-cycle can achieve high recovery speed in case of a failure. Indeed, in case of a 
link failure, only the two end-nodes of the affected link will need to switch the affected traffic 
onto the backup path (see Figure 3.10). Intermediate nodes will only pass the traffic without any 
reconfiguration of the protection capacity. Unlike a shared ring structure, which is at least 100% 
redundant, a p-cycle can protect larger capacity, and thus, is less redundant than a ring structure. 
Figure 3.10 shows a unit capacity p-cycle providing 100% single-link protection within the illustrated 
Working Path 
<*$ «. £ • Fully Pre-OXC p-Cycle 
Figure 3.10: Fully Pre-Cross Connected Cycle p-cycle 
working plane (one wavelength working paths). The working traffic carried on links that are also 
spanned by the p-cycle (called on-cycle links, e.g., 1 — 2 and 5 — 6) is protected by switching the 
working capacity onto the protection cycle all around the affected link; while on-cycle links whose 
end-nodes are also spanned by the p-cycle, but not the links, (called straddling-cycle links, e.g., 1 — 5 
and 2 — 6) are protected by switching the working capacity either on one of the two backup paths 
offered around the p-cycle. 
The recovery speed of p-cycle and ring based protection schemes is not really due to their logical 
topology. Rather, it is due to the fact that there is a unique way to map incident protection 
wavelength links at switching nodes. Indeed, there is either zero or two links of the p-cycle incident 
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at switching nodes. Though, they can be pre-cross connected ahead of failures in a deterministic 
way, and used without reconfiguration in case of a failure 
The p-trail is a linear protection structure that can be shared and fully pre-cross connected 
ahead of any link failure too. As in the p-cycle approach, there is no need to re-configure any cross 
connect along the backup path in order to provide 100% protection. Figure 3.11 show two p-trail 
structures providing protection within the same previous working plane. Although this approach is 
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Figure 3.11: Fully Pre-Cross Connected Trail p-Trail 
less capacity efficient than the p-cycle one, it has an advantage over the p-cycle when it comes to 
deployment in sparse and constrained link spare capacity budget. 
In fully pre-cross connected structures, the recovery process following a link failure involves 
almost all the overlay protection structure, e.g., a failure of link 1 — 2 in Figure 3.10, or link 2 — 6 in 
Figure 3.11-(b). Such a protection feature, raises a vulnerability issue to dual and multiple failures 
in the network. 
3.5.2 Dynamically Cross Connected Schemes 
In fully pre-cross connected schemes, the protection capacity is allocated following a pre-defined plan 
which enables protection structures to be fully pre-cross connected ahead any failure. However, this 
additional constraint, may induce an extra protection capacity cost in order to provide the same 
protection level. Figure 3 12 shows a pre-configuied piotection structure, a spanning p-tiee, where 
there is no pre-cross connection of the protection capacity at any switching node 
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Figure 3.12: Dynamically Cross Connected Structure 
In this scheme, the protection capacity is dynamically cross connected in case of a failure in order 
to set up any backup path. Though, in case of a failure of airy working link, a signaling process will 
be initiated in order to cross connect the protection capacity at intermediate nodes of protection 
paths. For instance, in case of a failure of link 1 — 2, a dynamic switching will be performed at 
both node 3 and 4 in order to isolate the backup path 2 — 3 — 4 — 1 . This approach allows high 
flexible protection capacity allocation, which can be used to meet different protection objectives like 
cost and resiliency against multiple failures. The illustrated p-tree based scheme in Figure 3.12, 
requires less protection capacity and it is more resilient against dual-link failures than the previous 
fully pre-cross connected scheme in providing the same protection and resiliency levels. However, its 
disadvantage lies in its recovery process. As intermediate nodes need to dynamically change their 
configuration, this adds to the global recovery delay of the protection scheme. 
3.5.3 Partially Pre-Cross Connected Schemes 
This approach leads to a compromise between the two previous ones [Sim07] A trade-off between 
the recovery speed of the fully pre-cross connected structures and the flexibility of the dynamically 
cross connected ones is sought by this protection approach. In partially pre-cross connected schemes, 
the number of dynamic cross connections in order to recover from any failure is limited, though. 
the recovery delay inherent to reconfiguration of the cross connects is limited too. The pre-cross 
connectivity property has its price in terms of protection capacity, and it is controlled in this approach 
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Figure 3.13: Partially Pre-Cross Connected Structure 
Figure 3.13 illustrates a partially pre-cross connected protection scheme, which provides protec-
tion with the same previous working plane. In this scheme, in order to recover from any link failure, 
there is a single cross connect at node 3 that needs to be re-configured dynamically. Two different 
backup channels are used on link 3 — 4 in order to avoid dynamic reconfiguration at node 4 
In terms of protection capacity budget, partially pre-cross connected schemes require a bit more 
protection capacity than dynamically cross connected scheme. Two wavelengths are used on link 
3 — 4 instead of one in the previous dynamically cross connected scheme. 
3o6 Summary of Protection Approaches 
In Figure 3.14, we represent a summary of protection approaches classified as shared and dedi-
cated protection schemes. The shared protection schemes are, in turn, classified according to their 
protected entities and to the pre-configuration of their protection topologies (same classification 
of dedicated protection schemes also exists). A protection scheme is either link, segment, or path 
oriented depending on the protected entities. Each of these schemes can either be fully or partially 
pre-cross connected ahead of failures, or dynamically cross connected in case of failures. 
Figure 3.15 shows the variation of the capacity redundancy and the recovery delay of the different 
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Figure 3.14: Classification of Protection Schemes 
known to be more capacity efficient than the segment which is in turn more efficient than the link 
approach [RSM03, XXQ03]. The recovery delay parameter in this case varies inversely with the 
capacity redundancy parameter. Indeed, the recovery delay depends on the recovery process, which 
involves larger signaling overhead and complex operations than in segment and link approaches. 
Increases Capacity Redundancy 
Segment 
Fully Pre-Cross Connected Partially Pre-Cross Connected Dynamically Cross Connected 
Recovery Delay 
Figure 3.15: Protection Performance: Capacity Redundancy and Recovery Delay 
According to the pre-configuration of the protection capacity, the recovery delay of fully pre-
cross connected scheme is known to be low [GS98, CCF04a], and it increases as the number of cross 
connects that need dynamic reconfiguration increases [Sim07]. Regarding the capacity redundancy 
it varies inversely with the recovery delay [Sim07] (see Chapter 8). 
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C H A P T E R 4 
Background on Optimization of 
Survivable W D M Networks 
In the design of large scale systems such as telecommunication networks, there is a fundamental 
need for efficient and scalable tools in order to perform network design and planning. Over the 
last decades, telecommunication networks have grown in size and complexity. Network coverage (or 
reach) limits have been pushed to regions, countries, and even continents, and a variety of tech-
nologies have been developed to increase the network capacity. The network physical topology and 
capacity expansions have increased the challenges related to the design and planning problems in 
modern telecommunication networks. Nowadays, with the fierce competition in the telecommuni-
cation business, network operators are more than ever interested in design and planning strategies 
that would optimize their deployment and operational budgets while providing different services. 
Design of optical networks, particularly survivable WDM networks, involves different parameters 
and objectives. In survivable WDM networks, design of logical protection topologies has attracted 
many researchers over the last two decades. Greedy algorithmic and classical Mixed Integer Linear 
Programming (MILP) based optimization approaches have been widely used in the design and plan-
ning of protection planes. However, with the increasing size and complexity of network topologies, 
the current optimization approaches are not always practical nor effective, especially, in large scale 
networks. Indeed, efficiency of greedy algorithms and scalability of classical MILP approaches are 
greatly dependent on the size of the problem inputs and the quality of the targeted solutions. 
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The prevalent design approach of protection schemes in survivable WDM networks is based on a 
two-step method [SG04b, SG05, ZZB05, SG03a, RT05]: A first step where, (all/some) potential pro-
tection structures, e.g., paths, cycles, trees, to provide protection against different failure scenarios 
are pre-enumerated, and a second step where selection of the most relevant ones is performecl through 
ILP optimization to meet different objectives. The drawback of such an approach lies in the way 
the modeling and optimization steps are performed. The number of candidate protection structures 
grows exponentially as the network size increases, e.g., there could be up to (
 3 ) + ( 4 ) + (^) • • • + (M) 
cycles in a network of M links, and most of them will not be of interest in the final solution. Fur-
thermore, the second step, which is usually based on ILP optimization, takes as an input the output 
of the first step, though, highly dependent on the size of the candidate protection structure space. 
This, in turn, affects the scalability and efficiency of the ILP optimization step. 
This chapter is dedicated to a review of some mathematical modeling techniques and solution 
methods to design protection schemes in survivable WDM networks. First, we start by reviewing 
some graph concepts and algorithms with some of their applications in the design of protection 
topologies. We focus on algorithms to construct different shape protection topologies and protection 
design metrics. The concepts of single and multiple link/node and SRLG disjoint protection paths 
are given a high priority as they are the key issues in several protection scheme design algorithms. 
Secondly, we review Linear Programming (LP), ILP, and Column Generation (CG) optimization 
techniques. We emphasis the CG decomposition approach by reviewing its associated modeling and 
solution techniques. 
4.1 Graph Algorithms 
A graph is a mathematical concept used to abstract network topologies in communication networks 
and several other processes in different fields. From now on, we represent a network topology by a 
graph G — (V, C) where V refers to the set of vertices or nodes, and C to the set of edges or links 
A link in this thesis refers to a set of physical fibers laid down between two nodes and sharing the 
same physical duct. Though, a link can be either unidirectional or bidirectional depending on the 
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orientation of the fibers laid down along the link. Sometimes, fibers share some portions of a duct, 
see Figure 3.1. In such cases, fibers are considered to form different links but share the same risk of 
failure along the shared portions of the duct. 
Next, review some graph algorithms which are widely used in the design and planning of surviv-
able WDM optical networks. 
4.1.1 Protection Path Algorithms 
Backup path calculation algorithms are very often used in the design of survivable transport networks 
to enumerate candidate routes as inputs to the optimization problem. In order to provide protection 
against any type of failures, e.g., node or link failure, the backup and working paths should be failure-
disjoint. For example, to survive any single link failure, a backup path and its protected working 
path should be link-disjoint. The most commonly used link/path-disjoint protection path algorithm 
belongs to the family of shortest path algorithms [Dij59, Flo62]. A comprehensive reference for 
shortest path algorithms is presented in [DP84]. A backup path can be node-disjoint, in which case 
it can provide node protection. There is a trade-off between a backup path length and its protection 
capability. Shorter paths (in terms of number of hops) tend to minimize the protection cost, but 
at the same they are less shard than long paths. Though, in practice, backup paths are calculated 
according to different metrics, not necessarily the shortest paths, such as SRLG-disjoint paths and 
inter-channel interference minimizing paths. 
.Another family of algorithms used in the computation of protection paths is the /c-shortest paths 
[Epp99]. In this case, k shortest paths are constructed in order to protect each working entity, e.g., 
link or path. Such a strategy has been widely used in enumeration of candidate protection paths 
in several optimization techniques in the literature [PM04]. Although, k shortest paths approach 
results in larger optimization models, it is usually more efficient than the single backup path for 
each working path approach in path protection. 
In the next section, we review some algorithms to construct some pre-defined shape protection 
structures different from the simple linear paths. 
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4.1.2 Protection Structure Algorithms 
In this section, and without any restriction, by a protection structure we refer to any shaped structure 
other than a linear path. Though, cycles, trees, squares,..., which can be physically divided into 
simple linear paths, are considered as protection structures. The advantage of using such structures 
rather than simple linear paths resides in the protection cost. Sharing of protection capacity is 
improved by allowing disjoint protection paths to mutually protect each others. For instance, a 
p-cycle can protect its on-cycle links, in comparison to its two constituent paths, which can only 
protect their straddling-path links. 
In the design of protection schemes in survivable optical networks, two pre-defined shape pro-
tection structures have been extensively used: The pre-configured cycle (p-cycle), and the pre-
configured protection tree (p-tree) In prevalent design approach of survivable WDM networks 
based on pre-defined shape structures, the set of candidate structures is pre-enumerated ahead 
of the optimization process following a given strategy. However, depending on its size, a trans-
port network may have up to millions or even billions of potential protection structures (e.g., 
p-trees). In order to limit the number of candidate protection structures, heuristic approaches 
have been proposed in the literature to scale both the pre-enumeration and the optimization steps 
[DHGY03. GD02. SHY09. KG05, GG07, TT05]. Those approaches are usually based on some specific 
design metrics. 
Design Metrics 
The solution spaces of p-cycles and p-trees increase as the network topology size and connectivity 
increase. Then, a question arises, what is a good criterion to select a limited number of structures 
that may be used to achieve a good solution while minimizing the size of the candidate structure set? 
One of the design metrics used in the design of p-cycles is the Topological Score (TS) [GD02]. 
The TS of a given p-cycle is the maximum amount of potential working capacity it can protect 
independentlj* of its required spare capacity. This metric favors large size protection structures which 




budget. According to this metric, Hamiltonian p-cycles and spanning p-trees (span all nodes) are 
first enumerated before other smaller p-cycles and p-trees. An alternate metric considering both the 
protected capacity and the protection capacity, called the a priori efficiency (AE), was proposed in 
[GD02]. The AE of a given protection structure, e.g., a p-cycle, is equal to the amount of a priori 
protected capacity over the protection capacity. 
Both TS and AE are metrics used in pre-enumeration of candidate structures, though, they only 
indicate the potential efficiency of the protection structures. The real efficiency of a protection 
structure and of a given protection scheme depends on the traffic distribution and spare capacity 
budget. The capacity efficiency of a given protection structure is a function of the traffic it protects, 
and it differs from the traffic it can potentially protects. Furthermore, the link protection budget, 
also called link spare capacity budget, can prevent deployment of protection structures on some 
links, though, affects their TS and AE. 
Cycle and Tree Searching 
Searching for all simple cycles or trees in a graph is a hard combinatorial problem which involves 
a huge input solution space. To find all/some protection cycles or trees in a graph, an explicit 
exploration of all the solution space is usually needed. In this section, we describe cycle and tree 
searching algorithms that are used to generate these input protectipn structures. 
The most widely used approach in simple-cycle searching is based on a Depth First Search (DFS) 
research method [DHGY03, GD02, KG05]. The DFS algorithm is a search and label technique that 
incrementally construction a tree. It is an iterative algorithm that solves the problem by searching 
all simple cycles passing through a node. Initially, it starts at an arbitrary node v% by exploring 
its adjacent nodes vt{t £ Z + ) that are not yet labelled. If v3 is not labelled, it is assigned a label 
that indicates that it has already been explored and cannot be considered within the current DFS 
starting at*i?2. and the DFS repeats the same steps from v3. This process is repeated until the initial 
node v-i is encountered again (closed cycle). If at a given node, all its adjacent nodes are already 
labeled, then the DFS algorithm will simply backtrack to the preceding node from which the current 
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node has been labelled and proceeds with the next unlabelled node. The entire algorithm iterates 
until there is no unlabelled node adjacent to vx. Once all adjacent nodes to vx have been labelled, 
though, all possible cycles through v% have been enumerated, the algorithm removes v% and all its 
adjacent links, and repeats the previous labeling process from another node vk in the graph, then, 
continues until there is only one node left in the graph. 
Although, some efforts have been dedicated to p-tree based scheme [MFB99, GCM+03, LYSH03, 
SHY04, TT05], there has been no efficient algorithm for trees construction and optimization. 
4.2 Integer Linear Programming 
In this section, we study some modeling and solution methods based on Integer Linear Programming 
(ILP) techniques. ILP is an optimization technique of a linear objective function, subject to a set of 
linear equality or inequality constraints and variable integrality constraints [NW99]. ILP modeling 
and solution techniques can be applied to various fields of study. It is used for solving hard combina-
torial problems where polynomial algorithms do not exist or are impossible to elaborate. Industries 
that use ILP models and solutions include transportation, telecommunications, and manufacturing. 
In the telecommunication domain, they have been proved useful in modeling and solving a variety 
of problems in design, routing, scheduling, and assignment in wireless and wired networks. 
4*2,1 ILP Modeling 
ILP programs can be expressed either in an equation or matrix form. The following two models in 
equation and matrix forms illustrate a generic ILP model of link protection scheme design based 
on a pre-defined shape protection structure. Let us suppose that the protection building blocks are 
p-cycles. Based on a set S of pre-enumerated p-cycles, this model enables the selection of the most 
efficient p-cycles among S according to the stated objective. 
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Equation form: 
Minimize J2 cs zs 
ses 
subject to: 
Y, CL£IS zs < be 
s<ES 
zs > 0 and integers 
( = 1, 2, 3 , . . . , | £ | , 
s = l, 2, 3 , . . . , | 5 | . 
Matrix form: 
Minimize (ci, c2 , c 3 , . . . , q s | ) • {zi,z2,z^,... ,z\S\Y 
Subject to: 
/ 
ai , i ai,2 
^2 ,1 &2,2 
a l | 5 | 
« 2 . | 5 | 
\ 







/ ^ i ^ i y y&iriy 
(zi, z2 , • - •, z\s\) > (0, 0 , . . . , 0 ) T and integers. 
Z = (zi, 22, • • •, z\s\) represents the vector of integer variables associated with p-cycles s G S. 
Each variable zs(s G 5 ) is equal to the number of copies of the p-cycle it is associated wi th . 
C = (ci, C2,, - . . , c\s\) is the cost vector of all p-cycles. B = (bj. b2, b\£\) is a vector of coefficients 
representing the protection capacity budget on each link £ G C. A = (ae)S) is a mat r ix of coefficients, 
each in Z + and equal to the number of protection paths a cycle s can provide to a link L T h e 
expression to be minimized is called the objective function (in this case C T Z) . The inequalities 
A Z < B are the constraints that delimit a solution space over which the objective function is to be 
optimized. 
Except for t he integrality constraints and the solution methods, Linear Programming (LP) is an 
optimization model similar to ILP. In LP, the integrality constraints on the optimization variables 
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are dropped. Though, the general form of an LP: 
y 
Minimize ]P cs zs 
ses 
subject to: 
52aiiaza<bi 1 = 1, 2, 3 , . . . , | £ | , 
s<ES 
zs>0 s = 1, 2, 3 , . . . , | S | . 
The size of the above LP and ILP optimization models depends on the number of candidate 
protection p-cycles. Each p-cycle s G S is assigned a variable zs in the objective, and a column 
A s in the constraints. The size of the mathematical model and the integrality constraints on the 
variables affect the scalability and performance of the solution methods during the optimization 
process. 
4.2.2 ILP Solution Method 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the relation between an optimal solution of an ILP and that of its relaxed 
LP. Therein, we have two p-cycles (two dimensional solution space) and three arbitrary constraints, 
and the objective is to maximize a linear function Z. The two dashed lines labeled Z^P and Z\LP 
give the intersection of the optimization function with the convex hull of the LP and ILP spaces, 
respectively. The intersection points identify the linear and integer optimal solutions of the LP and 
ILP problems, respectively. Note that, for this case, rounding down the LP optimal solution gives 
the ILP optimal solution. However, this is usually not true in practice. 
Since LP is less constrained than ILP. the following is deduced: 
• If the objective of ILP is a maximization, the optimal objective value for LP is greater than 
or equal to that of ILP, see Figure 4.1 for an illustration. 
• If LP is infeasible, then so is ILP. 









0 1 2 3 \ N 4 5 
Figure 4.1: LP vs ILP 
Even if the mathematical models of LP and ILP look similar, the algorithms used to carry the 
optimization on those models are completely different. The Simplex algorithm of George Dantzig 
[Dan98] is the widely used LP solution method in many optimization softwares. Given a polyhedron 
representing the solution space and a real-valued linear function representing the objective function 
defined on this polyhedron, the simplex method will find a vertex on the polyhedron, if it exists, 
where this function has the largest (or smallest) value [BJS08]. The vertices of the polyhedron form 
the basic feasible solution space of the LP model. In order to solve the LP model, the simplex 
method starts by constructing an initial feasible solution at a vertex of the polyhedron and explores 
the solution space by moving along a path on the edges of the polyhedron to vertices with equal or 
higher (at least lower if a minimization objective) values of the objective function until an optimum 
is reached. If certain precautions against cycling are taken into account, the simplex algorithm is 
quite efficient and is guaranteed to find the global optimum of the LP optimization problem (see 
chapter 3 in [Chv83]). 
In contrast to LP problems, which can be solved efficiently within a limited number of iterations, 
\ Constraint 3 
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ILP problems are NP-hard [NW99]. Some solution methods of ILP use their LP relaxations to 
approach their integer solutions. In fact, solving LP does give a bound on the optimal value of the 
ILP, and may give the optimal solution to ILP if the LP solution if integer. The ILP formulation 
plays a major role in the efficiency and scalability of the applied solution method. Indeed, in order to 
be efficient, ILP solution methods based on LP relaxations require formulation whose LP relaxation 
gives a good approximation to the convex hull of the integer feasible solutions. Different methods 
have been proposed to close the gap between LP and ILP, and to boost the performance of the ILP 
methods [Sch98, WolOO]. In the next section, we review some ILP based solution methods. 
Branch and Bound Techniques 
Branch and Bound (B&B) [LW66] is a well known optimization technique for its application to ILP 
problems. This approach computes upper and lower bounds on the optimal objective value during 
the optimization process; and terminates with an integer optimal solution, or with a certificate 
proving that the suboptimal point found is e-optimal (integrality gap) [LW66]. B&B algorithms 
are basically based on a divide*and conquer technique. The dividing (branching) is performed by 
dividing the feasible solution space into smaller subsets. The conquering (bounding) is performed 
by discarding the current subset if its bound indicates that it cannot contain an optimal solution 
for the original problem. This technique is widely used in optimization of protection schemes in the 
literature. 
The efficiency of the B&B technique depends critically on the used branching and bounding 
strategies [LW66, NW88]. Some branching choices could lead to a repeated branching, without 
any pruning of the B&B tree. In such a case, the branching method would become an exhaustive 
enumeration of the solution domain, which is very often huge. 
Cutting Plane Techniques 
An alternate solution to B&B. called cutting planes, can also be used to solve ILP problems [KJ60. 
JRT95]. The fundamental idea behind cutting planes is to ultimately find the constraints (facets) 
of the convex hull. In practice, one has to be satisfied with cuts that are not necessarily facets. 
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Cuts are added to the relaxed LP model until its optimal feasible solution becomes integer. As 
any feasible integer solution for an ILP problem is also feasible for its relaxed LP problem, and a 
fractional feasible solution to the LP is not feasible for its constrained ILP, the cutting planes are 
added to close the gap between LP and ILP by eliminating fractional feasible solutions to the LP 
model. Finding such cutting planes corresponds to the separation problem of the solution space. 
This process is repeated until an optimal integer solution is found. 
Branch and Cut Techniques 
A branch and cut technique is a hybrid of a B&B and a cutting plane technique [CF97, JT98]. In 
this method, if the obtained solution to the relaxed LP model has fractional values for some integer 
variables, then a cutting plane algonthm is used to find useful cuts, which are violated by the current 
fractional solution, but satisfied by all feasible integer solutions. If such cuts are found, they are 
added to the linear program, and the solution process is repeated until either an integer solution is 
found or until no more cutting planes are found. In this latter case, the B&B is started to split the 
solution space by branching on fractional variables. 
4.3 Column Generation 
Column Generation (CG) is an efficient algorithmic technique for solving large linear programing 
problems but its strength unfolds in solving integer programming problems too. It has lately been 
widely used in solving some large scale problems such as transportation and scheduling, e.g., air-line, 
vehicle, crew scheduling [DS89, RS94, CP99a. CP99b], but not yet as much in telecommunications 
[JRBG07, JRBG07. SPR+07]. Its motivation is that many linear models are too huge to explicitly 
consider all their variables and constraints, and that in the final optimal solution most of the variables 
will be non-basic (equal to zero) and only a small subset of them will be basic (take a non negative 
value). For example, in p-cycle protection based ILP models, there can be thousands to millions of 
p-cycles. and only a limited number, e.g., 1% or less, will be considered in the optimal protection 
scheme. 
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Though, in classical LP and ILP techniques, much effort is spent in exploring a large solution 
space in order to locate an optimal solution which is a combination of a very small set, e.g., a set of 
p-cycles in a network. 
The idea behind CG is to consider only the variables which have the potential to improve the ob-
jective function, by generating them on demand by means of a CG technique identical to generating 
cutting planes on the corresponding dual problem [Chv83, Las70]. 
4.3.1 C G Modeling 
In CG, the mathematical modeling is not straightforward. Indeed, the modeling process requires 
some abilities to look at a problem with a diffeient view in order to identify a decomposition structure. 
The problem being solved by CG techniques is split into two sub problems: a master problem and a 
pricing problem. The restricted master problem is a linear program with only a subset of variables 
being considered. The pricing problem is a new ILP model derived from the master problem to 
identify new promising basic variables for the master problem. The main motivation behind the CG 
decomposition technique is to delegate the subroutines to the subproblems at a subordinated level, 
i.e., pricing problem, and to coordinate the linking at a superior level, i.e., the master problem. 
However, not all LP optimization problems can be expressed in the CG modeling paradigm. The 
CG modeling approach requires that the whole problem can be decomposed into sub-routines, and 
that analytical functions can be established between the subproblems through their variables and 
parameters. The objective function of the pricing subproblem is defined as the reduced cost of 
the master problem (see below). In the context of protection schemes, these two routines can 
be optimization of the protection structures at the master problem, and generation of protection 
structures at the pricing problem. 
Following the simplex method to solve the previous LP program illustrated in Section 4.2.1, at 
each iteration, we search for a non-basic variable to price out and enter the basis. This means that, 
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in the pricing step, we look for the argument (column) of the following optimization function: 
arg min{cs = cs - uTAs : s G S}. (4.1) 
An explicit search of S is impractical as the set S of p-cycles is huge. In CG, we work with a 
reasonable small subset S' C S of columns associated with p-cycles in a Restricted Master Problem 
(RMP). If z and u are the optimal primal and dual solutions of the RMP, then, for a set srf ^ 0 of 
columns As,s € S, the following subproblem gives an answer to the pricing problem. 
c* = min{cs = c(A) - uTA : A G srf}. (4.2) 
If c* > 0, then no negative reduced cost cs exists: z is the optimal solution of the current RMP 
and of the original master problem as well. Otherwise, the column returned by the current pricing 
problem is added to the RMP. 
4.3.2 CG Solution Method 
The advantage of solving the optimization problem in (4.2) over the one in (4.1) is related to the 
size of the pricing solution space srf. The set of all p-cycles S cannot be explicitly considered as 
in (4.1), while in (4.2) it is a subset of p-cycles that are considered. The whole CG optimization 
process for p-cycle protection is repeated as follows. 
Algorithm 1 Column Generation Solution Method 
l- Initialize the RMP with a feasible solution, e.g., a set of p-cycles providing 100% protection. 
2 repeat 
3. solve the RMP, we obtain dual prices for each of the constraints in the RMP problem. This 
information is then utilized in the objective function of the pricing problem. 
4: solve the pricing problem 
5: if objective value is negative then 
6: a variable with negative reduced cost associated to a potential cycle has been identified, 
this variable is then added to the master problem. 
7 else 
8. the current RMP solution is optimal 
9. end if 
10: until the current RMP solution is optimal 
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To initiate the CG solution method, an initial feasible solution (set of protection p-cycles) to the 
RMP is required in order to ensure that proper dual information is passed to the pricing problem. 
Depending on the application, it is not always obvious to construct an initial feasible solution of 
the RMP. A common approach is to use a two-phase method similar to the two-phase approach 
incorporated in the simplex method in order to find an initial basic feasible solution. A solution 
approach in our p-cycle optimization is to add a set of artificial p-cycles with a large positive 
cost. This approach guarantees a feasible solution to the LP relaxation problem. Further details 
on initialization, especially in MILP are given in [LD05]. The initial feasible solution to the LP 
relaxation is very important in the CG solution process. Poorly chosen initial columns may lead to 
more iterations when the resulting initial solution is far away from the optimal one. 
The overall CG solution process is illustrated in the following flowchart: 
LP relaxation 
Restricted Master Problem 
(RMP): 
Minimize (cost) 
A ~ ( a ) |S'|«|S| (aS)new 
/ 











Minimize (reduced cost of RMP) 
LP Optimal of RMP B&B on RMP 
variables 
ILP solution of RMP 
(integrality gap %) 
End 
Figure 4.2: CG Solution Process 
The RMP is a linear relaxation of the original master ILP. though, it can be solved with any LP 
solution method. The ILP pricing problem is to find a column with the lowest negative reduced cost 
(highest positive reduced cost if a maximization problem). However, it is not necessary to select the 
columns with the lowest reduced cost in order to find the optimal solution of the LP. any column with 
a negative reduced cost can be enough to be able to iterate Based on that, the pricing efficiency 
can be improved by stopping its execution once its cost is lower than a given negative threshold 
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or 0 [VBJ+98, DDS05]. Furthermore, in the pricing problem, it may be possible to generate more 
than one column during an iteration. Such an approach increases the size of the RMP more quickly 
and may reduce the number of required iterations to reach the optimal solution [LD05, Ogt02]. In 
the CG solution approach for ILP, we are concerned by mechanisms to find an integer solution for 
the original master problem, and at the same time, to solve the linear relaxation of the RMP. The 
LP relaxation of the RMP solved by CG may not be an integer feasible solution, and applying a 
standard B&B technique to the RMP is also unlikely to find an optimal, or even a feasible integer 
solution to the original problem. However, the value of the current RMP optimal solution gives an 
insight on how possibly far (bound) the ILP value is from the optimal value of the RMP. Though, if 
the RMP has an integer feasible solution which is ^-optimal, then, this solution may be the optimal 
solution of the original ILP. Considerable efforts have been spent on the topic of how to obtain 
an integer solution by combining CG approach and other ILP optimization tools. Some branching 
strategies in CG are presented in [Van06, VanOO], and a rich literature on CG and B&B can be 
found in [BJN+98, VW96, LD05, Van94]. 
In this thesis, we propose a set of optimization methods of protection schemes based on CG 
where we solve the LP problem, and branch on the continuous variables of the RMP (as illustrated 
in flowchart 4.2). We found optimal solutions to the ILP problems with a very low optimality gap 
(s) in almost all solved problems {e G [0%,5%]). Though, we refrained from adding any branch-
and-price or branch-and-cut ILP schemes to our CG solution methods. 
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C H A P T E R 5 
p-Cycle Based Protec ted Working 
Capacity Envelope 
5.1 Introduction 
The trends in optical transport networks are moving toward dynamic network models that will 
support on-demand set up, modification and release, of a wide range of services and the ability for 
each class of services to be defined and treated separately. Dynamic network models will help service 
providers to maximize their profitability through automated provisioning of optical services. To 
address the dynamic and cost-effective network models, there is a need for an efficient network-control 
model to cope with the operational expenditures (OPEX) associated with the management and 
deployment of services. Standard-based protocols will help providers in savings, by enabling them 
to integrate multi-vendor equipment in their networks. These novel trends are under standardization 
in the automatic switched optical network (ASON) [RecOl] and the generalized multi-protocol label 
switching (GMPLS) frameworks [M+04, Ber03b]. 
In survivable optical networks, particularly in WDM networks, dynamic provisioning involves 
two inter-related capacity planes: The working plane and the protection plane. Design and planning 
of these two planes require high attention as they should be at the same time, packed tightly and 
disjoint in order to optimize the deployment cost. Such a requirement increases the complexity of 
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the management process to maintain consistent network states, and efficiently provide resiliency in 
the network. 
The problem of dynamically provisioning protected working capacity has been extensively stud-
ied within the paradigm of a working primary path and a predetermined link (or node) disjoint 
backup path, both established end-to-end at the provisioning time [SZM05, LR06, SSM03, KL03, 
YADA01]. In order to reduce the bandwidth requirement, shared backup protection schemes, e.g., 
Shared Backup Path/Segment/Link Protection (SBPP/SBSP/SBLP) [KLOO, XXQ02, HM04, SR01, 
OZZ+04] have been widely used. Under shared protection techniques, backup paths are allowed 
to share spare capacity, provided that their protected working paths do not belong to the same 
SRG. These sharing techniques improve the capacity efficiency of the protection design, but they 
involve complex network operations and a larger state information related to the disjointness among 
working and protection paths. Indeed, the requirement for an establishment of a shared-capacity 
protection path is highly dependent on the state information of all ongoing lightpaths in the net-
work (available capacity and sharing conditions of backup capacities), which is not easy to maintain 
accurately as the network scale or when the velocity of the network traffic increases [KLOO]. In order 
to simplify the provisioning operations and make them as independent as possible of the network 
state information, Grover has proposed a new design paradigm in survivable WDM networks named 
the Protected Working Capacity Envelope (PWCE) [Gro04b]. 
In this Chapter, we focus on PWCE, and propose efficient and scalable methods to design 
optimized PWCE with different network models including link and network spare capacity budgets. 
We use simple (elementary) and non-simple p-cycles as protection building blocks, and elaborate 
further on their ability to efficiently use the spare capacity. The particular contribution in this 
chapter is related to the scalable and efficient optimization strategies based on CG that can be used 
within different design conditions, and the new non-simple p-cycle approach that is shown more 
efficient than the simple p-cycle one. 
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5.2 The PWCE Paradigm 
The PWCE paradigm was first exposed in [Gro04b], and later studied in detail in [She06]. In 
PWCE, the protection capacity is deployed ahead of any working capacity or network failure in 
order to protect the network resources, though, potential working capacity. In the PWCE concept, 
given a demand forecast and a link or a network spare capacity budget, the problem consists to find 
an optimized protection plane to meet the potential working capacity of the traffic forecast. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the design process in the PWCE paradigm. The optical transport network 
with its link transport capacity (number of wavelength channels) as illustrated in the top of Figure 
5.1, is divided and optimized to provide as much as possible of protected capacity (maximum size 
PWCE). The illustrated link spare capacity budget on the left of Figure 5.1 enables the protection of 
the illustrated link capacity budget on the right of the same figure In PWCE. it is the pie-deployed 
protection capacity that defines the PWCE shape and size. 
Total transport capacity 
Figure 5.1: PWCE Design Process 
Rather than explicitly provisioning protected capacity (working -f- protection) for each connec-
tion, dynamic provisioning algorithms within the PWCE concept perform survivability provisioning 
over the already protected capacity. After the partitioning of the total transport capacity as il-
lustrated in Figure 5.1. any working capacity can be routed through the envelope provided that 
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the used links have some implicitly protected capacity left. Though, dynamic provisioning of pro-
tected capacity is restricted only to the provisioning of working capacity. Further details about state 
advertisement, network management overhead, and adaptive PWCE can be found in [SG05, She06]. 
5.3 Design of P W C E 
The spare capacity used to set up protection paths can be either configured on the fly to respond 
to any protection need, or can be end-to-end pre-configured and used in case of a failure. In the 
design of PWCEs, as in classical protection schemes, the protection capacity can be either reserved 
and configured dynamically in case of a failure, or fully pre-cross connected ahead of failures. 
In order to minimize the recovery delay and simplify the provisioning operations in the PWCE 
paradigm, we adopt the fully pre-cross connected p-cycle protection approach. By using p-cycles in 
the design of PWCEs, we aim at gathering the advantages of the PWCE design approach and the p-
cycle protection method. Indeed, the p-cycle based PWCE approach allows pre-deployment of fully 
pre-cross connected structures, which enable fast recovery of traffic with a limited reconfiguration 
in the underlying protection plane. 
5.3.1 p-Cycle Based PWCE 
The design problem of p-cycle based PWCE can be defined as a combinatorial problem consisting 
to find an appropriate set of p-cycles to protect the maximum capacity in the network for a given 
link/network spare capacity budget that is known in advance. 
Figure 5.2 illustrates two optimal designs of survivable WDM networks based on PWCE using 
p-cycles. The transport capacity budget of the network is illustrated in Figure 5.1: All links are 
assigned a transport capacity equal to four channels of the same capacity. Two types of p-cycles 
are used in these two protection schemes in order to maximize the size of the designed PWCE: The 
simple and non-simple p-cycles. The simple p-cycle based scheme includes all elementary p-cycles. 
i.e.. p-cycles that pass through each node in the network at most once. The non-simple p-cycle 
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based scheme includes all possible p-cycles in the network1, i.e., there is no limit on the number of 
times a p-cycle can pass through any node. This means that the simple p-cycle set is a subset of 
the non-simple one. 
In Figure 5.2-(a), the illustrated protection scheme contains four simple p-cycles. Figure 5.2-(b) 
contains two copies of the illustrated single non simple p-cycle. The objective function of these two 
designs is to maximize the PWCE size with a link spare capacity budget < 50% on each link, i.e., 2 
channels. 
(a) Simple p-cycle (b) Non-Simple p-cycle 



























































Table 5 1: Capacity Distribution in Simple and Non-Simple p-Cvcle Based PWCEs 
Table 5.1 illustrates the optimized partitioning of the total transport capacity over the protection 
and working planes. The wf and w}1 values represent the link protection budget and the resulting 
1
 Excluding p-cycles that ma\ pass through a link moie than once 
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protected capacity on each link £, respectively. We see in Table 5.1 that the non-simple scheme uses 
more efficiently the spare capacity to provide a larger size PWCE than the simple p-cycle scheme. 
The non-simple cycle in Figure 5.2-(b) uses less spare capacity (16 channels) and provides larger 
protected capacity (20 channels) than the simple p-cycle based scheme in Figure 5.2-(a), which uses 
18 spare channels and provides only 18 protected channels (100% redundancy). Obviously, as the 
set of simple p-cycles is a subset of the set of non-simple p-cycles, the size of the PWCE provided 
by the non-simple p-cycles is at least as large as that provided by the set of simple p-cycles. 
5.3.2 Prior Work on Design of P W C E 
Conventional design methods of PWCE based on p-cycles have tackled the problem by a two-step 
approach [SG04b, SG05, ZZB05, SG03a, RT05]. The first step deals with the enumeration of all/(set 
of) p-cycles in the network to form a potential candidate set; and the second step selects the most 
promising subset of p-cycles from the candidate set using ILP (Integer Linear Program) optimization 
methods [SG03a, Sch02]. However, as explained in Chapter 4, the size of the candidate p-cycle set 
grows exponentially as the network size increases, and from this results large ILP models, which in 
turn, makes the classical ILP optimization algorithms very time-consuming and not scalable. 
To address the scalability issue, different polynomial time algorithms for selecting a limited 
number of p-cycles have been proposed in the literature [DHGY03, ZY02a]. These algorithms are 
elaborated to select a subset of valuable p-cycles (based on some metrics, "see Sections 3.1.4 and 
4.1.2 for examples of metrics) that contains the potential candidates for the ILP optimization step. 
Obviously, the selected p-cycles are individually efficient, but when combined together, they generally 
provide only a suboptimal solution which is not necessarily close to the optimal one (see Section 5.5). 
However, those algorithms allow an interesting trade off between the scalability of the optimization 
method and the quality of the solutions. Furthermore, the adopted design metrics have been very 
often based on a single protection parameter, e.g., protected capacity or protection capacity, which 
does not reflect the real dimension of the PWCE design problem. Indeed, not all links have the same 
link spare capacity budget and same potential working capacity in the network, though, most of the 
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candidate p-cycles will be either impossible to set up because of a limited spare capacity budget, or 
will be providing more or less protected capacity that what is needed. 
In the design* of survivable WDM network based on PWCE, only simple p-cycle building blocks 
have been considered. The advantages of using non-simple p-cycles over simple p-cycles in WDM 
networks were discussed in [Gru03]. Therein, different types of non-simple p-cycles were illustrated, 
and an ILP optimization model was proposed. The proposed ILP optimization method was a two-
step based approach where a subset of non-simple p-cycles (only p-cycles of a limited length) were 
enumerated ahead of an optimization method which consisted to maximize the grade of service. 
The set of non-simple p-cycles is larger than the simple p-cycle set, though, this design approach is 
impractical and can never scale even in medium size networks. Furthermore, because the considered 
potential p-cycles are only a subset of the global set of non-simple p-cycles, the resulting solution is 
not necessarily a global optimal solution, rather, it is a local optimal solution. 
5.3.3 Discussion and Further Considerations 
As pointed out in previous Sections 4.1.2 and 3.1.4, the prevalent design approach consisting to 
pre-enumerate (all or a selection of) candidate p-cycles before the optimization approach is not 
practical nor scalable. The main drawback of this design approach lies in the enumeration step of 
the candidate p-cycles. In the selection process, the properties of the p-cycles are usually considered 
independently of the network conditions, e.g., link spare capacity budget and traffic distribution. 
This inevitably leads to excessive enumeration of inappropriate p-cycles. 
In the next section, we propose a new design approach of PWCE using the large scale CG 
optimization tools. In contrast with the two-step conventional design approach, a CG based method 
does not require an a priori explicit enumeration of all/(a set of) p-cycles in the network. A limited 
number of relevant p-cycles are dynamically generated during the optimization process only when 
they are needed in order to improve the current LP solution. Though, it results in a compact model 
< 
with a small number of variables, which is solvable by the highly scalable CG approach. 
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5.4 Efficient and Scalable Design of p-Cycle Based PWCE 
In this section, we propose a CG-based method where the p-cycle enumeration and the optimiza-
tion processes are jointly performed dynamically by two complementary problems. Both the link 
spare capacity budget and the potential working capacity are integrated as design parameters and 
considered in the generation process of potential p-cycles. Recall that a CG formulation relies on a 
decomposition of the initial problem into the so-called master and pricing problems, see, Chapter 4 
for a basic background). In our CG optimization approach of p-cycle based PWCE, the RMP (op-
erates on a restricted set of p-cycles generated dynamically by the pricing problem) maximizes the 
PWCE size according to a set of capacity (working and protection) constraints. At each iteration, 
the RMP is solved and provides the values of the dual variables which are necessary for solving the 
pricing problem. The output (solution) of the pricing problem is a new promising p-cycle which is 
added to the RMP. The augmented master and pricing problems are solved alternatively until no 
more promising p-cycles can be found, i e., no more p-cycles with a positive (assuming the master 
problem is a maximization problem) reduced cost can be found. 
The design problem of a p-cycle based PWCE can be described as follows: Given a link or 
network spare capacity budget and a network traffic forecast, find the optimal combination of p-
cycles that will maximize the protected capacity (or at least protect the forecasted traffic demands). 
In the next subsection, we present our CG based formulation for the design of optimized p-cycle 
based PWCE. 
5.4.1 Master Problem 
The master problem takes care of the capacity constraints, i.e., the working capacity and of the 
spare capacity of the potential p-cycles. For both simple and non-simple p-cycles, we develop the 
same master problem as in both optimization problems we deal with the selection of p-cycles. We 
denote the number of protected working capacity units on a link £ in the network by wi, which is 
less or equal to the maximum (total) transport capacity {wf) of link £: we < wf for all £ £ C We 
suppose that we are given a link spare capacity budget ^F (ipf < at. wf. at a real G {0,1}) which 
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will be used for the setup of protection capacity wf. 
Our objective is to maximize the number of working link-channels wt according to a certain 
distribution U(ut) in the network, so the objective function is: 
m a x \ utwt. 
£<E£ 
As in [GSOO], we use bidirectional p-cycles, therefore, straddling-cycle links can be protected in 
two ways, as two restoration paths are available for each unit of p-cycle. We define two parameters 
a\ and b\ in order to configure the p-cycles: a\ gives the number of protected channels on link £ by 
the p-cycle s, and b\ E {0,1} counts the used capacity by p-cycle s along each link £: 
2 if £ is a straddling-cycle link in p-cycle s 
1 if £ is an on-cycle link in p-cycle s 
0 otherwise. 
1 if £ is an on-cycle link in p-cycle 5 
0 otherwise. 
The variables of the optimization problem are wt and zs G Z + , which are the number of protected 
working capacity units on link £ and the thickness (number of copies) of unit-capacity p-cycle 3, 
respectively. 
The constraints of the master problem are: 
^Talzs -wt>0 
ses 




uu > w?m 
WL,z
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Constraints (5.1) guarantee a link protection for wt working channels along each link £. Con-
straints (5.2) prevent the overall working and protection capacity of link £ from exceeding its trans-
port capacity (wf). Constraints (5.3) impose a link spare capacity budget. Constraints (5.4) impose 
a minimum protected working capacity (wfm) along each link. Constraints (5.5) are integrality con-
straints. Observe that the master problem is expressed in terms of variables indexed dynamically by 
s G S. The dynamic set S grows as long as the pricing problem is able to generate columns (cycles) 
with a positive reduced cost, i.e., promising p-cycles that can improve the value of the objective 
function of the LP relaxation of the master problem. 
5.4.2 Simple p-Cycle Pricing Problem 
The pricing problem corresponds to the optimization problem of maximizing the reduced cost asso-
ciated to variables zs in the master problem. The simple p-cycle pricing problem generates simple 
p-cycles to protect working capacity in the network. We define the variables of the pricing problem 
as follows: 
x? 
1 if £ is an on-cycle link in the current p-cycle 
0 otherwise, 
1 if £ is a straddling-cycle link in the current p-cycle 
xi = < 
0 otherwise, 
We also need the following sets: 
For all v G V, the set of adjacent links to node v 
£(v) = {£3'-£3 ={v,vt} eC 
For all £ G £, the set of two end-nodes of link t. 
V(£) = { vuv3 : £ = {v7.Vj} 
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and, for all i V C V , the cocycle of TV, i.e., the set of links such that one of its end-node belongs to 
N and the other does not: 
E(N) =<£:£ = {vz,v3} :vleN,vJe V\N I . 
The objective function of the pricing problem, i.e., the maximization of the reduced cost can be 
written as follows, 
max ( J2 ap] - £ b\B\ - £ b\6\\ , 
\£ec tec tec ) 
where 6j, 0|, 6£ are the dual variable vectors associated with constraints (5.1), (5.2) and (5.3), 
respectively. These dual variables contain an important information about the protected capacity, 
the used capacity, and the available spare capacity after each iteration. When expressed in terms of 
the variables of the pricing problem, the objective function becomes equivalent to. 
max (j2 (9i ~ fi ~ *?) *? + 2 £ 0\x\\ . 
\£ec £ec J 
The constraints of the pricing problem aie defined in older to shape the generated p-cycles. They 
can be written as follows: 
] T x% < 2 v G V (5.6) 
£e£(v) 
] T x°£f>x°£ v£VJe£(v) (5.7) 
£'e£{v) £'^£ 
vev(£)£'e£(v) 
] T x°L>x% N CVJ' e£(N) (5.9) 
£e€{N) 
x°£.xl e{o.i} £eC. (5 10) 
All nodes belonging to a given cycle are required to have at most two incident links in the cycle. 
This is ensured by the sets of constraints (5.6) and (5.7). Constraints (5 6) set the upper bound on 
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the number on incident links, and constraints (5.7) set that bound to either two or zero. Constraints 
(5.8) guarantee that if a link straddles the current p-cycle, then each of its end-no des is also adjacent 
to two links that are on-cycle ones. Constraints (5.9) guarantee that if a link is straddling a p-cycle, 
then both of its end-nodes belong to the same cycle. Constraints (5.8) and (5.9) together guarantee 
that if a link £ is straddling a cycle, then any network cut separating its two end-nodes should 
contain two on-cycle links. The size of the set of constraints (5.9) is equal to the number of cuts 
separating all node pairs in the networks. Their enumeration would be impossible or results in a 
huge ILP model. In this case, and in order to scale the pricing model in large networks, we only add 
a few of them at the beginning of the optimization process, and others only when they are violated. 
Indeed, most of these cuts will not be useful and will not be binding in the optimal solution. Let 
Figure 5.3: Generated p-Cycles by the Pricing Model 
us look at an example in Figure 5.3 to illustrate the purpose of these last two types of constraints. 
The pricing problem can generate any of the p-cycles Ci, C2 or C3 on an individual basis, but it 
can also generate the p-cycles C\ and C3 simultaneously. However, note that p-cycles C2 and C3 
cannot be generated simultaneously because of constraints (5 8) and (5.9) which do not allow a link 
to straddle two different p-cycles. 
Though, each iteration of the pricing problem can generate more than one elementary p-cycle. 
and can avoid counting protection working capacity straddling different p-cycles. This is helpful in 
minimizing of the number of calls to the pricing problem. 
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5.4.3 Non-Simple p-Cycles Pricing Problem 
The only difference between the non-simple p-cycle pricing problem and the simple one is in the 
shape of the protection structures. In the non-simple p-cycle scheme, a p-cycle can pass through 
a node more than once. Though, it can protect more straddling-cycle links (see Figure 5.2 for an 
example). The reduced cost of the master problem does not change, hence the pricing optimization 
objective of the non-simple p-cycle remains the same. 
The constraints of the pricing problem are updated as follows: Constraints (5.6) and (5.7) are 
replaced by constraints (5.11). Constraints (5.8) to (5.10) are kept as in the previous simple p-cycle 
model, and we add constraints (5.12). 
] T x°£ = 2nv ve V (5.11) 
se£(v) 
x\-Yx°£<\ £eC (5.12) 
n , G Z + veV (5.13) 
All nodes spanned by a p-cycle are required to have an even number of incident links in the 
p-cycle, which is ensured by constraints (5.11). Constraints (5.12) say that a link £ cannot be a 
straddling-cycle and an on-cycle link at the same time. In this non-simple p-cycle model, two end-
nodes of an on-cycle link can have more than two incident links in the underlying p-cycle. Though, 
to avoid any confusion with a straddling-cycle link, we used the set (5.12) of constraints. Constraints 
(5.13) are additional integrality constraints. 
5.5 Numerical Results 
In this section, we evaluate the performances of the two protection methods base on simple and 
non-simple p-cycles, respectively. 
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5.5.1 p-Cycle Protection Model 
In addition to our CG-based approach, we consider two other approaches for enumerating p-cycles. 
The first approach [SG03a, SG04b, Sch02, GSOO] is based on an exhaustive enumeration of all p-
cycles in the network. The second one [ZY02a, DHGY03] is based on a selective enumeration of 
a restricted set of valued p-cycles. We consider three methods of selective enumeration, which 
have appeared in the literature: The Straddling Link Algorithm (SLA,) [ZY02a], and the GROW and 
EXPAND ones of [DHGY03]. These methods are used as p-cycle suppliers to an ILP formulation 
(our master problem). The first method (denoted by B-ILP) is a brute force approach based on 
an exhaustive enumeration. The three other methods are S-ILP for ILP based on SLA procedure of 
[ZY02a], E-ILP and G-ILP for ILP based EXPAND and GROW procedures of [DHGY03], respectively. 
Note that the resulting ILP models differ from the column generation model in the way the p-cycles 
are generated (off-line vs. on-line), and also in their number of candidate p-cycles (large to huge vs. 
very limited). 
5.5.2 Network Instances 
Table 5.2 presents the network instances used in the comparison of the solution methods considered 
in this study. The characteristics of each physical topology are as follows: For each network, we 
provide the number of nodes and links, the average network degree and the standard deviation of 
the node degrees (which measures the spread of the values of node degrees). 
Networks 
N S F [SG03a] 
COST239 [SG03a] 



























Table 5.2: Network Instances 
85 
5.5.3 Simple p-Cycle Based P W C E 
In this section, we compare the performance of the CG optimization method of p-cycle based PWCE 
with the ILP optimization one based on the four different enumeration strategies evoked above. 
Comparison metrics 
We compare the quality of the solutions obtained by the considered models based on the classical 
evaluation metrics (redundancy, runtime, capacity efficiency) and the following two new design 
metrics: 
^2 unprotected capacity on £ 
Protection gap ratio = —— ; — 
2^ protected capacity on £ 
£ec 
which gives the ratio of unprotected working capacity over the protected one in the network, and 
Y2 protection overhead on £ 
Protection overhead ratio = - =
 : : -
2^ protection capacity on £ 
£ec 
where the protection overhead is defined as the difference between the amount of potential protected 
capacity that can be provided by the current protection plane and the effective working capacity 
that is protected. The protection overhead ratio gives the fraction of spare capacity, which is not 
protecting any working capacity along some links. 
Numerical results in the example below show that, very often, those two ratios are not equal to 0. 
The explanation is that (i) the design and the deployment of p-cycles are performed independently 
of the available capacity, and (n) the transport capacity on each link varies from one link to the 
next (alternating links with high and low capacities). 
Protection Gap and Protection Overhead: An Example 
Let us consider the p-cycle scheme example shown in Figure 5.4, where the labels on the links 
correspond to their transport capacities (wf). Assume that, in a first step, the protection plane is 
made of p-cycles C\ and C2. each of them with one unit spare capacity (wavelength channel). 
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The illustrated p-cycle protection scheme shows a protection overhead, and does not guarantee 
100% protection to all non-protection capacity (protection gap). In Figure 5.4, p-cycles C\ and C2 
Figure 5.4: Protection Gap and Protection Overhead 
are configured with one light channel along all their on-cycle links. Therefore, they can provide one 
protected working channel for each on-cycle link and two for each straddling-cycle link. Let us first 
have a look at the protection gap. Links {^ 4, B} and {^ 4, D} have, each, a total protection gap of 
two link-channels. Indeed, link {A,B} has a total of four transport channels, one channel is used 
as a spare capacity channel by p-cycle C2l which provides one protected working channel, and the 
remaining two link-channels are not protected by the current protection plane, thus, it results in a 
protection gap of 2 link-channels. Link {A, D} is a straddling-cycle link in p-cycle C2 and can have 
up to two protected working channels by C2. This leaves two channels that cannot be protected, 
hence a protection gap of 2 channels along {A,D}. 
Regarding the protection capacity overhead, the proposed protection plan has a protection over-
head of four channels along links {B.C} and {CD}. Indeed, {B.C} is an on-cycle link in p-cycle 
C\ and a straddling-cycle link in p-cycle C2, it is supposed to have up to 2 -h 1 protected working 
channels, but only one is available, therefore it results in a capacity overhead of 3— 1 channels. Link 
{C, D} is an on-C3'cle link in p-cycles C\ and C2, it is supposed to have up to 1 -I- 1 protected work-
ing channels, but as all the available transport capacity along this link is consumed as protection 
capacity by p-c\ cles C\ and C2, there cannot be any channel along this link that can be associated 
with a protected working capacity unit, leading therefore to a protection overhead of two channels. 
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The link capacity distribution of the proposed protection plane is summarized in Table 5.3, 
where wfax is the maximum transport capacity (number of transport channels), w£v is the protected 






































Table 5.3: Capacity Distribution 
From Table 5 3, we have 10 protected working channels and 8 protection channels (by summing^ 
along the wY and wf columns respectively). The protection gap can be calculated as: 
V>r x -wf-wl); 
£ec 
it is equal to 22 — 10 — 8 = 4 (as detailed above) 
The protection overhead is equal to: 
( 
]T(2n s l R A + nON"CY)z5 - J2WV 
ses tec 
where n S I R \ n0N_CY are the number of straddling and on-cycle links, respectively. zs is the number 
of copies of p-cycle 5. Therefore, the proposed protection plane has a protection overhead equal to 
(2 x 1 + 4) x 1 + (2 x 2 4- 4) x 1 - 10 = 14 - 10 = 4 channels. 
We deduce: 
Protection gap ratio = 4/10 = 40%. 
Protection overhead ratio = (14 - 10)/8 = 4/8 = 50%. 
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( y 
The optimal solution to this PWCE design problem obtained by the CG-based solution method 
proposed in Section 5.4.2, is given in Figure 5.5. Both the associated protection gap ratio and the 
protection overhead ratio are equal to zero in this optimal design. 
Recall that not all the optimal solutions have a protection gap and overhead equal to zero, but 
it is of interest to keep these two design parameters as small as possible in order to increase the 
efficiency of the PCWE design methods (illustrative examples are shown in Section 5.5.4). 
The protection gap and the protection overhead can be linked to the forcer concept studied in 
[GMOO] (forcer-link is a link such that any increase in its protected working capacity implies an 
increase in the total spare capacity budget of the network). A link with a nonzero protection gap is 
a forcer-link, although it has an available working (but unprotected) capacity. A link with protection 
overhead is a forcer link, because no additional working capacity is possible along the link with the 
current protection plan. 
5.5.4 Simple p-Cycle Numerical Results 
Two design qualities are sought in this work, scalability and efficiency. The scalability is evaluated 
through the number of generated p-cycles and the runtime of the optimization methods. The 
efficiency is evaluated through the capacity redundancy, the protection gap and overhead ratios. 
Our comparison experiments are classified into two classes: In the first class, we consider that 
all the fibers have the same transport capacity (80 channels/fiber), and in the second class (Table 
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5.9), we adopt a random transport capacity distribution on fibers and investigate the impact on the 
efficiency of the proposed and studied design methods. 
Based on the size and connectivity of the network instances, we classified the experiments into 
two categories. Tables 5.4 to 5.6 present the results of the tests performed on the first category of 
network instances (NSF, COST239, and USA), i.e., networks of relatively small size. In the right 
most column, we provide the optimal solution (maximum PWCE) using the CG-based approach: 
The other columns, with headers B-ILP, S-ILP, E-ILP, G-ILP, contain the values of the ILP models 
derived from a set of p-cycles enumerated by: DFS explicit enumeration of all p-cycles, SLA [ZY02a], 
EXPAND, and GROW [DHGY03], respectively. 
Tables 5.4 to 5.6 show the results obtained on the first three network instances. The observations 
are the same for all three network instances: The set of p-cycles generated by the S-ILP, E-ILP, 
G-ILP and B-ILP models is getting larger with each model as the network size increases (the increase 
is in the order of the number of links). This translates of course in increasing computing times. The 
B-ILP solution method is, by far, the most time consuming among the compared methods. Indeed, 
the computing time required for the p-cycle enumeration and the optimization of the resulting huge 
ILP model for B-ILP is 300, 3800 and 6300 times more than that of S-ILP, E-ILP and G-ILP 
respectively for the USA network. 
# of potential p-cycles 
Computing time (sec.) 
# of selected p-cycles 




Protection gap ratio 




















































Table 5.4: CG vs. Conventional Design Methods of PWCE - NSF Network 
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The number of selected p-cycles corresponds to the number of activated p-cycles in the optimal 
solution, these numbers are remarkably smaller than the set of considered potential p-cycles in the 
B-ILP method. These numbers in the B-ILP approach are far from the initially considered potential 
p-cycles in all the considered networks. Our optimization objective is to maximize the size of the 
protected working capacity envelope. Note that the selected p-cycles with a larger average size (row 
3) in B-ILP are globally more efficient than those of S-ILP, E-ILP and G-ILP. 
# of potential p-cycles 
Computing time (sec.) 
# of selected p-cycles 




Protection gap ratio 




















































Table 5.5: CG vs. Conventional Design Methods of PWCE - COST239 Network 
The size of the resulting PWCE is proportional to the size of the considered p-cycles in the final 
solutions of all evaluated methods. The activated p-cycles in the optimal solutions of S-ILP. E-ILP 
and G-ILP are slightly smaller, require more spare capacity and provide less protected working 
capacity, and thus, result in high protection redundancy. Two more characteristics of S-ILP, E-
ILP and G-ILP are: They do not provide 100% protection in the network, and some protection 
capacity is useless (overhead) along some links. Protection gap ratios of up to 12%. 15% and 3% 
and protection overhead ratios of up to 15.4%, 8.8% and 9.% are recorded with S.-ILP, E-ILP and 
G-ILP, respectively. 
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# of potential p-cycles 
Computing time (sec.) 
# of selected p-cycles 




Protection gap ratio 




















































Table 5.6: CG vs. Conventional Design Methods of PWCE - USA Network 
Although the S-ILP, E-ILP and G-ILP solutions are less time consuming than those based on B-
ILP solutions, they are not as capacity efficient as the B-ILP solutions are. The protected working 
capacity and the required spare capacity of these former solutions are far less efficient than the 
optimal solutions of the B-ILP method. 
Table 5.7 summarizes the results of the previous experiments obtained by the S-ILP, E-ILP 
and G-ILP methods. The capacity gap to the optimality, which we define as the redundancy -f 

















Table 5.7: Optimality Gap of S-ILP, E-ILP and G-ILP 
Our CG-based design approach of p-cycle-based PWCE gathers the two qualities of the previously 
analyzed approaches, namely, the efficiency of the B-ILP method and the scalability (computing 
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# of potential p-cycles 
Computing time (sec) 
# of selected p-cycles 




Protection gap ratio 































































Table 5.8* CG vs. Conventional Design Methods of PWCE - Larger Networks 
time) of the S-ILP, E-ILP and G-ILP. Regardless of the size of the network, our CG method generates 
a limited number of p-cycles (3 in all cases), among the most relevant, and selects only what is needed 
(1 Hamiltonian p-cycle in all cases). In contrast to B-ILP, our optimization model is highly compact 
(generates less potential p-cycles) and results in significantly less resource usage (runtime is 1000 
times less than the B-ILP approach). Moreover, if we focus closely on the computing times, it is 
clear that our CG-based approach is not only faster than the B-ILP, but also faster than some of 
the other evaluated compact approaches, i.e., S-ILP, E-ILP and G-ILP. 
In the second category of experiments, larger network instances are considered (the last two 
networks in Table 5.2). The objective of these experiments is to evaluate the scalability of our 
design approach on larger network instances. The results obtained by our CG-based approach, 
the G-ILP and B-ILP approaches (more capacity efficient methods) are shown in Table 5.8> As in 
the previous experiments, the G-ILP approach is fast in combining the limited number of p-cycles 
in interesting solutions. However, its redundancy is still high (~ 20% more than the CG-based 
approach). In these two networks, the B-ILP approach fails to find a solution for the problem- No 
interesting solution has been found within the runtime of the solution method (6 days). Our CG-
based approach is by far the best approach for these two large networks, it is faster than the G-ILP 
approach and provides the optimal solution cfor the design problem The average size of the activated 
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p-cycles in these last experiments and all the previous ones is larger in the optimal solution, which 
allows us to conclude that, for PWCE design, larger p-cycles are more efficient than smaller. In 
addition to its capacity efficiency and scalability, our CG-based approach activates a small number 
of p-cycles in order to guarantee 100% protection (protection gap =0). Regarding the deployment 
issue of the p-cycles generated by the previously studied methods, the CG-based approach and the 
B-ILP (but B-ILP is not scalable) provide the easiest and practical solutions. Indeed, as the number 
of activated p-cycles is small, their deployment in a wavelength switched network (no wavelength 
conversion) becomes easier than with a larger number of p-cycles in the other approaches, i.e, S-ILP, 
E-ILP and G-ILP (need to solve another hard wavelength assignment problem). 
We have performed other experiments to show the limitations of the explicit enumeration of all 
the p-cycles before the optimization process. In the two-step approach, the p-cycle enumeration 
process is done ahead of the optimization process, only the physical connectivity of the networks 
is considered at this stage. We have varied the number of wavelength-channels of the physical 
links in the network, two capacity intervals ([40-80] and [60-80]) have been selected and a uniform 
distribution of link capacity was applied in these intervals, see Table 5.9. Intuitively, as the physical 
topology remains unchanged, the size of the set of enumerated p-cycles remains the same in the 
two-step methods, though, links with few channels (bottleneck links) and those with large number 
of channels will be used equally as in the case of links with the same capacity In our CG-based 
approach, p-cycles are generated by the pricing problem based on the dual variables of the master 
problem, the so far available capacity on each link is coded by these variables. So, the p-cycle 
generation process is dynamically adapted to the current available capacity. 
Table 5 9 gives a strong insight on the limitation of the two-step methods (either based on 
extensive or selected p-cycle enumeration). With links of different capacities, the active set of p-
C}'cles in the optimal solution grows as the capacity interval is extended. The active set of p-cycles 
is a bit larger than in the case where links are of the same capacity, (4 to 7) for B-ILP and CG-
based approach The computing times of the CG-based solution method are by far the best of all 
the computing times of the other methods. We solved the same ILP models as in the previous set 
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# of potential p-cycles 
Computing time (sec) 
# of selected p-cycles 
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Table 5.9- CG vs. Conventional Design Methods of PWCE - Links with Different Capacities 
of experiments (different transport capacities along links), on all the five networks considered in 
this study, and the obtained results were similar to the ones presented in Table 5.9, i.e, CG-based 
approach was by far the most efficient and scalable method among all the studied methods. The 
two solutions given by the B-ILP and CG-based methods in these two experiments have the same 
value (same PWCE size), although their redundancy, protection gap and protection overhead ratios 
are a bit different. The objective is to maximize the number of protected working channels in the 
network, so the working capacity envelope is of the same size in both cases, but its shape is not (not 
the same number of selected p-cycles in both methods). Different planning of spare capacity can 
create different PWCE shapes. In Table 5.9 the protection gap of the CG-based solution method is 
greater than that of B-ILP, but the protection overhead of the CG-based method is less than that 
of B-ILP. The difference between the two protection gap ratios is used as protection capacity in the 
B-ILP method (398 channels vs. 384 in CG-based approach), while the CG-based approach keeps it 
as unprotected capacity. The unprotected capacity (protection gap) of both methods is still usable 
to carry unpiotected traffic, thus the CG-based approach provides more working (even unprotected) 
capacity than the B-ILP method. Based on the above remarks, the solutions obtained with our 
CG-based approach are better than those provided by the B-ILP method, even though they provide 
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PWCEs of the same size. 
5.6 Non-Simple p-Cycle Numerical Results 
In this section, we evaluate the added value in terms of protection performances of non-simple p-
cycles over simple p-cycles. Recall that the simple p-cycle set is a subset of the non-simple p-cycle 
one. In this part of the numerical results, we focus on varying the link spare capacity budget, and 
see how the capacity redundancy ratio and the reliability ratio (, i.e., the ratio of protected capacity 
over the sum of the protected and non protected capacities) vary accordingly. We have summarized 
in Figure 5.6 the variation of these two ratios depending on the link spare capacity budget, for all 
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Figure 5.6: Non-Simple vs. Simple p-Cycle Protection Performances 
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The X-axis indicates the link spare capacity budget (upper bound on the link protection capacity), 
where 100% means that the potential spare capacity is equal to the total link transport capacity, 
and [z, j] that the link spare capacity budget lies in the interval [z, j] of the total transport capacity. 
We have considered six intervals of link spare capacity (see Figure 5.6) budget and applied uniform 
distributions of spare capacity over links in all the considered intervals. 
The capacity redundancy of the simple p-cycle based PWCE design method is higher than that 
based on non-simple p-cycle one in all the experiments that we conducted. When no limit is imposed 
on the link spare capacity budget (100% of transport capacity can be used as protection capacity 
on all links), the simple p-cycle based PWCE design method almost achieves the same capacity 
redundancy and reliability as the non-simple p-cycle based method. However, when the available 
link spare capacity budget is reduced, the non-simple p-cycle based PWCE method becomes more 
efficient (less capacity redundant and more reliable) than the simple p-cycle based method. This 
difference is more apparent in the France, USA and NSF networks and less in COST239 network: 
the design method based on non-simple p-cycles is ~ 25% more reliable for the NSF network (link 
spare capacity in [10,30]) than the method based only on simple p-cycles. Regarding the capacity 
redundancy, the design method based on non-simple p-cycles is ~ 10% less capacity redundant in 
the France network than the method based only on simple p-cycles. 
We observe that there is one network topology, the COST 239, for which almost similar perfor-' 
mances are obtained with the simple and the non-simple p-cycles. By having a close look to the 
characteristics of the topologies, we observe that COST239 has a high connectivity for all its nodes 
(low a), and therefore high flexibility is possible, whenever we set simple or non-simple p-cycles. 
The NSF network has lower connectivity (sparse network) and the degree values are widely spread 
(high a). Reducing the link spare capacity budget along some chosen links can reduce considerably 
the capacity efficiency of the design method using simple p-cycles. Non simple p-cycles offer more 
flexibility in exploiting the spare capacity, therefore they are more efficient than simple ones in using 
it, especially when it comes to building the PWCE in sparse networks. While the USA and France 
networks have similar average degrees, they have different degree standard deviations, see Table 5.2: 
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42% of the nodes in France network have a degree > 4 compared to 35% in the USA network. These 
characteristics explain why the advantage of using non-simple p-cycles rather than simple ones, is 
most apparent in the France network. 
In order to better assess the advantage of the non-simple over the simple p-cycles with respect 
to the variability of the connectivity parameters, or more generally, with respect to the variability 
of the spare capacities on the links, we decided to perform some additional experiments where we 
considered different distributions of the link spare capacity budget so as to artificially increase the 
node degree discrepancies. We, therefore, modified the link spare capacities so as to set ~ 10% of 
them to 0, in other words, to have 10 % of the links with a spare capacity budget equal to 0. Results 
are reported in Figure 5.7. The advantage of non-simple p-cycles over simple ones increases with 
the node degree discrepancies. 
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Figure 5.7- Node Degree Discrepancy Effect on p-Cycle Protection Capabilities 
More generally, as the set of non-simple p-cycles is much larger than the set of simple p-cycles, 
a PWCE design with non-simple p-cycles will always be at least as good as a PWCE design with 
simple p-cycles. independently of the spare capacity distribution and the network connectivity. 
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5.7 Conclusion 
The objective of this work was to develop a scalable and efficient method for the design of survivable 
WDM networks based on p-cycle-PWCE without a priori enumeration of any p-cycle. We first, 
using a column generation (CG) technique, developed a very efficient and scalable approach based 
on simple p-cycles where we focus on performance analysis, and secondly, extended the approach to 
include non-simple p-cycles as well as simple p-cycles. 
Unlike classical design methods of survivable WDM based on p-cycle-PWCE, our CG-based 
model and solution method does not require any prior enumeration of p-cycles, globally relevant 
cycles are dynamically generated during the optimization process based on the link spare capacity 
budget and the protection needs. 
To show the effectiveness of our CG-based method with simple p-cycles, we conducted extensive 
computational experiments on a set of five networks with different topology shapes. Results show 
that solutions of our CG-based method are much better than the solutions of all previously proposed 
methods within different design conditions. Further results showing the advantages of using non-
simple p-cycles over simple ones in the design of PWCEs were presented especially in sparse networks 
and with non homogeneous link spare capacity budget. 
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CHAPTER 6 
The Pre-configured Protection 
Extended-Tree Scheme 
6.1 Introduction 
Migration from ring-based towards mesh-based network architectures has raised many problems in 
the design and operation of optical networks and opened up several research directions. In the 
design of protection schemes, mesh-based architectures offer higher flexibility in the configuration of 
protection planes by enabling richer connectivity than ring-based ones. Though, a variety of shared 
protection topologies with different protection performances including, for example, cycles, trees, 
and linear trails can be deployed to provide protection in contrast to ring architectures where the 
network topology limits the candidate protection topologies to rings. 
The design problem of protection schemes in mesh optical networks involves different protection 
parameters, and a variety of design constraints and objectives. Different trade-offs exist among 
the different parameters in the design of protection schemes. The recovery delay and protection 
capacity cost are among the most targeted design parameters in different design approaches. The 
protection performance of a global scheme depends on the shape of its protection building blocks 
(logical topologies). Direct deployment of ring structures in mesh networks has been shown not to 
be efficient and requires high protection capacity [EHSOO]. The p-cycle-based approach [GS98] has 
been proposed as a solution to deployment of cyclical structures in mesh networks. This approach 
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preserves the advantage of ring topologies in terms of recovery delay, and extends their protection 
capacity efficiency by enabling protection of straddling-cycle links. The high speed recovery delay of 
ring and p-cycle-based schemes is not really due to their ring-like topology. Rather, it is due to the 
fact that'the protection capacity can be fully configured ahead of any failure, and used with a limited 
reconfiguration in case of a failure. Indeed, the pre-cross connectivity of these protection topologies 
allows dynamic monitoring and tuning of optical signals, though, guarantees high integrity of the 
backup paths before any traffic switching. This property is very important, especially in transparent 
optical networks. The pre-cross connectivity imposes a specific sharing strategy that may affect the 
cost of the required spare capacity in order to yield a 100% protection in a network. In addition, 
to be efficient, some fully pre-cross connected structures, e.g , p-cycles, may require a specific spare 
capacity distribution over the network links (see Section 3.5). 
Another protection topology in mesh networks that can enable interesting protection features is 
the pre-configured protection tree (p-tree) scheme. It is a highly scalable and a flexible structure that 
can support larger failure scenarios, such as, recovery from multiple failures. Dynamic provisioning 
of protection capacity with p-trees can be performed incrementally by local extensions of a p-
tree (adding branches). Although p-tree-based protection offers the advantages of scalability, local 
restoration capabilities, and failure impact restriction, it suffers from capacity inefficiency [GG07] 
and recovery delay due to the dynamic cross connection of the protection capacity. 
In this chapter, we propose a novel protection approach named pre-configured protection extended-
tree (p-etree). This novel protection approach uses hybrid protection structures based on p-trees 
and p-cycles. In Section 6 2, we give our motivation and goals for the p-etree scheme. We present 
more in detail the concept of p-etree m Section 6.3, and propose an optimization model based on 
CG in order to optimize the size and shape of different PWTCEs in Section 6.4 Section 6.5 contains 
the computational results. Therein, we evaluate the capacity efficiency and the recovery delay of 
the p-etree scheme and compare its performance with different pre-defined shape structure based 
protection schemes. Different link spare capacity budgets are used to measuie the flexibility of the 
compared methods. Section 6.6 concludes the chapter. 
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6.2 Motivation and Goals 
In this chapter, we are interested in the design of protection schemes where the link spare capacity 
budget is not uniform, and the protection topologies are not all of the same shape and type. Our 
main concern is to develop flexible and scalable structures to provide the expected protection level 
with the lowest possible spare capacity budget and an optimized recovery time when the link spare 
capacity budget is not necessarily uniform. The p-cycle and p-tree structures belong to two different 
families of protection structures: The fully pre-cross connected and dynamically cross connected 
structures. These two complementary structures can be used to supply their mutual needs and offset 
their mutual disadvantages. Indeed, the capacity efficiency of p-cycles and their recovery delay can 
offset the capacity inefficiency and recovery delay of p-trees. and the scalability and flexibility of 
p-trees can offset that of p-cycles. Based on these two pre-defined shape protection structures, we 
propose a novel protection strategy that consists to potentially construct fully pre-cross connected 
structures such as p-cycles and p-trails, starting from a p-tree by re-shaping its topology. Our goal 
is to construct scalable protection structures from basic p-trees by potentially (when it is profitable 
and there is enough spare capacity) extending their protection capabilities and optimizing their 
recovery delays. We establish some new integer linear programming models, and use CG in order 
to optimize the construction of the p-etree structures in the design of PWCEs. 
6.3 The Pre-Configured Ext ended-Tree (p-eTYee) Concept 
In the design of protection schemes, we are used to approaches, which consist to name the protection 
scheme after the shape of the protection topologies, e.g., p-cycle and p-tree based protection schemes. 
The protection performance including capacity efficiency, recovery delay, flexibility and scalability 
of those protection schemes depend greatly on the shape of the protection structures Hence, at 
a certain degree, we can predict the performance of a global scheme if we know the shape of the 
protection building blocks. In the next section, we present an illustrative example of the p-etree 
construction in a network model where the link spare capacity is not uniform and p-tree and p-cycle 
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schemes are either not efficient or not flexible in providing the targeted protection. Therein, we 
discuss in detail the p-etree protection scheme and its potential building blocks. 
6.3.1 Toward t h e p-eTree Scheme 
Figure 6.1 presents a WDM network C7{V, L) where a link spare capacity budget is given next to 
each link as follows: each link (£ G C) has two units of spare capacity except links £E,F and £E,D 
which have no available spare capacity (equal to zero). We assume that the objective is to maximize 
Figure 6.1: Spare Capacity Model 
the size of the PWCE, i.e., protect the maximum possible amount of capacity. In the next three 
sections, we illustrate three optimal designs of protection schemes respectively based on p-trees, 
p-cycles and p-etrees and compare their designs of PWCEs. 
Pre-configured Pro tec t ion Tree (p~1Vee) Scheme 
The basic building blocks in p-tree protection schemes [SG99] are trees. A pre-configured tree (p-
tree) can provide protection only for straddling-tree links (links whose two-end nodes are in the 
same tree, but do not define a tree link). In order to ensure efficient protection, multiple overlapping 
p-trees are required. Figure 6.2 illustrates an optimal p-tree based scheme where two overlapping 
trees on different channels provide protection in the network model of Figure 6.1. In terms of 
capacity efficiency, p-tree based protection is known to be far less capacity efficient than the p-
cycle protection [GG07]. In addition, as a basic protection pattern, a p-tree cannot be considered 
as a totally pre-cross connected structure, unless, it is shaped like a linear trail (no bifurcation). 
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However, the p-tree protection has some advantages over linear and cyclical protections. Firstly, 
when spare capacity is not uniformly distributed over the links of a network, cyclical structures like 
p-cycles may not be able to economically provide a given protection level [HS07]. Secondly, in case 
of a failure, it is possible to perform local restoration through dynamic cross connection of some 
backup segment paths. These advantages allow more flexibility in exploiting the spare capacity, and 
thus increases the resiliency against multiple failures, even if the protection scheme aims at only 
addressing the single failure protection issue. Through dynamic cross-connection of spare capacity 
at nodes F and D in Figure 6.2-(a) and at node A in Figure 6.2-(b) it is possible to restore any one 
of the straddling-tree links even those without spare capacity. 
(a) (b) 
Figure 6.2: Pre-Configured Protection Tree (p-Tree) Scheme 
Although the flexibility in provisioning protection capacity is higher when the cross connects 
are made dynamically, the delay incurred by the dynamic setting of the paths (particularly when 
many sequential cross-connects need to be set up on the fly) may seriously slow down the dynamic 
provisioning operation, especially in transparent networks. 
Pre-Configured Protection Cycle (p-Cycle) Scheme 
The p-cycle protection scheme [GS98] is widely acknowledged as the most efficient pre-configured 
protection scheme in terms of capacity efficiency and switching delay [SGOO]. However, when the 
distribution of spare capacity over the links is not uniform, or in case of a sparse network, setting 
up a p-cycle may result in an expensive investment in terms of spare capacity [HS07]. 
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In Figures 6.3-(a) and 6.3-(b), two optimal designs based on simple and non-simple p-cycles 
respectively are illustrated of the network model in Figure 6.1. Each of the simple p-cycles in Figure 
6.3-(a) has one capacity unit while in Figure 6.3-(b) the single non-simple p-cycle has two capacity 
units. Compared to the previous p-tree design, which uses 14 spare channels and provides only 10 J 
(a) (b) 
Figure 6.3: Pre-configured protection Cycle (p-Cycle) Scheme 
protected channels, the two simple and non-simple p-cycle-based schemes use 18 and 16 channels, 
and provide respectively 18 and 20 channels. 
Due to the link spare capacity budget constraint, none of the totally pre-cross connected cyclical 
structures can provide protected capacity on links E — F and E — D. Existing solutions in the 
literature which consist to combine totally pre-cross connected patterns like p-cycles and linear 
trails [SG99. LS08] cannot remedy the problem in this case without affecting the capacity efficiency 
of the protection scheme. 
Pre-configured Protection Extended-Tree (p-eTree) Scheme 
Our proposal for pre-configured extended-trees is motivated, on the one hand, by the capacity 
efficiency and restoration speed of p-cycle schemes and, on the other hand, by the flexibility of 
p-trees and linear trails in providing protected capacity even within constrained spare capacity 
budgets. 
Figure 6 4 illustrates a p-etree protection scheme in the network model of Figure 6.1. We use two 
copies of the illustrated p-etree structure The bold lines represent the basic tree, and the dashed 
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bold lines the extending tree links. The resulting structure is a hybrid one, composed of two sub 
structures: A pre-cross connected (cyclical thick lines), and a linear trail which is incident to the 
first one, but not a priori cross-connected with it (link E — A). 
Figure 6.4: Pre-Configured Extended-Tree (p-eTree) Scheme 
In Figure 6.4, the selected tree (not necessarily a spanning tree) is extended by adding some 
straddling-tree links C — F and G — D and cross-connecting the spare capacity at node A as follows: 
A — C connected to A — J5, A — H connected to A — G. The resulting pattern is an optimized 
pre-cross connected structure where, only a limited number of cross-connects need to be performed 
dynamically in case of a failure In Figure 6.4, only node A needs to perform dynamic cross-
connection of protection capacity in case of a failure, and this is only when a failure occurs on link 
E - F or E — D. The protection branch A — E incident at the non-simple p-cycle structure is part 
of the initial p-tree and it is part of the current p-etree. In case of a failure on link E — F or E - Z>, 
this branch is connected to A — H or A — G in order to isolate the backup path to protect E — F 
or E — D respectively 
Let us have a look at the capacity efficiency of our p-etree protection scheme in Figure 6.4: 
Therein, we use 18 spare channels and provide 24 protected channels, i.e., more protected channels 
compared to the previous p-tree and p-cycle scheme in Figures 6.2 and 6.3, respectively. Moreover, 
the capacity redundancy of the p-etree scheme is 0 75 whereas it is 0.8 and 0 9 for the non-simple 
and simple p-cycle schemes, respectively. 
In Figure 6 4. a potential protection structure of the p-etree protection scheme is illustrated. 
However, following the extension strategy, different other shapes can result. In the next section, we 
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illustrate other potential p-etree structures. 
6.3.2 Potential p-eTree Protection Structures 
There is a priori no restriction on the shape of the building blocks in a p-etree scheme. Starting from 
a tree, we can construct different shape structures including simple and non-simple cycles, trails, 
and a bunch of hybrid structures composed of elementary cycles, trails, and trees. In Figure 6.5, we 
represent all the potential shapes that can take the protection structures resulting from extending 
p-trees following the p-etree approach. The protection structures can be classified into two families: 
• Pure structures, which include pure p-trees (spanning all the network nodes or not), see Figures 
6.5-(a),(b), pure p-trails in Figures 6.5-(c), pure simple p-cycles, see Figures 6.5-(d), and pure 
non-simple p-cycles, see Figures 6.5-(g). Recall that a p-trail is a particular p-tree without 
bifurcations, and a simple as well as a non-simple p-cycle can be obtained from a p-tree by 
adding one and two straddling-tree links, respectively. 
• Hybrid structures, this family can be divided into two sub-families 
— Hybrid p-cycles and p-trees, includes simple as well as non simple p-cycles combined with 
p-trees, see Figures 6.5-(e) for simple p-cycles and Figure 6.5-(h) for non-simple p-cycles. 
— Hybrid p-cycles and p-trails, includes simple as well as non simple p-cycles combined with 
p-trails, see Figures 6.5-(f) for simple p-cycles and Figure 6.5-(i) for non-simple p-cycles. 
The p-etree design approach extends the solution space of all previously proposed schemes with 
pure and hybrid patterns. Though, it is more flexible to meet different objectives in the design 
problem. In Figures 6.2 to 6.4, the design objective is to maximize the size of the PWCE. However, 
with the extended range of potential protection structures in the p-etree approach, different other 
design objectives can be effectively reached. 
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Figure 6 5 Potential (p-eTree) Protection Stiuctures 
6o3o3 Recovery Delay Analysis of p-eTree Scheme 
Regarding the reco\erv delay the resulting optimized pre-cross connected p-etree structures can 
approach the speed of a totally pie-cross connected stiucture Indeed, when signaling messages to 
set up the cioss-connects are sent out-of-band to a very limited number of nodes, it is possible to 
set up these cross-connects m parallel yith those at the end-nodes of the affected link In order to 
discuss the recover} delay, we introduce the following notation 
• Dn Time for a node n to detect a link failure on one of its incident links 
P£ Piopagation delay on link £ 
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• Tn: Time to process and transmit a message at node n. 
• Cn: Time to setup and test a cross-connect at node n (Cn > Tn 4- P£). 
In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that setting and testing a cross connect takes the same 
amount of time at all the nodes (Cn = C), and that signaling is performed sequentially along the 
backup protection paths. Thus, the recovery delay in case of a hybrid or pure protection pattern is 
equal to: 
h 
Ds + Ti + P£l + T2 + Pi2 + • • • + C = Ds + J2 (T* + p**) + C> (6-X) 
where h is the number of nodes along the backup path that are sent a request to setup the backup 
path (can be half of the nodes when the two end-nodes participate in the recovery process). As 
setting up and testing cross connects at intermediate nodes are performed in parallel with message 
transmission and propagation, we do not include their incurred delay in the recovery delay formula. 
The recovery delay in formula (6.1) is sensitive to the number of intermediate unset cross-
connects. When there is none (totally pre-cross connected pattern), the recover delay becomes 
the same as in a totally pre-cross connected pattern, i.e., Dn + C. With a p-etree protection, we 
can maximize the protected working capacity, and implicitly the number of pre-cross connected 
backup paths. In Figure 6.4, the failure of any of the links which is part of the cyclical layout 
will require a recovery delay of Dn 4- C, and the off-cyclical layout link E — A a recovery delay of 
Dn 4- P\ -f- T\ 4- C — Dn 4- C i.e.. the recovery time of a totally pre-cross connected structure. 
6.4 Optimized Design of p-eTree Protection Scheme 
In this section, we propose an optimization model based on CG in order to optimize the selection of 
p-etree in the design of a maximized size PWCE. Same optimization and decomposition approaches 
as in Chapter 5 are used in this chapter The only difference is the shape of protection building 
blocks. In this chapter, we use p-etrees while in Chapter 5 we used p-cycles. Though, we re-use 
the master problem of p-cycle based scheme m Section 5.4.1. and update the pricing problem in 
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order to re-shape the potential protection structures. Using the values of the dual variables of the 
master problem, which code the information about spare capacity availability and protection needs, 
the pricing problem generates a new potential p-etree at each iteration. 
The expression of the pricing objective, i.e., the maximization of the reduced cost is not different 
from that of the p-cycle based approach. The only difference is parameters a£ which are associated 
with a different expression in the p-etree approach. Indeed, for each link £, in the p-cycle scheme, 
a link cannot be granted more than 2 protection paths by any given p-cycle (a£ G {0,1, 2}), while 
in the p-etree scheme this value can theoretically grow up to the maximum number > 2 of backup 
paths a p-etree can provide for a link. The pricing objective is written as follows: 
max \ T e]as£ - ] T (62£ + 6>J) 6f ) , 
\teL teh J 
where 9f 0£ and 0£ are the dual variables associated with constraints (5.1), (5.2) and (5.3), respec-
tively. 
The pricing problem generates pre-configured extended-tree (p-etree) structures to protect link-
channels in the network. To ease the presentation, we start by presenting the pure p-tree optimization 
problem before we move to the added extension and the whole p-etree. 
6.4.1 p-Tree Construction 
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Constraint (6.2) identifies the root-node (one root-node). Constraints (6.3) select one parent in 
the p-tree for each node that is not a root-node. Constraints (6.4) prevent cycling on a parent-son 
relationship (at most y^ or y\ equal to 1) if £ is not a straddling-tree link. Constraints (6.5) stipulate 
the necessary conditions for a link to be a straddling-tree link, i.e.. each of its end-nodes should have 
a parent in the tree if it is not the root-node. Constraints (6.6) prevent unconnected components 
from arising in the network, e.g., under the form of cycles. These constraints are not all enumerated. 
rather they are added only when they are violated Constraints (6.7) enforce the integrality of the 
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variables. 
6.4.2 p-Tree Reshaping 
So far, we have built a p-tree. Let us extend the p-tree structure to build p-etree structures. The 
following variables are used to reshape the tree and count the number of alternative backup paths 
for each link £. By extending the selected tree, we aim at forming an optimized pre-cross connected 
structure (p-cycles), but some branches of the tree may not be part of it. 
( 1 if vz belongs to the pre-cross connected part of the current p-etree 
j 0 otherwise, 
xfCK: — number of disjoint backup paths for link £ 
Constraints of the second part of the pricing are as follows: 
x?xc < xj 4- yvv] + yli £ = K v3} G C (6.8) 





CK< E x°*c vtev,t.ee£ (6.10) 
£'&,£'e£(vt) 
XBCK < ^ xf,xc NcVJeC (6.11) 
£'eS{N) 
xfxc G {0,1}, xfCK, nVx G Z + £ G £, vt G V (6 12) 
Constraints (6.8) restrict the extensions to either on-tree or straddling-tree links, in older to define 
a p-etree structure. Constraints (6.9) guarantee that the pre-cross connected structure will involve 
nodes with an even degree (Eulerian tour). Constraints (6.10) are used to count the number of 
alternative backup paths for each link in the pre-cross connected p-etree. Constraints (6.11) prevent 
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from straddling two pre-cross connected sub-structures. This set is very large, only a limited num-
ber of its constraints are added, other constraints are dynamically added when they are violated. 
Constraints (6.12) are integrality constraints. 
In order to feed the master problem with p-structures found by the pricing problem, we need to 
express the parameters a£ and b£ as functions of the variables of the pricing problem: a£ encodes 
the available number of backup paths for link £, either £ is part of the pre-cross connected structure, 
which implies that xfC)C > 0, or none of these two cases (i.e., is not protected by the pre-cross 
connected structure). Thus, 
of = xfC!C + inf {XJ, 1 - xfxc, [I - exTK\ } , £ « 1 
Parameter b\ encodes the spare capacity used by the p-etree on link £. A spare capacity channel is 
used either by the basic tree (on-tree), or by the pre-cross connected part of the p-etree. Thus, 
b\ = sup {xf*c,yl + y)) £={hJ}eL 
These two parameters at and bt are used in the master problem as the protected capacity and 
the used protection capacity, respectively. 
6,5 Performance Results 
In this section, we compare the protection performance of the new p-etree protection approach to 
three other approaches: Pure p-tree scheme, and simple and non-simple p-cycle schemes presented 
in Chapter 5. We compare the four approaches based on their protection efficiency and flexibility 
and on their recovery delays. 
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6.5.1 Network Model 
We consider four network topologies: NSF, COST239 - 19 links, New Jersey LATA, and COST239 -
26 links, each has an average nodal degree of 3, 3.4, 4.1 and 4.3, respectively. In order to investigate 
on how the link spare capacity budget affects the capacity efficiency, we selected three random 
distributions of link spare capacity budgets for each network topology. Each random distribution 
is characterized by its average spare capacity p on each link and its standard deviation a. For 
the first distribution (first set of vertical bars in each sub figure in Figure 6.6), all the links of the 
network have been assigned the same transport capacity (60 channels) and the same spare capacity 
(20 channels), thus (p, a) = (20, 0). Other distributions are described in Figure 6.6 (x-axis). 
6.5.2 Protec t ion Efficiency 
In Figure 6 6, we illustrate the variation of the number of protected capacity units (channels) as a 
function of the spare capacity budget distributions. The first observation is that, when all the links of 
any of the considered networks are allocated the same maximum spare capacity (first distribution), 
then the p-etrees and the non-simple p-cycles provide the same protected capacity. In such a case, 
the simple p-cycle protection provides ~ 4%) less protected capacity, and the pure p-tree ~ 50% 
in the first two networks (sparse networks) and ~ 30% in the two last networks (more connected 
networks). The equivalent performance of the non-simple p-cycle and p-etree schemes tells us that 
the protection building blocks in the p-etree scheme are purely cyclical structures (non-simple p-
cycles). 
In the second and third distributions, we extended the link spare capacity budget to the in-
terval [0,30], and performed a random selection of the spare capacity according to the illustrated 
distributions. The protected capacity provided by all the protection approaches is different from the 
case where a uniform spare capacity was applied. Within all the considered spare capacity budget 
distributions, the p-etree protection provides the highest amount of protected capacity units. The 
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Figui e 6 6 Distribution of the Protection Capacity 
protected capacity by the p etree in the COST239 26 links is 23%, 28% and 43% better than that 
piovided by the non simple p cycle simple p cycle, and p tree protection, respectively The amount 
of protected capacity decreases as the discrepancy a of the link spare capacity distribution increases 
This is due mainly to the lack to flexibility of the cyclical protection structures 
Table 6 1 illustrates the drop in the amount of protected capacity (%) due to the new distribu 
tions of spare capacity in COST239 26 and NJ LATA networks All four protection schemes are 
sensitn e to the dispeision of the link spare capacity values (increase of a) The p etree has the least 
drop among all four compaied schemes The p tiee is the second less affected scheme by the new 
distribution of spare capacity (distribution 2 m COST239 26 links and the NJ LATA network) The 
results in Table 6 1 give us a clear indication that linear patterns can be of higher flexibility o\er 
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cyclical patterns, especially with the constrained spare capacity budgets. 
The advantage of the p-etree protection over the p-cycle (either simple or non-simple) ones in 
terms of capacity efficiency is due to the protection building blocks in the p-etree-based protection 
scheme. Indeed, as pure cyclical, linear and hybrid structures are combined by the p-etree scheme, 
the resulting protection plan cannot be less efficient or less flexible than any of the pure cyclical or 

































Table 6.1: Drop in Protected Capacity (%) 
6.5.3 Recovery Delay 
In order to evaluate the recovery delay of the p-etree-based protection scheme, we looked at the 
shape of its protection structures. Table 6.2 gives the recovery delay of the p-etree protection plan 
in the second distribution of link spare capacity (last set of bars of all sub figures in Figure 6.6). 
The results show that between ~ 80% and 90% of the protection capacity is a pre-cross connected 
capacity, and 10% to 23% requires an additional delay of only T-hP to restore from any link failure. 
The percentage of protection capacity that requires a restoration delay > 2 (T+P) is very low < 2%. 
Thus, a high restoration delay compared to any totally pre-cross connected scheme is obtained. The 
distribution of the recovery delay over these three values, which are in turn associated with some 
p-etree structures, gives an insight on the shape of the p-etree protection structures 
116 
NSF 
COST239 -19 links 
NJ LATA 
COST239-26 links 















We assume Dn = D, Tn — T for all n 
and P£ — P for all £, to simplify the exposure. 
Table 6.2: Recovery Delay Distribution 
6.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we proposed a novel pre-configured protection scheme where a priori no restriction is 
imposed on the shape of the protection building blocks. By extending trees, we built a pre-configured 
extended-tree (p-etree) protection scheme where the number of pre-cross connected backup paths are 
implicitly optimized by the explicit optimization of the protected working capacity. We compared 
our scheme to three other pre-configured schemes, and showed that it is more capacity efficient than 
all pure p-cycle and p-tree based schemes and still, achieves a recovery delay comparable to the 




The Pre-Configured Protection 
Structure Scheme 
7.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 5, we proposed new efficient design techniques of PWCE using fully pre-cross connected 
protection p-cycles (simple and non-simple) schemes. The protection building blocks in p-cycle 
schemes are pure cycles. Later on, in Chapter 6, we extended the p-cycle based approach, and 
proposed a novel protection approach based on hybrid protection structures that can be a priori of 
any shape. This approach, named p-etree, has the advantage that it includes a larger number of dif-
ferent shape protection structures than pure p-cycles. In p-etree based schemes, fully pre-cross con-
nected structures are augmented with partially pre-cross connected structures bv extending p-trees. 
Therein, the protection topologies are made of hybrid structures of trees and cycles (see Chapter 
6 for typical structures). We showed the advantage of the p-etree approach in terms of flexibility, 
efficiency, and recovery time for different network scenarios, and that the protection structures tend 
to be more fully pre-cross connected when the link spare capacity budget is uniform, but partially 
within non uniform link spare capacity budget However, a question arises after these two chapters 
is: How would the capacity efficiency vary if we consider all possible protection structures without 
any regard to their pre-cross connectivity . i.e.. not only pure and hybrid structures.? 
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Regarding the flexibility in provisioning protected capacity, the use of totally pre-cross connected 
structures like p-cycles, although it guarantees a low recovery delay, can be sometimes less flexible 
than dynamically cross connected schemes, e.g., in sparse networks [HS07], or with a constrained 
link spare capacity budget (see Chapters 5 and 6). From chapters 5 and 6, there is a clear trade-
off between the pre-cross connectivity of protection schemes and their flexibility in provisioning 
protected capacity. We believe that a fully pre-cross connected scheme, even though it simplifies the 
recovery process in case of failure, has a price in terms of protection capacity and reliability. 
Another issue in the design of PWCE that we have not much considered in the previous two 
chapters is the shaping of the PWCE. The shaping concern is to find the most appropriate PWCE, 
not necessarily the maximum size, that would minimize the blocking rate when dynamic tiaffic 
is carried in the network. This problem has been approached by a multi-objective ILP model in 
[She06]. In Chapters 5 and 6, we adopted a lower bound on the link protected capacity in order to 
shape the PWCE. However, finding the appiopiiate routing of the potential working capacity in the 
PWCE that will guarantee 100% protection for the upcoming dynamic traffic with the given link 
spare capacity budget is not an obvious activit}'. 
In this chapter, we will further investigate the trade-off between the pre-cross connectivity and 
flexibility of protection schemes, and investigate shaping strategies of PWCE in order to maximize 
the end-to-end protected capacity. To achieve our objectives, we propose a new PWCE design 
approach based on pre-configured protection structures (p-structures) where pre-cross connectivity 
is not part of the objective (implicitly or explicitly). Rather, we favor the reliability and capacity 
efficiency of the resulting protection schemes For the end-to-end optimized PWCE. we use the 
p-structure concept, and propose an integrated protected and protection capacity optimization in 
order to maximize the protected capacity flow circulation in the network. 
s 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.2 we present our motivation and 
goals regarding the two design objectives targeted in this chapter We illustrate by an example the 
advantages of a p-structure based approach o\er the pure p-cycle and hybrid p-etree approaches. 
In Section 7 3 we present efficient ILP optimization models based on CG techniques for optimized 
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hop-by-hop and end-to-end PWCEs. Next, in Section 7.4, we compare the performance of our new 
p-structure based PWCE design with the p-c}'cle based one. Conclusions are drawn in Section 7.5. 
7.2 Motivation and Goals 
Based on the results in Chapters 5 and 6, we clearly see the advantage of using hybrid shape 
protection structures in order to offset some disadvantages of some pure shape protection structures. 
The construction approach of protection structures in the p-etree method focuses on some specific 
hybrid shape structures (see Figure 7.1). Although, a variety of shapes are considered as potential 
patterns, there are still further shapes to explore and investigate in order to improve different 
quality-of-service (QoS) parameters related to protection. 
7.2.1 The p-Structure Concept 
By p-structures we mean all possible protection structures in the network, i.e., no restriction is 
applied in the design process, and no pre-defined shape structure is used as an initial pattern as in the 
p-etree based approach. By doing so, we aim at selecting the most valued protection structures that 
will effectively provide the protection level in the network independently of their shapes. Though, 
no need to select p-cycles in order to meet the ring-like recovery delay, or any other shape protection 
in order to optimize any other protection parameter. In this approach of design of survivable WDM 
optical networks, by using p-structures, QoS parameters related to protection will be optimized 
independently of the shape of the protection structures. It is the shapes of the protection structures 
that are adapted to meet the QoS parameters, not the shapes that define the protection performance 
of the protection scheme. In other words the design problem focuses on the protection parameters, 
not on which protection patterns can achieve those parameters . In the next two sections, we present 
some advantages of using p-structures over p-cycles and p-etrees in the design of optimized PWCE. 
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7.2.2 Flexibility in Protection Capacity Allocation 
In Figure 7.1, we illustrate three optimal protection models of PWCE based on p-cycles, p-etrees, 
and p-structures. We suppose a link spare capacity budget of one wavelength channel on each link. 
In the p-cycle and p-etree approaches, the link spare capacity budget is not fully used. Not because 
it'is not needed, but because it is impossible to allocate any spare capacity following the pre-planned 
shape allocation plane, i.e., following p-cycles and p-etrees. Though, their lack of flexibility in using 
the spare capacity. The p-structure based scheme uses all spare capacity budget and spans all the 
links in the network. Regarding the requirement in terms of reconfiguration in order to recover from 
any link failure, the p-cycle scheme will not require any reconfiguration at intermediate nodes of 
any protected link; the p-etree scheme will require a reconfiguration at node G in case of a failure 
on link B — D; and the p-structure scheme will require the following reconfigurations at nodes a2 in 
case of a failure on link £ (az,£): (B, D - G), (G, B - D), (G and C, A~ B), (G and A, B - C). 
A E A E 
(a) p-Cycle (b) p-eTree 
(c) p-Structure 
Figure 7.1: p-Structure vs. p-eTree vs. p-Cycle 
Table 7.1 illustrates the distribution of the protected capacity in the three previously illustrated 
protection schemes. In the p-structure scheme, we use three and two more spare channels than the 
p-cycle and p-etree, but we provide four and three more protected channels than the p-cycle and 
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Table 7.1: Protected Capacity Distribution in p-Structure, p-eTree, and p-Cycle 
7.2.3 Optimized End-to-End PWCE 
In this section, we focus on local optimal PWCE to minimize the blocking" rate in dynamic provi-
sioning based on PWCE. In Chapters 5 and 6, we focused on the designs that find the global optimal 
size of the PWCE by using some constraints that set a lower bound on the protected capacity budget 
(see Constraints 5.4). However, this approach does not necessarily guarantee a minimum blocking 
rate in the network, neither a maximum protected capacity flow circulation. In shaped PWCE, to 
be efficient, a PWCE design should be adapted to the distribution of the traffic over the node-pairs. 
Mathematically speaking, the shaping approach in Chapters 5 and 6 may cause difficulties to the 
optimization problem in finding feasible solutions, especially when a limited link capacity is assumed. 
Indeed, the lower bounds on the link protected capacity should be chosen with high care, otherwise 
the problem may not have a feasible solution. 
In Figure 7.2, two designs of PWCE based on p-cycles are illustrated. We assume that each 
link has one unit of spare capacity budget. In Figure 7.2-(a), the proposed design is adapted to 
guarantee a maximum protected capacity flow circulation among nodes t>2, but not from/to s and d. 
The design in Figure 7.2-(b) offers another protected capacity flow circulation among other nodes. 
In this configuration, a communication between nodes s and d is guaranteed two backup paths in 
case of a failure, while less traffic among nodes v% is provided protection in comparison to Figure 
7.2-(a) 
These two designs are based on p-cycles. In the next section, we propose optimization models 
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(a) (b) 
Figure 7.2: Optimized End-to-End PWCEs 
and solution methods based on CG to carry the optimization process with p-structures as protection 
building blocks. 
7.3 Optimized Design of p-Structure Based PWCE 
In this chapter, we see the power of the CG modeling and solution method. Indeed, pre-enumeration 
of all possible protection structures in a network is impossible and an impractical exercise, even if 
the network size is relatively small. CG with its powerful modeling and solution-exploring approach 
make the solution method as scalable and efficient as the previous CG-based p-cycle and p-etree 
methods. 
In the next two sections, we present two CG based optimization methods to optimize the number 
of protected links (hop-by-hop) and number of protected links along paths (end-to-end) in the design 
of PAVCEs. 
7.3.1 Hop-by-Hop Optimized Size PWCE Using p-Structures 
The shape of the next protection structure is not known a priori, rather, it is decided by the pricing 
problem based also on the dual variables of the master problem. 
M a s t e r Problem 
The master optimization problem is identical to the p-etree one in Chapter 7.3 2. indeed all the 
parameters, constraints and the objective are identical. The difference is in the protection structure 
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solution space <S, which is much larger in the p-structure scheme than in the p-cycle scheme. 
Pricing Problem 
The pricing problem corresponds to the problem of generating one promising protection structure 
that improves the value of the current LP solution of the RMP. It corresponds to the maximiza-
tion problem of the reduced cost of the master problem subject to a set of protection p-structure 
constraints. Thus, it is identical to the one in Section 5.4.3. 
Let us next define the following vaiiables: 
V\ = < 
1 if £' provides protection for £ in the current p-structure 
0 otherwise, 
1 if £ is spanned by the current p-structure 
0 otherwise. 
yt G Z + = the number of disjoint alternative protection paths for link £. 
xt — < 
Re-expressing the objective in terms of these variables leads to: 
ae 
max Y.°lzW-Y, (e< + e t ) ^ 
K£eL £eh 
The constraints of the pricing problem (generation of a protection structure) can be written: 
Pi < xt> l' eL 
Yl Vlt>V£ NcVJeuj(N) 
£'^£eu{N) 
xt, pf G {0,1} £,£' eL 






Constraints (7.1) say that, for a given pair of links £ £\ £' can provide protection for £ if and only if it 
is (£') part of the current p-structure (spanned by the p-structure). Constraints (7.2) set the number 
of disjoint backup paths for link £ to the minimum number of incident links to the minimum cut (min 
cut problem) separating the two end-nodes of the protected link. This problem is equivalent to the 
flow 'circulation problem in graph theory [AM093]. Depending on the network topology, and using 
a combination of a BFS (Breadth First Search) and a DFS (depth First Search) algorithm, starting 
from one of the end-nodes of a protected link £, it is possible to enumerate all the cuts separating 
the two end nodes of £. In our case, for each protected link £, only a limited number of cuts (when 
needed) are dynamically added like user cuts during the optimization process. Constraints (7.3) and 
(7.4) are integrality constraints. 
7.3.2 End-to-End Optimized Size PWCE Using p-Structures 
In this section, we develop an ILP model and use CG in order to design protection planes that 
maximize the availability of protected capacity on an end-to-end basis by using p-structures. 
Master Problem 
The objective is to maximize the number of protected end-to-end working paths denoted by wVo\Vd G 
Z + between each pair of origin - destination (v0,vd) nodes involved in communication. It is written 
as follows: 
max Y2 wvo,vd-
We define a first set of variables wi0%Vd G Z + to be the number of paths carried along £ between 
a node pair v0-Vd- Furthermore, the two parameters a£ G Z + and bp£ G {0,1} which encode the 
number of disjoint alternative protection paths for link £ and spare capacity utilization on link £ in 
the current p-structure p, respectively, and the link transport capacity (wf) and link spare capacity 
budget (if) are kept unchanged from the model in Chapter 6. 
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Constraints of the master problem are written as follows: 
N cV,oeN,d?N * (7.5) 




vo,vd eV.se S. (7.10) 
Constraints (7.5) are used to route flow through cuts separating node pairs v0,Vd involved in a 
communication. These constraints are added dynamically only when they are needed as user cuts. 
Constraints (7 6) guarantee link protection for all working paths along each link £ carrying traffic 
between all node-pairs. Constraints (7.7) limit the overall working and protection capacity of a link 
£ to its transport capacity (wf). Constraints (7 8) set the link spare capacity budget. These two sets 
of constraints are similar to those in the pre\ ious master problem. Constraints (7.9) set a minimum 
working capacity between each node pair {v0~vd} (w^ls1^Jd is a parameter). Constraints (7.10) define 
the domains of the optimization variables. Recall that the set S of p-structures grows dynamically 
as the pricing problem generates new p-structures that are added to the master problem. 
Pricing Problem 
As the new working flow variables are not dnectly consideied in the definition of the reduced cost 
of the master problem, the pricing objective problem remains the same as in the previous model in 
Section 7 3.1 
22 Wv<>,Vd =™V0,Vd 
£eu){N) 





Wv0,vd > ™Voyvd 
wiovd^z^wvovd e Z + 
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7.4 Performance Results 
In this section we evaluate the new PWCE design approach based on p-structures, and compare its 
performance with the p-cycle based approach. The objectives of the p-cycle (simple and non-simple) 
schemes in Chapter 5 are to maximize the size of the PWCE on a hop-by-hop basis. Though, to be 
fair in the comparison process, we decided to compare the hop-by-hop p-structure based model to 
the non-simple p-cycle model in Chapter 5. Recall that the non-simple p-cycle set includes simple 
as well as non-simple p-cycles. In the remaining of this chapter, we refer to this set as p-cycle set. 
As in Chapter 5, we define the reliability of a protection scheme as the ratio of protected capacity 
over the sum of protected and unprotected capacities. In addition to the reliability, we evaluate the 
capacity redundancy, and the average length of the backup protection paths in both the new p-
structure based PWCE design and the p-cycle based one The backup path length is a significant 
parameter in the recovery process Indeed, longer restoration paths result in longer restoration 
delays and potential exposure to multiple optical impairments. 
Performance evaluation and comparison are conducted on four networks: NSF, COST239, NJ-
LATA, and USA all presented in Chapters 5 and 6. We assume a link spare capacity budget to be 
uniformly distributed in the interval (20%. 40%) of the transport capacity of each link. 
The comparison of the capacity redundancy in Figure 7.3 shows that the design approach of 
PWCE using p-structures is less redundant than the one using pure p-cycles. For all four networks. 
100 p 
90 [ 










NJ-LATA COST239 NSF USA 
Networks 
Figure 7.3: Capacity Redundancy: p-Structure \ s . p-Cycle 
K&HJSI p-cycle 
f H ^ a p-structure 
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the p-cycle based design approach is more capacity redundant (require more spare capacity) than 
the p-structure approach. We observe that the difference in capacity redundancy is higher (~ 10%) 
when the network topology is relatively sparse (NSF and USA networks). 
In Figure (7.4), we compare the reliability (function of the PWCE size) of the two PWCE design 
approaches based on p-structures and p-cycles. We see that the new design approach using p-
structures provides more protected capacity (higher reliability) than the one using only pure p-cycles 
in all four considered networks. With respect to reliability, the new design approach outperforms 
the pure p-cycle one by a ratio of up ~ 15%. Combined with the previous results on capacity 
tad&fl p-cycle I 
B l l l l p-structure 
Figure 7.4: Reliability: p-Structure vs. p-Cycle 
redundancy, we conclude that due to its flexibility in provisioning protection capacity, the PWCE 
using p-structures uses more efficiently the spare capacity, and provide larger PWCEs than the fully 
pre-cross connected p-cycle scheme. Herein, we use ~ 10% less spare capacity, and provide ~ 15% 
more protected capacity. 
The average backup path length is directly related to the capacity redundancy of the protection 
scheme. In sparse networks where the network connectivity is low, there is less flexibility in setting up 
some pre-specified shape structures, e.g.. p-cycles that usually require a specific link spare capacity 
budget distribution to be efficient. Figure 7.5 gives the average length of the backup path in the 
p-structure and p-cycle based designs. The average backup path length in the p-cycle based design 
is larger than in the p-structure based one. It is well known that large p-cycles are more capacity 
efficient than small ones. However, due to its flexibility in provisioning protection capacity, the new 
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PWCE design approach using p-structures uses more efficiently the spare capacity (less redundant), 
provides larger PWCEs (more reliable), and guarantees shorter recovery paths compared to the 
Figure 7.5: Average Backup Path Length' p-Structure vs. p-Cycle 
7.5 Conclusion 
We proposed a new way to design Protected Working Capacity Envelopes (PWCEs) in survivable 
WDM networks by using pre-configured protection structures with unrestricted shapes (arbitrary 
shape patterns) in order to maximize the protected working capacity in a hop-by-hop and end-to-end 
basis. 
We showed the advantages of using p-structures over p-cycles in terms of flexibility and efficiency, 
especially within sparse networks and constrained link spare capacity budgets In order to cope with 
the large solution space of p-structures. we developed an ILP optimization model, and used CG 
decomposition method to scale the solution method. Results show that a design of PWCE using 
p-structure patterns is ~ 10% less capacity redundant. ~ 15% more reliable, and allow recovery 
along shorter backup paths compared to the p-cycle based scheme. 
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C H A P T E R 8 
Differentiated Quality-of-Recovery 
in Survivable W D M Mesh 
Networks 
8.1 Introduction 
The design problem of protection schemes in survivable WDM networks consists to find a trade-off 
among several parameters including capacity efficiency, recovery delay, management and operation 
complexity, and network availability time. In the previous Chapters 5 to 7, we considered the design 
problem of survivable WDM networks in the context of PWCE. We started with some pre-defined 
shape protection structures of pre-defined performances, i.e., p-cycles in Chapter 5, extended to 
pre-defined shape hybrid structures, i.e., p-etrees in Chapter 6, and ended up with non pre-defined 
shape structure (p-structures) in Chapter 7. This research direction is motivated by the search for 
more flexible protection structures to provide protection with different constrained spare capacity 
budgets and network models. The performances of protection schemes using pre-defined shape 
protection structures can be predicted because of the shape of the protection building blocks. For 
instance, p-cycles offer a good trad-off between recovery delay and capacity efficiency, but they 
are not scalable and not flexible; and p-trees offer high flexibility and scalability, but they are not 
capacity efficient. The advantage of using p-structures in the design of protection schemes is that 
the protection limits (e.g., flexibility) due to the shapes of the protection structures are overcome. 
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Furthermore, p-structure based schemes can be optimized to meet different protection parameters, 
e.g., recovery delay, protection capacity. Indeed, for a given targeted QoS protection parameter, 
using p-structures will result in a more flexible and efficient protection scheme. Because, among all 
protection structures in the networks, the ones that effectively guarantee the targeted QoS protection 
parameters will be chosen. 
The fierce competition in the telecommunication world forces network operators to diversify their 
service portfolio in order to attract diverse customers with different telecommunication needs. In 
order to respond to the needs of as many customers as possible, the trends in current transport net-
works are evolving toward providing various services and applications with different bandwidth and 
service availability time requirements at different rates through the same network facility. Indeed, 
not all services require the same service availability time, neither all end-users are willing to pay 
high rates for the services they receive. Due to the multi-dimensional aspect of the design prob-
lem of protection schemes in survivable WDM networks, differentiation of QoR can be the solution 
method in order to strike a balance between the involved design parameters and cost for both service 
providers and customers. 
In Section 3.2.2, we discussed the importance of recovery differentiation in the design of pro-
tection schemes in survivable WDM networks. In this chapter, we further investigate the design 
problem of protection schemes that guarantee different recovery classes, also referred in this chapter 
as differentiated Quality-of-Recovery (QoR). 
In this chapter, we propose new design approaches of protection schemes based on p-structures, 
which optimize different protection parameters independently of the shapes of the protection struc-
tures, in order to achieve different classes of recovery. Our focus is on the design of protection schemes 
to explicitly optimize the recovery delay and the sharing of the protection capacity. Though, we 
develop a framework for QoR differentiation based on the pre-configuration of the basic protection 
structures. We propose three approaches of shared protection schemes to provide three classes of 
recovery based on pre-configured structures that are fully and partially (at some nodes) pre-cross 
connected ahead of failures, and dynamically reconfigured in case of failures. 
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This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 8.2, we present a quick review of the existing work 
in the literature on differentiation of QoS in 'survivable WDM networks. We give some motivation 
and goals of this chapter in Section 8.3. In Section 8.4, we present three design approaches of 
protection schemes, used in this study, in order to provide three equivalent QoR classes. We also 
provide some numerical comparison examples of the diversely pre-configured protection structures, 
and study the trade-off between the capacity efficiency and the recovery delay. In Section 8.5, we 
propose ILP models in order to optimize the quality-of-recovery of the strategies devised in Section 
8.4, and adopt a CG modeling and solution method to solve them. Computational results are 
reported in Section 8.6. 
8.2 Literature Review on QoS Differentiation in Survivable 
Optical Networks 
Considerable research efforts have been made in recovery differentiation in survivable optical WDM 
networks [GS02, SGZ04, SM04, AKM03, BKLS01, DSST99]. Proposed differentiation strategies 
have focused on combining different quality of service protection parameters such as availability, 
reliability (quality of backup paths), and recovery delay. 
The issue of providing differentiated QoS in terms of restoration delay versus capacity effi-
ciency and management complexity in survivable all-optical networks has been studied in [BKLS01]. 
Therein, connections are classified into three categories according to their recovery delay require-
ments: Platinum (50 ms) for fastest recovery, gold (50-100 ms), and silver (1-10 s). In order to 
meet the recovery delay requirements, the authors used dedicated protection for connection in the 
platinum class, shared logical rings in the gold class, and a shared mesh scheme in the silver class. Al-
though spare capacity saving is achieved with the gold and silver classes, the investment in platinum 
class to achieve the required recovery delay is at least 100% redundant, therefore, highly expensive. 
In [AKM03], the authors proposed a Quality-of-Reliability (QoR) framework based on the recov-
ery delay. The different classes of service are linked to a continuous linear function of recovery time 
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in [RTmm, RToo[, where RTmin is the best possible recovery time, whereas RToo means no recovery is 
provided. Although the main factor is the delay, the authors neglected the queuing delay of control 
packets incurred at nodes where sequential signaling is performed, e.g., when switching nodes have 
to process many concurrent requests. 
The problem of providing differentiated recovery delays in WDM is considered throughout the 
scheduling of control messages at the switching nodes in [SS04]. Control messages to set up dif-
ferent connections are processed according to their associated priorities. Though, a high priority 
request will be processed and its connection set up before any lower priority connection. An on-line 
scheduling heuristic, maximum-remaining-time-first (MRTF), to improve the worst case restoration 
time performance of each class has been proposed. In MRTF, the objective is to optimize the worst 
restoration time performance by giving priority to the tasks belonging to connections that are further 
away from completing the rerouting process. 
In [DSST99], the authors considered different signaling strategies, and evaluated the recovery de-
lay (i.e., OXC switching, transmission, and propagation delays) of three basic restoration methods 
based on their recovery signaling strategy in order to provide different recovery classes in survivable 
WDM networks. Different parameters were considered in the delay recovery including the propaga-
tion and processing delays of control messages and the number of cross connects at each switching 
node. 
In the design of protection schemes in survivable WDM networks, there are different trade-offs 
between resource redundancy (cost), service unavailability time, recovery speed, traffic loss, and 
management overhead. We believe that, in order to efficiently provide a differentiated QoR, a better 
understanding of the recovery capabilities (protection and recovery time) of the protection building 
blocks is necessary. In the next section, we present our motivation and goals of the QoR classification 
based on the pre-configuration of the used protection schemes. 
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8.3 Motivation and Goals 
The goal of this chapter is to develop design strategies of protection schemes in order to provide 
different classes of recovery throughout the best possible trade-offs among the different protection 
parameters. Our QoR differentiation strategy uses shared p-structures which are diversely pre-
J 
configured ahead of failures. Three classes of p-structures including fully pre-cross connected p-
structures, partially pre-cross connected p-structures, and dynamically cross-connected p-structures 
are used. This classification is motivated by the trade-off, between the capacity efficiency and the 
recovery delay, each type of p-structures offers (see Section 3.6 for a simple comparison). In addition 
to the trade-off capacity efficiency - recovery delay, we emphasis in this chapter some others when 
combining several protection structures in global protection topologies. 
In optical networks, either all-optical or opto-electrical, the recovery delay (i.e., from the time the 
failure appearance to the time the traffic is sent on the backup path) includes a failure detection delay, 
a cross connect switching delay, as well as control-message processing, queuing, and propagation 
delays (all together designated as the recovery operation time in Section 3.2.1). Failure detection 
delay is the time from the failure occurrence until the time the end nodes of the failing component 
start the recovery process. Cross connect switching delay is the time it takes to map (connect) 
an input port to an output port in a switch fabric along a backup path. Although, there are some 
differences among the various signaling protocols proposed in the literature to perform traffic recovery 
[DSST99, LYWK02, BerOSb], the recovery process generally involves sending a control message along 
the backup path and reconfiguring the optical cross-connects (OXCs) along the backup paths. The 
number of cross connects that need to be re-configured at a given node and along backup paths affect 
directly the end-to-end recovery delay of the underlying protection scheme. Indeed, control messages 
for cross connect re-configuration may need to be scheduled for processing after a queuing delay equal 
to the number of control messages waiting at each switching node. Though, the distribution of the 
number of cross connects that need a dynamic reconfiguration m case of a failure over the switching 
nodes is an important parameter in order to minimize the queuing and processing delays. This 
parametei is minimized in fully pre-cross connected schemes (only two end-nodes of an affected 
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link) and differently optimized in partially pre-cross connected schemes. 
8.4 Pre-Configured Protection: From Backup Reservation to 
Pre-Cross Connection 
In shared capacity protection schemes, the shape of the basic building blocks has a major impact 
on the performance of the protection schemes. In th is chapter, and in order to avoid any limitation 
inherent to the shape of the protection structures, we use protection structures of unrestr icted shapes, 
i.e., all possible protection structures t ha t can meet our design requirements and constraints. In 
Section 8.4.2 to 8.4.4 we discuss those different protection schemes together with their pros and cons. 
8.4.1 Network Model and Signaling Strategies 
Figure 8.1 illustrates the basic switching node model we will rely on in this chapter. We assume t h a t 
the switching node supports separated signaling channels along different control channels, denoted 
by ACIRLJ a n d tha t the channels passing through the switch fabric are exclusively dedicated to da ta . 
T h e Optical Cross-connect (OXC), either t ransparent or opaque, is mainly composed of a switch-
ing fabric, and a set of input and output ports . T h e switching fabric is a re-configurable matrix of 
cross connects which is dynamically cross connected in order to m a p input por ts to ou tpu t ports to 
set u p optical pa ths in the OXC switch. Pre-cross connected protection schemes can be planned with 
reconfigurable switch fabrics as well as with static non reconfigurable equipment (e.g., s ta t ic ADMs) 
as they do not require any reconfiguration in case of a failure. The brain of the switch is its OXC 
processor. Indeed, it is responsible of resource management , and of coordinating the provisioning 
operations with other switching nodes. The control channels are electrically converted a t each OXC 
processor, and next processed to decode the messages. The proposed OXC processor architecture is 
similar to the one in [Mae98]. 
T h e speed of the recovery process in case of a link failure depends on the number of cross connects 
tha t need dynamic cross connection at switching nodes involved in the recovery process. In fully 
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Figure 8.1: Switching Node Model 
pre-cross connected backup paths, a dynamic switching is performed only at the two end-nodes 
of the failing link (path in case of path protection), with the traffic bypassing the intermediate 
nodes without an}' node reconfiguration. The cross connect switching delay is among the most time-
consuming recovery operations in today OXC based switching nodes, it is estimated to be in the 
interval of 5-10 ms in MEMS based switches [DSST99]. The processing, propagation, and queuing 
delays of control messages come in addition to the cross connect switching delay that is incurred 
by a non pre-cross connected protection structure The processing delay is the time it takes for 
the message receiver to process a message and forward it to the message processor. The message 
processor manages queues where control messages waiting for processing, are queued. The signaling 
protocol in use to set up backup paths, can affect the queuing delay in the recovery process. 
Our objective in this chapter is not to compare the performance of the signaling protocols regard-
ing the recovery delay, rather, it is to design protection schemes that optimize the recovery delay 
independently of the signaling protocol in use. Next, we present three link protection schemes with 
different degrees of pre-cross connectivity of their protection structures, and discuss the trade-offs 
among their protection parameters. 
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8.4.2 Dynamically Cross Connected p-Structure Schemes 
In this first approach, the protection relies on pre-calculated and reserved backup structures, but 
without cross-connection of input/output ports at the switch fabrics. Here, the focus is on extensive 
sharing of the spare capacity independently of its cross connectivity. Dynamic (on the fly) mapping 
of input and output ports through cross-connection at given OXCs are performed when protected 
links need protection capacity across some OXCs. Such a protection approach allows high flexibility 
in configuring the protection capacity, and efficient use of the protection capacity by multiple failure-
independent (failure disjoint) working paths. 
In Figure 8.2. we present an optimal design of a shared link protection scheme using an arbitrary 
shape protection structure (bold lines). The two working paths U\ and W2 (dashed lines) of one 
Figure 8 2: A Dynamically Cross Connected p— Structure Scheme 
unit capacity (wavelength capacity) each, are protected by the shared protection structure (bold 
lines) of one unit backup capacity. The arrows starting at the box entitled "DXC" (for Dynamic 
cross-connection) and oriented to nodes A and E identify the cross connects that necessitate dynamic 
reconfiguration in case of any link failure in order to isolate any backup path. On the contrary, at 
the other nodes (except for A and E), there is a unique way to map each input port to an output 
port on the protection structure 
Dynamic reconfiguration of cross connects allows end-to-end backup path isolation before traffic 
recovery. In Figure 8.2, a failure of any of the working channels will require a recovery signaling from 
the end-nodes of the failing link, and a dynamic cross connection at nodes A and E in order to set up 
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(isolate) the inherent backup paths. In some OXC based technologies, dynamic reconfiguration of 
cross connects can seriously alter the recovery delay of such shared protection capacity schemes. In 
addition to the cross connection delay (switching delay), the queuing delay due to different failures 
on several channels may slow down the recovery process too. Indeed, when a node has to process 
several cross connection requests, a queuing delay of control messages - especially in sequential 
recovery signaling - is added to the recovery delay which increases the service unavailability time. 
Table 8.1 reports the protection performance of the protection scheme depicted in Figure 8.2. 
Three parameters are presented: The capacity redundancy (CR), the average length of the backup 
paths, and the average number of cross connections that need to be dynamically reconfigured in 
order to isolate any backup path. 
CR 
150% 
Avg backup path length (# hops) 
3.66 
Avg # cross-connects 
2 
Table 8.1: Protection Performance of a Dynamically Cross Connected p— Structure Scheme 
Dynamic reconfiguration of the cross connects at node A and E allows flexible provisioning of the 
protection capacity, which in turn, results in short recovery paths (in average 3.66 hops). Although 
this scheme is more flexible and less expensive in terms of capacity redundancy, it suffers from the 
drawbacks of switching delay due to dynamic cross connection at some nodes of the backup paths. 
8o4o3 Felly Pre-Cross Connected p—Structure Schemes 
With a pre-cross connected protection scheme, in the event of a link failure, only the two end-nodes 
of the failing link need to perform dynamic switching of the traffic, with no additional reconfiguration 
at any intermediate node. Indeed, there is a unique way to map input ports to output ports in a 
totally pre-cross connected p-structure, thus no dynamic reconfiguration will be required in case of 
a failure. Local recovery can be performed with a limited signaling overhead if failure detection and 
recovery are implemented at the optical layer of the two end-nodes of the failing link. Therefore, 
with a fully pre-cross connected protection scheme, the recovery process is greatly simplified and 
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management overhead is reduced as well as the service unavailability time. Examples of fully pre-
cross connected protection structures are rings, pre-configured cycles (p-cycles) [GS98], and pre-cross 
connected trails (PXTs) [CCF04b]. 
In Figure 8.3, the two working paths are provided link protection by the illustrated shared p-
cycle (bold lines). In case of a link failure, only the two end-nodes of the failing link will switch the 
working traffic from the failing working link onto the backup paths, intermediate nodes will bypass 
the traffic along the p-cycle without any reconfiguration. 
H K J 
Figure 8.3: A Fully Pre-Cross Connected p-Cycle Scheme 
Figure 8.4 illustrates a protection scheme based on shared PXTs which provides 100% protection 
to the proposed traffic model. The two PXT structures (bold lines) that define the protection scheme 
are shared and can be totally pre-cross connected ahead: of any failure, and still provide 100% link 
protection without any reconfiguration in case of a failure. 
H K J 
Figure 8.4: A Fully Pre-Cross Connected p-Trail Scheme 
Table 8.2 illustrates the protection performance of the p-cycle and p-trail schemes in Figures 8.3 
and 8.4, respectively. The capacity redundancy of the p-trail based scheme is higher than that of the 
p-cycle based one. However, the restoration path is in average 4 hops longer in the p-cycle scheme 
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compared to the p-trail one. Thus, this may suggest that longer pre-cross connected structures are 






avg-bckp-path-length (# hops) 
7 
3 
Table 8.2: Performance Comparison: p—Cycle vs. p—Trail 
However, these two shared p-structure are not the only ones that can be fully pre-cross connected 
ahead of failures and used without any reconfiguration in case of a failure. Figure 8 5 shows another 
p-structure which is not a p-cycle nor a classical p-trail, but still can be fully pre-cross connected 
and used without reconfiguration in case of a failure. 
H K J 
Figure 8.5: A Fully Pre-Cross Connected p-Structure Scheme 
The reader may get confused when looking at nodes D and F , and say, there is more than one 
single way to map the three branches of the p-structure. However, at both nodes D (resp. F) , the 
branches {B, D} {D,E} (resp. {C, F} {E.F}) are by default mapped to recover from a failure on 
link {B,F} (resp. {C, D}) and branch {D, G} (resp. {F, /}) is ended locally at node D (resp. F) . 
The only difference with the classical pre-cross connected structures is that the recovery process 
at a given node is performed through the already mapped protection branches, and there are no 
protection branches that are used locally to change the mapping of the protection capacity In 
Figure 8 5, in case of a failure on link {B. D} (resp. {C. F}) , the end-nodes B and D (resp. F and 
G) will switch locally on the two protection branches {D. G} and {B, H} (resp. { F / } and {C. J}). 
We define such a local switch reconfiguration as the switching diversity of fully pre-cross connected 
protection p-structure schemes. 
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Protection performance results of the fully pre-cross connected p-structure scheme in Figure 
8.5 are given in Table 8.3. The fully pre-cross connected p-structure scheme gathers the capacity 
efficiency of the p-cycle scheme in Figure 8.3, and the average backup path length of the p-trail 
scheme in Figure 8.4. Indeed, it is capacity efficient as the p-cycle scheme and provides, in average, 
recovery along shorter paths as in the p-trail scheme. 
CR 
166% 
avg backup path length ( # hops) 
Table 8.3: Protection Performance: Fully Pre-Cross Connected p—Structure 
For the traffic distribution depicted in Figure 8.5, it is possible to find a p-structure that is totally 
pre-cross connected and capacity efficient at the same time. However, it is clear that dynamically 
reconfiguring the cross connects at some nodes provides more flexibility in setting up (isolating) 
backup paths. In the next sub section, we study a third protection approach that relies on partially 
pre-cross connecting some nodes, and dynamically reconfiguring other ones. 
8.4.4 Partially Pre-Cross Connected p—Structure Schemes 
In partially pre-cross connected protection schemes, we investigate how much the cross connectivity 
of protection structures does affect the trade-off between the capacity efficiency and the recovery 
delay. The reserved but dynamically cross connected protection capacity in dynamically reconfigured 
protection schemes allows high protection capacity sharing, but at the same time may suffer from 
some recovery inefficiency (larger delay, longer downtime, higher management overhead). On the 
other hand, fully pre-cross connected schemes guarantee low recovery delay, high availability, and 
less management overhead, but may result in more expensive protection cost. By partially pre-cross 
connecting the protection capacity, we aim at finding a good trade-off between these two protection 
capabilities. 
Figure 8.6 shows a partially pre-cross connected p-structure which provides 100% protection 
against single link failures. In contrast with the protection scheme in Figure 8.2. this partially pre-
cross connected p-structure scheme uses two protection channels on link {A. E} which are mapped 
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to the two branches {A,B} and {A,C} on the p-structure as illustrated. 
DXC 
Figure 8.6: A Partially Pre-Cross Connected p—Structure Scheme 
Table 8.4 illustrates the protection performance of the partially pre-cross connected p-structure 
protection scheme of Figure 8 6. Any failure on the working links will involve dynamic reconfiguration 
at the two end-nodes of the failing link and at node E Therefore, such a p-structure will require less 
signaling overhead and shorter switching delay in comparison to the p-structure scheme in Figure 
8.2, but slightly higher spare capacity budget. 
CR 
166% 
avg backup path length ( # hops) 
3 66 
•#• cross connects 
1 
Table 8.4: Protection Performance: Partially cross connected p—structure 
In Figure 8.6, the end-to-end cross connection delay is composed of one cross connect operation 
at intermediate node E in addition to those at the two end nodes of the failing link. In case where 
several copies of the partially pre-cross connected protection p-structure are required to provide 
protection to more working capacity, a queuing delay will be experienced by control messages at the 
OXC processor of node F , especially if sequential signaling and wavelength switching are used. In 
this case, and in order to limit the queuing delay and still guarantee a limited end-to-end switching 
delay, an equivalent p-structure where the reconfigurable cross-connect is moved from node E to A 
can be combined with the current one. In the resulting'scheme, the reconfigurable cross connects will 
be divided between nodes E and A. Therefore, the protection scheme will simultaneously guarantee 
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limited end-to-end switching and queuing delays at the reconfigurable switching nodes. 
8.5 Optimized Designs of p-Structure Schemes 
In this section, we propose optimization models based on CG in order to optimize the required 
spare capacity to provide 100% protection within the three proposed protection schemes presented 
in Section 8.4, i.e., dynamically cross connected, fully pre-cross connected, and partially pre-cross 
connected p-structure schemes. We propose the first optimized designs that explicitly limit the 
number of dynamic cross connects required at each switching node and along each backup path. 
The novelty in this study is that we do not restrict the shape of the protection structures to a 
specific shape (e.g., p-cycle, p-trees) in order to meet the specifications of any QoR requirement. 
Rather, all protection structures that can meet the QoR requirements are considered as candidate 
structures. Though, it is not the shapes of the protection structures that define the possible QoR, 
but the QoR requirements that define the shape of the protection structures. 
In the next three subsections, we re-use the variables, parameters, constants, and sets of Chapters 
5 and 7 in the definition of the optimization models of the previously defined piotection schemes. 
We only introduce a new parameter ct e M+ for each £ e £, which is the cost of using a wavelength 
channel on link £, and change the variables Wyo v into integer parameters by applying a shortest 
path routing algorithm in order to route the working traffic 
8.5.1 Design of Dynamically Cross-Connected p-Structure Schemes 
The focus in the dynamically cross-connected p-structure protection is on extensive sharing of the 
protection capacity (minimize the protection capacity budget) without worrying about the cross 
connectivity of the protection structures. Therefore, this approach is expected to be the most 
effective and flexible whatever the design constraints (spare capacity budget, traffic distribution, 
connectivity, . . . ) . 
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Master Problem 
We express the objective of the first master problem as follows: 
min ^2^2ctb8tz8 (8.1) 
ses £ec 
Subject to: 
V > f z s > Y, < • « * teC (8-2) 
ses v0,vdev 
zs el>+ seS (8.3) 
The objective of this master problem is to minimize the spare capacity used by the candidate 
p-structures s e S in order to provide 100% protection against single-link failures Constraints (8.2) 
reserve backup protection capacity for all working capacity in the network Constraints (8.3) define 
the domain of the optimization variables. 
In order to cope with the size of the set of candidate p-structures, we adopt a CG modeling 
and solution method. Like in the previous CG optimization models, we develop a task oriented 
CG decomposition: The Restricted Master Problem (RMP) optimizes the selection of candidate 
p-structures, and the pricing problem generates new augmenting p-structures, i.e., p-structures that 
improve the value of the objective of the LP relaxation of the RMP. 
Pricing Problem 
The pricing problem corresponds to the minimization of the reduced cost associated to variables zs 
in the RMP subject to a set of p-structure design constraints. The reduced cost is written as follows: 
min V^ (be ct — atOt) 
£ec 
where 6t (£ e C) are the dual variables associated with constraints (8.2) of the RMP. 
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Re-expressing the pricing objective in terms of these variables leads to: 
( be ae 
xt ct - yt 
The constraints of the pricing problem (generation of a single p-structure) at each iteration are 
written as follows: 
p££ <xv £,£'(£ ^£')eC (8.4) 
J2 ^£>V£ AfcVJe £{N) (8.5) 
£'{£'^£)eS{M) 
]T p£t <atyt ieC (8.6) 
£'{t'^£)eC 
E Pi=*< veVJeC\S(v) (8.7) 
£'es{v) 
xt, pi e {0,1} £, £'(£ ^£')eC (8.8) 
nJ,GZ+ veVJeC (8.9) 
yteZ+ £eC (8.10) 
where at G Z + is an upper bound on the length of every backup path protecting link £, and nf, an 
integer variable used to protection capacity flow conservation at node v for each working link £. 
Constraints (8.4) and (8.5) are equivalent to Constraints (7.1) and (7.2) in Chapter 7. Constraints 
(8.4) set the protection relationship between links £ and £'; and constraints (8.5) are flow conservation 
constraints to set the maximum protection capacity flow to the min cut separating the two end-nodes 
of a protected link £ (see [AM093] for the maximum flow minimum cut problems). Constraints (8.6) 
are used to limit the average length of the backup paths used to protect working links. Constraints 
(8.7) are used to guarantee mapping of logical protection links at intermediate nodes of protected 
links (protection flow conservation constraints) Constraints (8.8), (8.9) and (8.10) are integrality 
constraints 
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8.5.2 Design of Fully Pre-Cross Connected p-Structure Schemes 
In this section, we propose an optimization method to design protection schemes using p-structures 
that can be fully pre-cross connected ahead of failures. In order to extend the necessary conditions 
of pre-cross connectivity to protection structures that are not of pre-defined shapes like p-cycles and 
p-trails, we will use the following results. 
Theorem 1.- At a given node v, if two incident links £\ and £2 are protecting a third link £ which is 
not incident at v, then, each of these two protecting links cannot be used alone in combination with 
a fourth link to protect another link, which is not incident to v. 
Proof. In order to prove the above results, we proceed by contradiction. We suppose that we can 
fully pre-cross connect a protection structure where at a given node v, there are three incident links 
£\. £2, and £3 in the protection topology, and that £\ and £2 provide protection for £, and £\, or £2 
can be combined with £3 in order to protect another link £' which is not incident at v (see node 2 
in Figure 8.7 for an example). Then, we end up with a contradiction. Indeed, in case a failure of 
£ or £', a dynamic cross connection will be required at node v, thus the p-structure cannot be fully 
pre-cross connected ahead of failures. • 
Figure 8.7 illustrates this protection condition. The working paths (Wz) are provided protection 
by the p-structure which spans all the network nodes .(bold lines). The illustrated pre-configured 
protection structure can be pre-cross connected at node B as follows: Links {A,B} and {B,D} are 
mapped through node B, and link {B,C} is locally ended. By using the switching diversity based 
recovery introduced in Section 8.4.3, we can provide 100% for links {B,C} and {B.D} without any 
dynamic reconfiguration. In contrast to node B, node A requires dynamic reconfiguration in case of 
a failure of any of the two links {JB, F} or {E, G}. Indeed, by applying Theorem 1 at node A, links 
{A,B} and {A.F} are protecting working link {B.F} (i.e., p^Zp = PB-F ~ -0> ^ u t a t t n e s a m e 
time, link {A, F} together with {A, E} provide protection for link {E, G}. Therefore, the illustrated 
p-structure cannot be pre-cross connected at node A and provides protection for all the protected 










Figure 8.7: Requirements for Fully Pre-Cross Connected Capacity 
Now, in order to avoid such a dynamic cross connection and still use all the possible p-structures 
in the network, we add the following variables and constraints: 
• Variables 
1 if £\. and £2 incident at node v protect link 
0 otherwise. 
• Constraints 
Constraints (8.11) to (8.13) fix the above variables.to their appropriate values in the pricing 
problem: 
v,£i£2 ^ £\ , / 
> # + p / - 1 
v,£i£ 7y <mm{pf',pe2} 
e e c,v ev\v(e),£i,e2 e £(v) 
e e c,v &v\v{e),ei,e2 e £{v). 
(8.11) 
(8.12) 
Constraints (8.11) fix the value of variables rv£ a 2 to 1 if both £\ and £2 incident to v protect 
v,£\£i £ which is not incident to v. Constraints (8.12) set rv£ 1 2 to 0 if £\ or £2 does not protect £. 
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£,£' e C,v e V\ V(£) U V(£f)Ju£2J3 e S{v) (8.13) 
£,£' e C,veV\V(£) U V(£,)y£lJ2Js G S(v) (8.14) 
ej' eC,ve V\V(£)uv(£,)j1j2Js eS(v). (8.15) 
Constraints (8.13) to (8.15) are used to avoid protection configurations like the one illustrated 
in Figure 8.7. Indeed, for any link pair £,£' and at any intermediate node v along the backup 
paths of both £ and £', three protection-links incident at v cannot be shared for the protection 
of £ and £'', i.e., if £\ and £2 are protecting £ (rv£ 1 2 — 1), and £2 and £3 are protecting £' 
(rv£, 2 3 = 1) then unless £2 and £3 are protecting £ at the same time, this configuration is not 
allowed. 
8.5.3 Des ign of Part ial ly Pre-Cross Connec ted p-Structure Schemes 
In this section, we propose a design approach that uses protection structures that can be partially 
pre-cross connected at some nodes. The focus is placed on mechanisms to explicitly optimize the 
number of cross connections that need dynamic reconfiguration in case of a link failure. Though, 
we minimize the number of dynamic cross connections at switching nodes in order to minimize 
the queuing delay, and the end-to-end reconfiguration delay along the backup paths. We design 
p-structures that individually guarantees limited end-to-end cross connection delay, and globally 
limited queuing delay at all switching nodes. 
Master Problem 
We extend the previous master problem by the addition of the following constraints: 
£ > ; * * < n? X C veV (8.16) 
ses 
where variables dsv e {0.1} for 5 e S and v e V equal to: 
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t ~f~rtf ~ Tt> ^ i 
yM£z , v , * 2 * 3 joM£z < 1 
t ^Tt> - Tt' - l 
y,h£2 vMh vM£i < -, 
/ ~T r nr — 7 pi \ 1 
df,= 
1 if p-structure 5 requires dynamic cross connection at node v 
in order to recover from any link failure, 
0 otherwise; 
and parameter n ^ x c is an upper bound on the number of cross connects that need dynamic cross 
connection at node v in case of any link failure. 
Constraints (8.16), which limit the number of dynamic cross connects at each node v, are intended 
to minimize the queuing delay that results from re-configuration of several cross connects at switching 
nodes. 
Based on the new extended master problem, the objective function of the pricing problem be-
comes 
min ^2 {c£ &£ — 0\ at) + ^ d\ dv. 
eec vev 
where 0\ and 0% are the dual variables associated with constraints (8.2) and (8.16), respectively. 
Pricing Problem 
In the pricing problem, we define the following new variables and constraints: 
Variables 
1 if current p-structure s requires dynamic cross connection at node v 
ty — \ in order to recover from any link failure 
0 otherwise. 
1 if a dynamic cross connection is required at node v in order to recover from 




c v / f^  -t- r£, — i £, — ± 
.£
 > v,£i£2 ivMz vAh -, 
tv ^ rt "+" T£' ~T£' ~ L 
.£
 > V , * i * 2 , V,*2*3 «,*1*2 -, 
ej'eC,v eV\V(£)UV(£'), £iJ2Js e£{v) (8.17) 
£,^ G / > e V \ V ( f ) U V ( 0 , ^1,^2,^3 G S(v) (8.18) 
£,^ e / > E V \ V ( f ) u V ( 0 , ^,^2,^3 e <6» (8.19) 
^ > 4 v G V , ! G / : (8.20) 
] T ^ <** £eC (8.21) 
where ^ G Z + is an upper bound parameter on the number of cross connects that need dynamic 
reconfiguration in order to recover from a failure on link £ 
We re-use constraints (8.11) and (8.12) to set up the cross connect variables, and relax constraints 
(8.13), (8.14), and (8.15) in order to allow dynamic cross connections at some specific nodes. Con-
straints (8.17) to (8.19) are deduced from (8.13) to (8.15) by setting a variable t„ to 1 when a dynamic 
cross connection is required in order to isolate a backup path of link £. Constraints (8.20) are used 
to set up variables tv when a dynamic cross connection is needed at node v in order to recover from 
any link failure. Setting a limit on the number of reconfigurable cross connects at switching nodes 
does not automatically solve the end-to-end recovery delay of connections. In order to remedy to 
this situation, constraints (8.21) impose a limit on the number of cross connects that need dynamic 
i 
reconfiguration in order to set up an end-to-end backup path for any protected working link £. 
8.6 Computational results 
In this section, we compare the performance of the three proposed protection schemes and the 
p-cycle in Chapter 5. Our objective is to optimize the required spare capacity to provide 100% 
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protection against single-link failures while meeting. some design constraints in order to optimize 
different parameters of the recovery delay. 
We use three network topologies characterized by a 3-uplet (number of nodes, number of links, 
average nodal degree): A (4x4) Manhattan (16, 24, 3), COST239 (11, 26, 4.72), and the NJ-LATA 
(11, 22, 4.1). These last two networks were presented in Chapter 5. We assume a uniform link 
cost model (ct) in the interval [1,10], and from now on, we refer to fully, partially, and dynamically 
pre-cross connected schemes by F-OXC, P-OXC, and D-OXC. 
In the next three sub-sections, we focus on the trade-off capacity and reconfigurability of the 
protection schemes. First, we study how a maximum length bound on the backup paths affects the 
three protection schemes and the pure p-cycle one as studied in Chapter 5. Secondly, we focus on 
the trade-off between capacity efficiency and the number of reconfigurable cross connections m order 
to perform traffic recovery. Both the number of re-configurable cross connects at switching nodes 
and along backup paths are considered. 
8.6.1 Backup Path Length vs. Capacity Redundancy 
Figure 8.8 illustrates the variation of the normalized capacity redundancy as a function of the 
maximum backup path length expressed in terms of the number of hops. In this first set of exper-
iments, we do not impose any restriction on the number of reconfigurable cross connects. Thus, 
the partially pre-cross connected (P-OXC) scheme is equivalent to the dynamically cross connected 
(D-OXC) scheme. 
All compared schemes are sensitive to the maximum backup path length However, the most 
sensitive one is the fully pre-cross connected p-cycle (F-OXC p-cycle) scheme. The capacity re-
dundancy of the pure p-cycle decreases as the length of the backup path bound increases, and it 
reaches its lowest bound when the maximum length of the backup paths lies in [8. 10] in COST239 
and NJ-LATA. and greater than 10 in Manhattan 4x4. The fully pre-cross connected (F-OXC) 
p-structure scheme is less capacity redundant than the p-cycle. and reaches its lowest capacity re-
dundancy bound earlier than the p-cycle scheme (in [5, 8]). Within the F-OXC p-structure scheme. 
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all protection structures that can be fully pre cross connected ahead of failures, and used without 
any reconfiguration in case of a failure, are implicitly considered as candidate structures Thus, 
we preserve the pre cross connectivity of the protection scheme at a lower capacity redundancy in 
comparison to the F OXC p-cycle 
Backup path ength (#hops) 
(a) COST239 Network 
5 8 10 No mt 
Backup path ength (#hops) 
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(c) Manhattan (4x4) Network 
Figure 8 8 Normalized Capacity Redundancy vs Maximum Backup Path Length 
In Figuie 8 8 we see that the difference in the capacity redundancy between the F OXC p cvcle 
and p structure varies depending on the network connectivity The COST239 is relatively highlv 
connected compared to NJ LATA and Manhattan 4x4 The F OXC p structure scheme is ~ 10% 
less redundant than the p cvcle based one, and m aveiage ~ 30% less capacit} redundant m all the 
othei network instances 
When comparing the d\namically cross connected and the full pre cioss connected p struct uie 
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schemes, we see a difference of [10%, 20%] in their capacity redundancy due to the pre-cross connec-
tivity of the F-OXC. In the D-OXC, a backup path shared by different link disjoint working paths, 
can be dynamically reconfigured at its intermediate nodes in order to isolate it. High sharing of the 
spare capacity (low redundancy) is achieved in D-OXC in comparison to the two F-OXC schemes. 
Moreover, because the D-OXC offers a high level of flexibility in setting up the backup paths, it 
reaches its capacity redundancy lowest bound earlier than the two other F-OXC methods. However, 
as no design constraints are considered to limit the number of reconfigurations at intermediate nodes 
along backup paths and at switching nodes, a switching and queuing delays will be generally added. 
It may prevent this scheme from scaling in large networks. 
Next, we propose to study how much dynamic re-configuration is necessary to achieve the perfor-
mance of the dynamically cross connected scheme from the fully pre-cross connected one. In order 
to close the gap between the capacity redundancy of these two protection schemes, we propose to 
use the partially pre-cross connected scheme. When no dynamic cross connection is accepted along 
any backup path, such a scheme becomes a fully pre-cross connected one, the other case where no 
constraint on the cross connects leads to the dynamically cross connected one. Next, we want to 
measure how reconfigurabihty should be added to the partially pre-cross connected scheme in order 
to achieve the same performance as the dynamically cross connected scheme. 
8.6.2 End-to-End Dynamic Cross Connects vs. Capacity Redundancy 
In Figure 8.9. we measure the capacity redundancy as a function of the maximum number of allowed 
dynamic cross connects along backup paths. The histogram illustrates the variation of the normalized 
capacity redundancy as a function of the number of allowed dynamic reconfigurations along each 
backup path. In this set of experiments, we do not limit the length of the backup paths. The first 
set of vertical bars corresponds to the fully pre-cross connected (F-OXC) p-structure scheme. In 
Figure 8.9. we see that as the maximum number of allowed dynamic cross connects increases, the 
capacity redundancy decreases to reach its lowest bound corresponding to the dynamically cross 
connected scheme (no limit on the number of dynamic cross connects). The most interesting part of 
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the results in Figure 8.9 is how the capacity redundancy varies when the allowed number of dynamic 
cross connections along backup paths is bounded. Except for the Manhattan 4X4 topology where 
a maximum of 3 dynamic cross connections is required in order to achieve an optimal capacity 
redundancy, in the two other networks, only 2 are required. The capacity redundancy saving is 
in the range [15%, 35%] by allowing at most 1 dynamic cross connection along each backup path, 
and in the range [20%, 50%] with 2. In this case, the diameter of the network affects the capacity 
efficiency of the protection schemes. Both COST239 and NJ-LATA are 3-hop diameter networks, 
while the Manhattan is a 6-hop one. Therefore, as we do not limit the length of the backup paths, it 
is more likely that the Manhattan 4 x 4 will require more dynamic cross connections at intermediate 
nodes. 
Max number of D-OXC along each backup path 
Figure 8.9: Normalized Capacity Redundancy as a Function of the Maximum Number of Reconfig-
urable Cross Connects Along a Backup Bath 
Limiting the number of dynamic reconfigurations along each backup path is a solution to minimize 
the switching delay needed to isolate each backup path. However, when, at a given node, the number 
of needed reconfigurations to isolate a set of backup paths is high, a queuing delay of control messages 
will be added to the overall end-to-end recovery delay. In the next sub section, we propose to study 
how limiting the number of dynamic reconfigurations at switching nodes, in order to minimize the 
queuing delay, affects the capacity redundancy. 
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8.6.3} Number of Local Dynamic Cross Connects vs. Capacity Redun-
dancy 
In Figure 8.10, we measure the capacity redundancy of the partially pre-cross connected scheme 
as a function of the maximum number of allowed dynamic cross connects at switching nodes. The 
maximum number of dynamic cross connections required at each node in order to recovery from a 
link failure is evaluated by the size of the reconfigurable switching fabric. On the x-axis, we report on 
the maximum number of allowed dynamic cross connects at a given switching node as a percentage 
of the number of working paths going through that node. Though, 20% means that the size the 
reconfigurable switch fabric (or dynamic cross connects) reserved for protection is equal to 20% of 
the working path going through. 
The fully pre-cross connected schemes can be envisioned with static switching fabrics where no 
dynamic reconfiguration is required in order to isolate the backup paths at intermediate nodes. As 
in Figure 8.9, we do not impose any bound neither on the length of the backup paths, nor on the 
number of reconfigurable cross connects along backup paths. Also, as in Figure 8.9, we consider the 
cases where no dynamic cross connections are allowed (first set of vertical bars corresponds to fully 
pre-cross connected schemes), and no limit on the number of dynamic cross connects (last set of 
vertical bars corresponds to dynamically cross connected scheme). 
We observe the same trends as in Figure 8.9. However, the capacity redundancy reaches here its 
lowest bound when the maximum size of the reconfigurable switches used for protection is equal to 
number of working paths going through (100% of working paths). The saving in capacity redundancy 
is within a [10%, 35%] range, with reconfigurable switches of maximum size equal to 50% of the 
working paths, and tends to [15%, 55%] when the size is equal to 100%. 
Results in Figure 8.10 are also useful in the dimensioning process of the switching nodes. The 
network resources can be shared between active working paths and their link disjoint protection 
counterparts, though reused in case of a failure on a working path. In such a case, and as with 
reconfigurable cross connects of size equal to the working paths going through them, it is possible to 
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Figure 8.10: Normalized Capacity Redundancy as a Function of the Maximum Number of Recon-
figurable Cross Connects at a Switching Node 
protection without any additional cost. 
8.7 Conclusion 
Differentiation of quality of recovery is an important design technique in survivable WDM networks 
in order to strike a balance between the service availability and its cost. In this chapter, we proposed 
three optimized designs of protection schemes in survivable WDM networks to meet the requirement 
of three classes of recovery, and studied their requirements in terms of protection capacity. 
We demonstrated that, in addition to the fully/(end-to-end) pre-cross connected and the dynam-
ically cross connected protection schemes, there is an efficient way to limit the dynamic reconfig-
uration of a protection scheme in case of a failure, and still provide high service availability at a 
low cost. By allowing only a limited number of cross connect reconfigurations along backup paths 
and at switching nodes, it is possible to save up to 50% of protection capacity and still provide an 
acceptable level of availability for different services. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that has considered the three components of 
-
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the recovery delay: the propagation, switching, and queuing delays, and proposed design methods 
to explicitly optimize each component separately and combinations of the different components. 
Depending on the used technology, the proposed protection schemes can be used to meet different 
quality of recovery and optimize any of the recovery delay components, or find a good trade-off 




Quality-of-Protection in Survivable 
W D M Mesh Networks 
9.1 Introduction 
Nowadays, the trends in the telecommunication business are moving toward multi-service platforms 
that will support different types of services and end-users, with different requirements and needs. 
In order to be competitive, a telecommunication business must be able to respond to the needs of 
as many customers as possible while minimizing its deployment and maintenance costs. Availability 
c 
requirements in survivable transport networks depend on the type of customers using the network 
and the supported services. In today's telecommunication businesses, a variety of services with 
different protection guarantees, also called Quality-of-Protection (QoP), are proposed through the 
same network at different rates. In Chapter 7, we propose a framework for optimized design of 
differentiated QoR where different protection schemes with different spare capacity budgets provide 
different availability guarantees. In this chapter, we propose a framework to optimized designs of 
multiple QoP classes including single and dual-link failure scenarios in survivable WDM networks 
that use p-cycles and p-structures. 
In modern telecommunication networks, some mission-critical applications, e.g., tele-surgery, 
158 
require high network availability, e.g., 100%, which is not necessarily guaranteed by a 100% single-
link failure protection scheme. In order to guarantee a high service availability, it takes recovery 
mechanism to protect against a large number of potential failure scenarios, e.g., dual-link and node 
failures. However, providing such a high network availability requires a protection capacity budget 
which is proportional to the targeted protection level. Differentiated QoP, which we refer to as the 
different guarantees of protection, can be the solution approach in order to optimize the network cost 
while providing different classes of protection. Indeed, not all the end-users and applications require 
the same level of resiliency against failures, some applications can perform even with a lower network 
availability than others, e.g., e-mail, and not all users can afford paying the cost of a guaranteed 
100% service availability. 
Different network availability analyses have been proposed in order to quantify the offered avail-
ability of different protection schemes [TN94, MCL+03, HLS07]. However, most of those availability 
analyses have assumed that link failures in the network are independent from each other, and dual-
link failures have not been considered much. The occurrence of dual-link failures, although less 
likely than single-link ones, is not unusual in modern optical networks [LDK01]. Resiliency against 
dual-link failures is the dominant factor in determining the service availability after a guaranteed 
resiliency against single-link failures. 
Many factors may motivate the need of design methods to provide different protection classes 
including dual-link failures in resilient WDM networks. Single-link failure recovery schemes guar-
antee 100% recovery in case of a single-link failure within a short time (few milliseconds to few 
seconds depending on the protection scheme). However, the time it takes to repair the failing phys-
ical link may vary from a few hours to a few days. It may happen that a second failure occurs 
during the repair time of the first failure, thus leading to a dual-link failure during the same time 
period. Furthermore, telecommunication operators are facing the challenges of meeting at least the 
specifications of service-level agreements (SLAs) with their customers. Nowadays, some cooperative 
customers are asking in their SLA a service availability of 99.999% or higher [GROOa]. Therefore, it 
is of interest to understand and measure the provided availability in order to offer safer SLAs and 
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competitive services, and though, avoid penalties. Another motivation for investigating dual-link 
failures is related to the SRLG concept (see Section 3.1.3). Indeed, failures on different optical fibers 
are not necessarily independent from each other for at least two reasons: 
(1) Physical routing of optical links may differ from their logical routing counterparts, e.g., see 
Figure 3.1. The physical routing of links is dictated by different external constraints, e.g., 
sharing multi-purpose pipelines in cities, or minimizing design costs. 
(2) Fibers are linked at switching nodes, and a partial (e.g., a port) or global node failure can easily 
(
 cause a dual-link failure, e.g., see Figure 9.1. Such a case of figure is equivalent to a failure on 
a fiber-bypass at a given node, which, in case of a failure on one of its incident (at the node) 
links, make the other one unusable. 
induces a dual link fai 
Figure 9.1: SRLG - Switching Node 
Providing different classes of protection has been considered with single and dual-link failures. 
With single-link failures, Grover and Clouqueur proposed a multi QoP provisioning framework in 
survivable single-link failure networks [GC05]. Four protection classes were defined: guaranteed 
protection, best effort, unprotected, and preemptable services. The distribution of the multi-QoP 
services and their effect on the sharing of the protection capacity were studied. An ILP-based opti-
mization model was proposed. In [TMP05], Tornatore et ai proposed a heuristic-based optimization 
approach within dedicated and shared path protection in order to achieve two different objectives: 
optimize the network availability, and minimize the number of fibers to provide the required QoP. 
However, the authors assumed in their availability analysis that optical nodes are perfectly reliable, 
and fiber links are mutually failure-independent. 
The problem of dual-link failures has been studied within two failure scenarios* SRLG failures 
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[SYR05, SYR03, XXQL04], and arbitrary dual-link failures [HS03, CSC02]. In [HS03], He and So-
mani investigated the requirements in terms of protection capacity in order to provide an arbitrary 
double-link failure protection with the path and link based protection schemes. An ILP-based opti-
mization method was proposed where three different backup paths between each source-destination 
node-pair were considered. With the optimization conditions, they showed that the path-based 
protection approach is more capacity efficient than the link-based one In [SZZW07], Shao et ai in-
vestigated the problem of providing differentiated QoP for surviving arbitrary double and single-link 
failures by allowing connections to choose among three different protection classes: Single Shared 
Path Protection (SSPP), Single Dedicated Path Protection (SDPP), and Double Shared Path Pro-
tection (DSPP). Routing algorithms were proposed, and the performance evaluation was focused on 
blocking probability and average QoP. In [CG05] Clouqueur and Grover proposed three ILP-based 
optimization models based on a pre-enumeration method of candidate protection paths in order to 
optimize the spare capacity required with multi-QoP services that can survive dual-link failures. 
In this chapter, we are interested in optimal designs of protection schemes that use minimum spare 
capacity to provide different classes of QoP including 100% single-link failure protection (Ri = 100%) 
and different optimized dual-link failure protection (R2)' We investigate the design problem of 
protection topologies to provide the targeted QoP classes under arbitrary SRLG scenarios, and 
propose methods for optimizing the spare capacity within p-cycle and p-structure-based protection 
schemes. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 9 2, we give our motivation and goals Two 
issues are addressed in this section: the requirements in terms of capacity to provide single and 
dual-link failure protection, and the shape of the most resilient protection structures. In Section 
9.3, we review some existing work on the design of protection schemes that can recover from single 
and dual-link failures. In Section 9.4, we illustrate, by using examples, the p-cycles capabilities 
in providing dual-link failure protection, and the advantage of using p-structures. In Section 9 5. 
we propose two different CG optimization approaches based on p-cycles and p-structures in order 
to optimize the required protection capacity in order to provide the targeted QoP classes. Section 
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9.6 is dedicated to computational results. We compute the required protection capacity in order 
to provide the targeted QoP classes, and establish a relation between the shapes of the protection 
structures and their protection efficiency. Section 9.7 concludes the chapter. 
9.2 Motivation and Goals 
The performance of any protection scheme in survivable WDM networks is mainly defined by the 
shapes of its protection building blocks. Different shared protection schemes, named after the shape 
of their protection structure, e.g., p-cycles [GS98], p—trees[XCT03, ZY02b], p—etrees in Chapter 
6, and p-structures in Chapters 7 and 8, are either proposed or studied in this thesis in order to 
provide 100% protection against single-link failures. We conducted performance comparison studies 
to measure the efficiency of those pre-configured protection schemes with 100% single-link failure 
scenarios. However, some questions that have aroused our curiosity are: 
• How would the protection efficiency of those schemes vary if they were to provide protection 
against different QoP classes including different R2 levels? 
• What are the shapes of the most efficient protection structures that can effectively guarantee at 
the same time 100% single-link failure protection (Ri — 100%) and different levels of dual-link 
failure protection (#2). 
In this chapter, and in order to answer these questions, we propose quantitative design approaches 
that guarantee different service availability levels including resiliency against 100% single-link failures 
and multiple dual-link failure scenarios. 
We focus on the design process of p-cycle and p-structure based protection schemes in order 
to effectively extend their protection capabilities to support the different targeted QoP classes. In 
the p-cycle-based approach, as no exact optimization method exists, our goal is to develop efficient 
and scalable optimization tools in order to optimize the required protection capacity to provide the 
different targeted QoP classes. The p-cycles of the optimal solutions will be studied in order to 
establish a relation between their shapes and the provided QoP classes. In the p-structure-based 
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approach, and by using all possible protection structures, our goal is to select the most efficient 
structures that can effectively meet the different QoP requirements. By doing so, we aim at giving 
a clear answer to the question about the shapes of the most efficient protection structures. 
9.3 Literature Review on Design of Dual-Link Failure Pro-
tection Schemes 
The literature on design of protection schemes to provide different QoP classes including dual-
link failures is not rich. The p-cycle and p-tree are the two types of predefined shape protection 
structures that have been considered in the design of multi-QoP schemes in the literature [TT05, 
SGC04a, RC08, Sch03b, Sch03a]. 
Dual-link restorability in mesh networks protected by p-cycles was studied in [Sch03b, Sch03a, 
SGC04a]. In [Sch03b], Schupke' et al. used directed p-cycles in the design of 100% single-link failure 
recovery schemes, and studied the trade-off between the number of p-cycles and the average dual-link 
failure restorability. Therein, the authors proposed an ILP model based on a set of candidate p-
cycles that are enumerated ahead of the optimization process, and pre-configured to protect against 
some pre-defined dual-link failures. Even though the ILP model was solved to optimality, the best 
potential solution with such a two-step optimization approach can be far from the optimal one, see 
Chapter 5. In [SGC04a], different pre-selection strategies of p-cycles were proposed in order to reduce 
the susceptibility of p-cycles to some specific dual-link failures. p-Cycles with a lower susceptibility 
are selected as potential protection structures. Failure dispersal is another strategy for selecting 
p-cycles in order to spread the link protection over different p-cycles [SGC04a]. However, restricting 
the p-cycle selection affects the optimal design and the required number of p-cycles, as well as their 
length (see Chapter 5). 
The design of p-trees to provide different QoP classes including dual-link failure in survivable 
WDM networks has been considered in [TT05, MFB99. XCT03]. In [TT05], Tang et al. proposed an 
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ILP model to minimize the spare capacity budget in order to provide 100% protection against single-
link failures and a distributed provisioning algorithm for double-link failure restoration. Simulation 
results show that through dynamic re-provisioning around 70% of the double-link failures can be 
restored by the restoration scheme even though the spare capacity in the network is planned to stand 
against single-link failures. 
In [MFB99], Medard et al. presented a design approach to construct a pair of directed spanning trees 
in a way that a failure of any single edge or node (except the root node) in the network, leaves all the 
nodes connected with the root node using at least one of the trees. They named their approach the 
red/blue trees. In [XCT03], Xue et al. extended the red/blue trees design, and included Quality-of-
Protection (QoP) and Quality-of-Service (QoS). The QoP of a pair of red/blue trees was defined as 
the maximum number of simultaneous link failures that can be survived in the network. Heuristic 
algorithms were proposed for constructing a pair of red/blue trees with enhanced QoP, low total 
cost, and maximum bottleneck bandwidth. 
In the previous Chapters 5 to 8, we have seen how restricting the shape of the potential protection 
structures can be harmful to the capacity efficiency of a protection scheme. In the literature, and 
to the best of our knowledge, the problem consisting to describe the shapes of the most resilient 
protection structures to dual-link failures has never been studied. 
9o4 Dual-Link Failure Recovery: p-Cycle a n d p°Stractuire 
Based Protection Schemes 
In this section, we present some illustrative examples of the protection capabilities of p-cycles and 
p-structures in providing different QoP classes associated to different R2 levels. 
9.4.1 Dual-Link Failure Recovery Based on p-Cycles 
In this section, we investigate dual-link failure recovery without p-cycles reconfiguration, or rerout-
ing. Unlike in [Sch03b], we consider bidirectional p-cycles. thus every straddling-cycle link has two 
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backup protection paths. We focus on pre-configured static p-cycles which, in case of a failure, 
reroute the affected traffic without any dynamic reconfiguration of the spare capacity. In our study, 
a dual-link failure may affect any two links in an arbitrary order, in which case the affected traffic 
is switched onto the backup p-cycles in a way that guarantee the recovery of a maximum working 
capacity (see below the examples illustrated in Figure 9.3-(a) and Figure 9.4-(b)). 
A 100% single-link failure protection scheme based on p-cycles can survive a dual-link failure 
provided that the failure happened on disjoint p-cycles (p-cycles that are not sharing any common 
link). We next discuss the cases when the affected links are protected by the same p-cycle, and 
analyze their impact on the network availability. In Figures 9.2 to 9.5, the dashed lines represent a 
one unit capacity p-cycle indexed from now on by 5, and the numbers (1/2 means 1, or 2 units) on 
the links indicate the number of protected capacity units by the illustrated p-cycle. 
Figure 9.2-(a) illustrates a case of a dual-link failure occurring on two links A — B and E — F, 
which are on-cycle links and provided one unit of protected capacity by the current p-cycle s. In this 
case of dual-link failure, the protected capacity units will not be restorable on both links, i.e., not 
fully restorable working capacity. However, if s provides protection for only one of the links (e.g., 
see Figure 9.2-(b), protected capacity by s on link E — F = 0), the same dual-link failure scenario, 
even though not fully restorable, will only affect the capacity on the protected link (A — B). 
(a) (b) 
Figure 9.2: Dual-Link Failure Protection - Two On-Cycle Links 
In Figure 9.3, wre illustrate a dual-link failure scenario where one of the affected links is an on-cycle 
one and the second is a straddling-cycle one. In Figure 9.3-(a). we assume both links aie protected 
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by the illustrated p — cycle s. Therein, the restorable capacity is at most 1 unit (independently of the 
order in which the failures have occurred, at most one working capacity can be restored). In Figure 
9.3-(b), the on-cycle link A — B belongs to s, but it is not protected by s (0 protected capacity). A 
dual-link failure on A — B and A — F will induce the same recovery process. However, in this case, 
the lost capacity, if any, is less than before. 
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(a) (b) 
Figure 9.3: Dual-Link Failure Protection - On-Cycle/Straddling-Cycle Links 
Figures 9.4-(a) and (b) illustrate two cases where the two failing links are provided protection 
by the illustrated p-cycles as straddling-cycle links. We can distinguish different configurations: 
(i) Only the first failing link can be restored in case of a dual-link failure: Whether the two 
straddling-cycle links are guaranteed one or two protected capacity units, and independently 
of the order in which the failures have occurred, it is possible to reconstruct one or two alternate 
backup paths to recover the first affected link, but not the second one. In Figure 9.4-(a), a 
first failure on link A — F followed by a second on B — E will result in the following restoration 
scheme: switch the affected traffic on A — F onto the backup path(s) A — E — F (A-B — D — F), 
and drop the traffic on B — E (no backup capacity is left). 
(n) Working capacity from the two affected links can be fully or partially restored: this is only 
possible when the first failing link has less than two protected capacity units. Figure 9.4-(b) 
illustrates two failing links that are sharing the illustrated p-cycle. Suppose that A — F had 
failed before link B — Fy and that the protected working capacity on A — F is one unit and 
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restored through A — E — F. Because it is possible to construct a second disjoint backup path 
B — D — F on the same p-cycle, surviving a second failure on B — F becomes possible. However, 
to be fully restorable, the two links should not have more than one protected capacity unit. 
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Figure 9.4: Dual-Link Failure Protection - Two Straddling-Cycle Links 
A dual-link failure cannot be fully recovered if, from one end-node of a failing link, it is not 
possible to join its second end-node without crossing one of the two endpoints of the second failing 
link. A second example is illustrated in Figure 9.5. Even though the protected capacity is only one 
unit on links C — D and E — B, the proposed p-cycle cannot survive a dual-link failure on those two 
links. 
Figure 9.5: Dual-Link Failure Protection - Non Fully Restorable Configuration 
In the next section, we illustrate by an example the advantage in terms of capacity efficiency and 
flexibility of using p-structures in the design of dual-link failure resilient protection schemes 
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9.4.2 Dual-Link Failure Recovery: p-Cycles vs. p -St ruc tures 
In Figure 9.6 is illustrated a network topology with its potential dual-link failures. The link pairs, 
which are susceptible to fail at the same time, are grouped in distinct SRLGs (e.g., SRLGi contains 
links A — B and A — C which are susceptible to fail at the same time). We assume a working traffic 








In Figure 9.7, we illustrate the optimal combination of p-cycles that minimizes the required 
protection capacity in order to provide 100% protection against all single-link failures and the dual-
link failures in Figure 9.6. The illustrated four p-cycles (bold lines) provide protection to the eight 
working links (dashed lines). We see that, except for the first p-cycle in Figure 9.7-(a) which is 
used at its full protection capacity (protect all its on-cycle links), all the three others are used 
at ~ 38% (3/8) and ~ 34% (1/3) of their total protection capacity. Indeed, no link-pair of the 
spanned links by the first p-cycle belongs to one of the SRLGs in Figure 9.6. However, to protect 
links that belong to the same SRLG in Figure 9.6, it takes more protection capacity to provide 
100% protection (e.g., see the other three sub-figures). In this case, the shared p-c}'cles tend to be 
dedicated protection structures. The only way to protect a pair of links that .belongs to an SRLG 
is to protect them as non intersecting straddling-cycle links, e.g., Figure 9.7-(d) (see Section 9 4.1). 
The p-cycle based scheme in Figure 9.7 provides 100% protection against all single-link failures and 
protection for only 7/ Q x 100% (7 link pairs out of (2) pairs) of all possible dual-link failures. The 
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Figure 9.7: Dual-Link Failure Protection: A p-Cycle Based Protection Scheme 
= 200%. 
In Figure 9.8, we illustrate another optimal design of a protection scheme based on p-structures 
in order to provide protection within the previous network and failure models illustrated in Figure 
9.6. The illustrated two p-structures provide 100% protection against all single and potential dual-
link failures in the network. Compared to the previous p-cycle scheme in Figure 9.7 which requires 
16 backup channels, the p-structure scheme illustrated in Figure 9.8 requires only 12 backup chan-
nels. Thus, it is more capacity effective than the p-cycle based scheme. Regarding the shapes of 
the protection structures in the p-structure scheme, the protection topologies are more connected, 
though, offer more routing possibilities in case of any single or dual-link failures. The problem of 
single and dual-link failure protection can be assimilated to the design of protection schemes with a 
constrained link spare capacity budget. Indeed, the constraint related to spare capacity distribution 
in the latter affect the flexibility of the protection scheme as well as the distribution of the link over 
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Figure 9.8: Dual-Link Failure Protection: A p-Structure Based Protection Scheme 
9.5 Mathematical Optimization Models 
In this section, we propose ILP-based optimization models to optimize the spare capacity needed 
to provide the targeted QoP classes, i.e., 100% protection against single-link failures and different 
protection classes against dual-link failures. Our optimization approach is based on CG where the 
definition of the shape and of the protection capability of each protection structure are integrated 
in the optimization process. Unlike the models in [Sch03b, SGC04a], the protection matrix of the p-
cycles and p-structures are built and defines dynamically during the optimization processes. Indeed, 
following the CG approach, we iteratively construct the protection matrix until we reach the optimal 
value with respect to the design objective. 
9.5.1 Network Failure Model 
We propose optimization models where we are given a discrete probability distribution P — (pt,f) 
which associates a value in {0,1} to each pair of links £ and £' depending on whether they are 
susceptible to fail at the same time (pt,t< — 1) or not (pt,tf = 0) (or, belong to the same SRLG). 
Furthermore, and unlike the optimization models in [Sch03b] and [SGC04a] where one has to find 
appropriate weights for the components of a multi-objective optimization function, we propose to 
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use the following R2 formula based on the dual-link failure probability distribution. 
E P£,£ 
i,£'e£ 
R2 =-^Eu-- (9-D 
Formula (9.1) gives the number of link-pairs that are susceptible to fail at he same time over the 
total number of link-pairs. 
9.5.2 Optimized Design of jp-Cycle Based Protec t ion Schemes 
As in the previous CG models in this thesis, the optimization model for p-cycles design is divided 
into two sub-problems: the master and pricing problems. In this case, the master problem optimizes 
the selection of protection structures generated by the pricing problem, and the pricing problem 
dynamically generates p-cycles that can effectively provide the targeted QoP classes. 
M a s t e r P r o b l e m 
We assume that the working capacity we on each link £ (routing of working paths) is given, and we 
re-use some of the variables, sets, -and parameters defined in Chapters 5 to 8. In addition to the 
parameter a\ and b\ already defined in Chapter 5, for each p-cycle s e S we define the following 
parameter: 
• d\£, encodes the protection relationship between p-cycle s and links £, £'. It is equal to the 
number of protected channels that cannot be recovered in case of a dual-link failure on both 
£ and £'. 
The objective of the master problem is written as follows: 
Ksesiec 
mm l > > b\zs 
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The constraints of the master problem are as follows: 
Y^o,stzs>w£ £eC (9.2) 
ses 
J^PW'dit'Z3 = 0 £,£' e C. (9.3) 
ses 
Constraints (9.2) guarantee protection against all single-link failures for wt working channels on 
each link £ (100% single-link failure recovery). Constraints (9.3) guarantee 100% protection against 
all potential dual-link failures on all link-pairs £,£'. p-Cycles that do not protect against potential 
dual-link failures are forbidden in the optimal solution by this last set of constraints. 
Pricing Problem 
The pricing problem consists to minimize the reduced cost of the master problem subject to the p-
cycle shaping and protection constraints. We define the variables of the pricing problem as follows: 
if £ is an on-cycle link 
otherwise, 
if £ is a straddlmg-cycle link 
otherwise. 
The objective function of the pricing problem, i.e., the minimization function of the reduced cost 
associated to the variables of the master problem is written as follows: 
min 1^2 b£ ~ ^2 °\ai + ^2 ff£ *' PLi> d[ £r 
\tec £ec £,t'eL 





The p-cycle shaping constraints are written as follows: 
] T
 x°£ < 2 veV (9.4) 
£eoj{v) 
J2 x°t>>x°£ veVJeV(v) (9.5) 
£'euj(v) £'^e 
2x\< J2 x°t' £eC,veV(£) (9.6) 
£'ev(v) 
] T x°t > x\, N c V, £' e S(N). (9.7) 
£es(N) 
Constraints (9.4) and (9.5) are used to shape the current p-cycle. According to these two sets of 
constraints, a p-cycle can have either 2 or 0 incident links at any given node v eV. Constraints (9.6) 
are used to set up straddling-cycle links. Constraints (9.7) are sub-cycle elimination constraints, and 
they are only added when needed using the so-called user cuts feature [ILO03]. 
Now that the current p-cycle is shaped, let us introduce additional variables in order to calculate 
the dual-link failure protection matrix. We need to distinguish two situations for a given link: (i) 
belonging to a p-cycle (whether on-cycle or straddling-cycle) and (n) being protected by a p-cycle. 
For this reason, we define the following variables: 
• y£ = 1. if £ is provided protection as an on-cycle link, 0 otherwise, 
© y\ e {0, 1, 2}, for a straddling-cycle link £, this variable counts the number of protection paths 
for t 
• t£f e {0,1. 2}. which encodes the vulnerability of the current p-cycle to a dual-link failure on 
links £ and £'. ttt1 — 0 if the current p-cycle can fully survive a dual-link failure on links £ and 
£\ and n > 1 to count the number of lost link channels due to a dual-link failure on £ and £'. 
The next two sets of constraints (9 8) and (9.9) express the protection relationship between 
the current p-cycle and a link £. Constraints (9.8) express that the current p-cycle can provide 
protection for its on-cycle links Constraints (9 9) count the number of provided backup paths for a 
straddling-cycle link £. Recall that in such a case, a link can be either on-c} cle or straddling-c\ cle, 
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but it is not necessarily provided protection (see the examples in Figures 9.2, 9.3, and 9.4) 
y°£ < x°£ £eC (9.8) 
y\ <2x\ £e C. (9.9) 
Let us now see how to measure the impact of a dual-link failure on a recovery scheme based on a 
single p-cycle s. In this section, we re-use the dual-link protection analysis presented in Figures 9.2, 
9.3 and 9.4. We include the probability of a dual-link failure to occur in order to help the pricing 
problem in finding the globally most resilient p-cycles. 
9 If two links £,£' are on-cycle, and the current p-cycle provides protection for both of them 
(y°t — I? V% — 1)> then, the current p-cycle cannot fully survive a dual-link failure on these two 
links, see Figure (9.2)-(a). Constraints (9.10) set the variables7^/ to the number of channels 
that cannot be recovered in case of a dual-link failure on £ and £', and 0 otherwise, (the current 
p-cycle can fully survive a dual-link failure on £ and £'). 
Utt> > 2Pt,t>(y°£ -r y°£. - 1) £J' e C. (9.10) 
• If two links are on-cycle, and the current p-cycle provides protection for only one of them, 
e
-&-> V°t — 1 a n d V°t< — 0 (see Figure (9.2)-(b)), again, the current p-cycle cannot fully survive 
a dual-link failure on those two links, and constraints (9.11) set the variables ttt' to their 
appropriate values (lower than the previous case). 
te,£> > P£,£>(y°t + x \ , - l ) te'eC (9.11) 
• Given £ and £''. if one of the links is provided protection as an on-cycle link (y£ = 1) while the 
other link as a straddling-cycle (either one unit or two) (y\, — 1 or 2). then, by (9 12). the 
current p-cycle cannot fully survive a dual-link failure on those two links, and tt,i> is set to the 
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induced vulnerability, (see Figure (9.3)-(a)). 
tu> > PtA^vl + y\, - 2) £J' e C. (9.12) 
• Given £ and £\ a similar case when one link, £, is only used as an on-cycle link (x°£ = 1) while 
the other link, £'', is provided protection as a straddling-cycle (either one unit or two) (y\, — 1 
or 2), then, by (9.13), the current p-cycle cannot fully survive a dual-link failure on those two 
links and tt,v is set to the induced vulnerability, see Figure (9.3)-(b). 
Us > Pt,t<(x°t + y}f -2) £J' eC (9.13) 
The remaining cases to be looked at are when both links are protected while being considered as 
straddling-cycle links, see Figure 9 4-(a) and (b). The p-cycle in Figure 9.4-(a) cannot fully survive a 
dual-link failure on links A — F and B — E, even when these two links are only transporting one unit 
of working capacity (other cases, e.g., two units on a given link and one or two units on the second 
one cannot be recovered). In Figure (9.4)-(b), due to the disjointness of backup restoration paths. 
it is possible to fully recover from a dual-link failure when the two affected links are transporting 
one capacity unit. 
In order to distinguish the cases of Figures 9.4-(a) and 9.4-(b), we propose to use the following 
idea: remove one of the two affected links and all its adjacent links, and try to construct a second 
p-cycle that spans the remaining affected link. In order to put our idea in practice, we propose to 
use the following new variables r\,
 £l, to encode whether there exists a protection path that spans £ 
when one of the links £' or £" and its incident links are unusable (removed). Hence. r£, £ll— 1. when. 
after removing £' and its incident links, there remains a backup protection path for £"', 0 otherwise 
The following constraints are used to encode the vulnerability of a p-cycle to dual-link failures in 
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such cases. 
rij,, < x°£ fc £,£',£"(£ ^ £") e C (9.14) 
r
£
tit, < \ £,£',£"(£ = £") e C (9.15) 
J2 r££,)£„=0 £\£"eC (9.16) 
£e£(V(£')\V(£")) 
E rit',t" = 2nh" v e V't't"e c (9-17) 
£es(v) 
where n£, £ll G Z + is a parameter. 
Constraints (9.14) express that an alternate back path crosses only on-cycle links, and constraints 
(9.15) extend it to the second failing link. Constraint (9.16)-(^;, P) removes link £' and all its adjacent 
links that are not adjacent to £". Constraints (9.17) try to reconstruct a second p-cycle with the 
set of remaining links. This last set of constraints can be viewed as flow conservation constraints. 
Indeed, if a flow can circulate (while removing the first link and its adjacent links) from one of the 
two end-nodes of the second failing link and can reach the other end-node, then, it means that a 
disjoint backup path for the second failure can be established. If the reconstruction of a new p-cycle 
spanning £" succeeds, then the variable r|,
 £,, associated with the link £" will be equal to one. Thus, 
variable r£, £ll can be used to encode the feasibility of an alternate backup path for £" in case of 
removal of £'. 
Constraints (9.18) and (9.19) are used to set up variables t£^ to a given value when the two links 
£ and £' are both provided protection as straddling-cycle links. In case of a dual-link failure on £ 
and £\ constraints (9.18) set the amount of lost protected-capacity. In the particular case of y\ = 1 
and y£, — 1 (both £ and £' have exactly one protected capacity), if it is not possible to reconstruct a 
second p-cycle without one of the failing links, constraints (9.19)-(£,£f) will assign a value 1 to t££>, 
meaning, we cannot survive a dual-link failure on links £ and £'. 
U.i> > PL£> (yt + y\. - 2) ej'eC (9.18) 
*£',*" > Pw(y\ + y\> - 4\t- - i) WX e £. (9.19) 
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Last, in order to interconnect the master problem with the pricing problem, we need to express 
the variables of the pricing problems in terms of the variables of the master problem. 
b't=x°t £€£ 
ai = yi+y\ e e c 
r d£ gr = tt,tr £•>£ e C 
Recall that, in case where all the p£^ = 0 (V{£, £'} e C) (dual-link failures cannot occur), the 
proposed model becomes a classical optimization model of a single-link failure survivable WDM 
network. 
9.5.3 Optimized Design of p-St ructure Based Protec t ion Schemes 
In this section, we extend the optimization approach proposed in the previous section for p-cycle 
protection to support all possible protection structures (p-structures). 
Mas te r p rob lem 
The master problem consists to minimize the spare capacity requirement in order to achieve the 
targeted QoP classes. It is written as follows: 
min





The only difference with the master problem of a p-cycle based scheme is in the set of Constraints 
9.3. These constraints are moved into the pricing problem in the p-structure based scheme. Though, 
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y ^ a\zs > wt 
ses 
^
s e Z + 
£eC 
seS, 
as opposed to the p-cycle model, the p-structure master model select among candidate p-structure 
which individually satisfies the targeted QoP, i.e., resilient against all failure scenarios in the network. 
Pr ic ing P r o b l e m 
Based on the dual variables of the master problem, the pricing problem decides on the shape and 
the protection capability of each p-structure it generates. 
We define the variables of the pricing problem as follows: 
1 if £' protect link £3 in case of 
T£\M^ e I1" 2J) = \ a dual-link failure on links ^1,^2 
0 otherwise 
1 if £ is used for protection 
0 otherwise 
y£ e Z + is the number of protected channels on link £ provided by the current p-structure. 
The objective function of the pricing problem, i.e., minimization of the reduced cost of the master 
xt = < 
problem is deduced as follows: 
min \2_^ot— / . @£at 
\£ec £ec / 
where 0t(£ € C) are the dual variable values associated with constraints (9.20). Re-expressed the 
objective function in terms of the pricing variables leads to the following new expression: 
min ^ xt - Y2 °ty* I • 
\£ec £ec J 
The constraints that shape and decide the protection capabilities of each p-structure are divided 
into two sets: the first set of constraints (9.22)-(9.24) are dual-link failure model dependent (V 
dependent), and the second set (9.25)-(9.30) is used to decide the protection capabilities and shape 
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of each candidate p-structure. 
£i,£2,e£ (9.22) 
£i,£2€£ (9.23) 
Pii,(2 x (rt'X + rl'%) < 1 ei,l2,£'eC. (9.24) 
This set of constraints is used to avoid protection conflicts when links of any link-pair are suscep-
tible to fail at the same time. Constraints (9.22) and (9.23) are used to forbid inter-link protection 
between any pair of links £\, £2 when they belong to the same SRLG (i.e., Vtx,t2 — 1)- Indeed, if 





 = 0, nor £2 can protect £\. i.e . r£'£ — 0). Constraints (9.24) are used to avoid for any link 
£' to protect both of links £\, £2 of any SRLG when they are susceptible to fail at the same time 
(Vt1:t2 — 1) In such a case, £' can only protect one of the two links. 
VJ 4;%>yl3 NcV,£1,£2€C 
t'(.t'*t3)ev(N) 
£3e{£i,£2), (9.25) 
*•£•£ = 0 ii,e2,e£ (9.26) 
41(1=0 h.hzC (9.27) 
4X < **' *i,*2,*' G C,i3 e {£u£2} ' (9.28) 
4';% G {o, 1} ei,e2,e' ec.e3€ {£i.£2} (9 29) 
a e{0,i},yeez+ ieC. (9.30) 
This second set of constraints. (9.25)-(9.30), is used to shape the p-structures, and decide for 
their protection. Constraints (9.25) are used for each link pair £\, £2 (either susceptible to fail at the 
VlL x rD 
M 
?hM x r\ £\M 
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same time or not) to set up the number of disjoint backup paths for link £3 e {£^£2} to the minimum 
number of incident links to the minimum cut (min cut problem) separating the two end-nodes of £3. 
This technique was used in previous Chapters 7 and 8. Constraints (9.26) and (9.27) express that a 
link £ cannot protect itself. Constraints (9.28) say that a link £' can provide protection for £3 if and 
only if it (£') is part of the current p-structure (spanned by the p-structure). Constraints (9.29) and 
(9.30) are integrality constraints. 
9.6 Computational Results 
By Menger's theorem [BM76], a graph is k—connected if and only if there are k edge-disjoint paths 
between every pair of nodes in the network. If so. the removal of any k — n edges will leave the 
graph n—connected In communication networks, in order to design a fully survivable dual-link 
failure scheme, the network physical topology must be at least 3-connected, i.e , all nodes (all sub 
networks) should have at least three incident disjoint-links (cuts of at least three-edges). In the 
performance evaluation processes, we use five network topologies, all at least 3-connected. Two 
highly connected: COST239 (11 nodes, 26 links, avg degree 4.3), an augmented version of the NJ-
LATA (11 nodes, 26 links (3 added links), avg degree 4.2), and three relatively sparse: NSF (14 
nodes, 22 links (one added link), avg degree 3.1), and ATLANTA (15 nodes, 24 links (two added 
links), avg degree of 3.2), and Polska [Zus] (12 nodes, 20 links (two added links), avg degree of 3.33). 
In the next two sub-sections, we present the computation results of the pure p-cycle and the 
p-structure design approaches. Herein, we suppose uniform traffic distributions over the node-pairs 
in the network; and arbitrary link failure probability distributions. 
9.6.1 p-Cycle Protection Performance 
In Figure 9.9, we see the variation of the dual-link failure restorability as a function of the capacity 
redundancy (v-axis). The required amount of spare capacity to provide R2 — 100% is about 2.3 
the amount of protected capacity (~ 235% redundent) in both COST239 and NJ-LATA networks 
(highly connected networks). This redundancy decreases as the ratio of restorable dual-link failures 
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drops down to achieve only 42% in case of a single failure scenario. The NSF and ATLANTA net-
works show the same behavior as for the previous two networks. However, the required amount of 
spare capacity to improve R2 is growing faster for an equal increase of the R2 ratio. The amount 
of spare capacity needed to achieve R2 — 100% is about 5.2 the protected working capacity, and 
compared to the previous two networks the same amount that provides 100% dual-link failure pro-
tection in COST239 and NJ-LATA only provides around 20% dual-link failure protection in NSF 
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Figure 9.9* Redundancy vs. Dual-Link Failure Recovery Ratio R2 
The network physical topology does affect the ability of p-cycles in providing dual-link failure 
protection. Sparser networks offer less flexibility in the set up of p-cycles, which in turn, affects 
their capacity efficiency (fewer straddling-cycle links) and their ability to survive dual-link failures 
as well. 
The second measured parameter is the average p-cycles size. The study performed in [Sch03b] 
showed the effect of varying the number of p-cycles on the capacity redundancy, and how varying 
the size of the candidate p-cycles could affect the restorability of a p-cycle based protection scheme. 
Figure 9.10 shows the variation of the average size of the p-cycles in the optimal design proposed in 
this study. The average size of the p-cycles that provides R\ = 100%. R2 ~ 0% is larger than that 
at any other R2 level 
However, the drop in the average size is not that high, the average size of p-cycles providing 
100% dual-link protection is only two hops less than that at R2 ~ 0%. 
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Figure 9.10: p-cycle Average Size vs. Dual-Link Failure Recovery Ratio R2 
and ATLANTA networks (sparse networks) much larger p-cycles (with a higher number of hops) 
are required in order to provide an optimized dual-link failure restorability (R2)' p-Cycles of large 
size are required even in the case of a lower dual-link failure restorability ratio (R2 = 40%). The 
same trend is observed in the NJ LATA and COST239 networks, but with less difference when the 
R2 ratio changes. 
9.6.2 p-Structure Protection Performance 
In Figure 9.11, we see the variation of the capacity redundancy (y-axis) as a function of the dual-link 
failure restorability (x-axis) in the p-cycle and p-structure schemes. We recorded a ~ [3%. 5%] of 
protection capacity saving with the p-structure based scheme over the p-cycle one when the objective 
is to provide 100% single-link protection, i.e., Ri = 100% and R2 — 0% (origin of each plot) in all 
network topologies. The difference in spare capacity between the p-cycle and p-structure based 
schemes increases as the dual-link failure restorability increases 
The required amount of spare capacity to provide R2 — 100% in the p-cycle based scheme is 
~ 5.2 and 4.5 the amount of protected capacity (~ 520%. and ~ 450% capacity redundant) in the 
NSF and Polska networks (relatively sparse networks), respectively The same R2 — 100% level costs 
150% and 100% less protection capacity when there is no constraint on the shape of the protection* 
structures (using p-structures). The saving in protection capacity related to the different R2 levels 
in the p-structure over the p-cycle scheme varies in the interval [5%. 150%] and [5%. 100%] in the 
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Figure 9.11: Capacity Redundancy vs. Dual-Link Failure Restorability 
NSF and Polska networks are relatively sparser in comparison to COST239. Providing dual-link 
failure survivability even for a small class of traffic may cost excessively high when the network 
topology is sparse. COST239 offers a more effective support of dual-link failures with both the 
p-cycle and p-structure based schemes. Thanks to its physical connectivity, dual-link failures can be 
survived by rerouting the affected connections through diverse other protection paths. Furthermore, 
as there is no constraint on the shape of the protection structures in the (p-structures). this scheme 
is more likely to provide flexible and more efficient protection allocation than the p-cycle scheme 
The saving in protection capacity in this case lies in the interval [5%, 50%]. 
In Tables 9.1 and (9 2), we present some additional characteristics related to the shapes of the 
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p-structures and p-cycles, respectively. We consider three R2 levels: 10%, 50% and 100%, and two 
topologies: NSF and COST239. 
In Table 9.1, we recorded the number of p-cycles and p-structures in the optimal solutions of the 
two designs for R2 = 10%, 50%, and 100%. We remark that the number of distinct p-cycles in both 
networks, and p-structures in the NSF network increases as the level of R2 increases. The number of 
p-structures in COST239 network vary differently compared to others: for any R2 level, this number 
is smaller than the number of required p-cycles. These variations come from the fact that when a 
higher number of SRLGs are assumed then larger number of distinct structures (especially sparse 
structures, e.g., p-cycles) are needed, especially in sparse networks (e.g., NSF network). 
In Table 9.2, we study more in-depth the shapes and protection capabilities of the p-cycles and 
p-structures in the two proposed designs. We consider two statistic distributions: The number of 
spanned links and number of protected links by each p-cycle and p-structure The two distributions 
are characterized by (XXn <jxg) and (yxn cryi) which refer to their main value and standard deviation, 
respectively. We keep NSF and COST2309 networks, and the three previous R2 levels i.e., 10%, 
50%, and 100%. 
In NSF, on average, the number of spanned links by the p-cycles and p-structures increase as 
the dual-link failure resiliency increases. Moreover, as R2 increases, the p-structures tend to use 
slightly more links than the p-cycles do. Regarding the number of protected links in NSF network, 
the p-structures protect more working links than the p-cycles do. There is one exception, in the 
case R2 — 10% where the difference in capacity between the p-structure and p-cycle schemes is 
~ 3% (see Figure 9.11) and the average number of protected links by the p-cycles is larger than the 
p-structures. The standard deviations of the two distributions show a slightly larger discrepancy in 
the size (spanned links) and protected links between the p-structures and p-cycles There is a larger 
difference among the p-structufes in terms of size and protected links than among the p-cycles. This 
discrepancy in size and protection explains the difference in protection performance in Figure 9.11 












































































































Table 9 2 Characterization of the Optimal p-Structures and p-Cycles 
In COST239 network, the same trend is observed regarding the size of the p-cycles and p-
structures (number of spanned links). The major difference with the NSF network is in the distri-
butions of the protection and protected links of the p-cycles and p-structures. The size and number 
of protected-link discrepancies in the p-structure distributions are almost equal to the p-structure 
average size and to the average number of protected links by each p-structure, respectively. In 
other words, there are more different p-structures (larger and smaller) with different protection 
capabilities than p-cycles. The flexibility in capacity allocation and distribution offered by the p-
structure scheme is better than the one offered by the p-cycle scheme, and this is corroborated by 
the protection capacity saving. 
9.7 Conclusion 
We proposed a design framework for link protection in survivable WDM networks based on p-cycles 
and p-structures in order to provide different measurable QoP classes including 100% single-link 
protection and different optimized dual-link failure protection R2. We proposed the first optimiza-
tion methods to design protection schemes to exactly (and optimally) measure the required spare 
capacity budget in p-cycle and p-structure schemes in order to provide different QoP guarantees. 
We evaluated the protection performance of the p-cycle and p-structure schemes, and provided a 
valued relationship between the required amount of spare capacity and the physical topology in order 
to achieve an optimized dual-link failure survivability. We also provided a valued relation among 
network connectivity, dual-link failure resiliency, and average size of the protection structures in the 
optimal designs. 
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C H A P T E R 10 
Conclusions and Future Work 
10.1 Summary of Thesis 
Differentiation of Quality-of-Recovery and Quality-of-Protection are two important features in the 
design of survivable WDM networks. In modern transport networks, the challenge related to opti-
mization of the network resources to meet different service requirements has grown with the intro-
duction of several new applications and services. In the design of protection schemes, the trade-off 
between sharing of protection capacity and the recovery delay has motivated many researchers of the 
community of survivable optical networks. These two protection parameters have generated some 
research in QoR and QoP differentiation in optical networks. Protection schemes based on dedicated 
to shared protection capacity have been proposed to differently optimize the recovery delay. 
So far. not much work has been done in QoR and QoP differentiation in the optical layer using 
shared protection schemes. The prevalent design approach to optimize some protection parameters 
is based on protection schemes that use pre-defined shape protection structures to optimize some 
protection parameters. The pre-defined shape p-cycle scheme is a typical protection approach where 
the shape of the protection building blocks (cycles) define its potential protection performance. 
Indeed, because they are a priori capacity efficient and can be fully pre-cross connected ahead 
of failures, the}' have been widely studied in the design of protection schemes in the literature 
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[She06, KG05, GD02, Gru03, EM09; LS08, SGA02, SGC04b, ZY02a, AR08]. However, their a-
priori efficiency can be offset by different network conditions, such as, traffic patterns and link 
spare capacity budgets. Indeed, because of the constraint on the shapes of the protection structures 
(cyclical), the flexibility in the set up of the protection capacity can be greatly jeopardized, which 
in turn can affect the efficiency of the protection scheme. 
To overcome the above difficulties, in this dissertation, we proposed a set of new design approaches 
in order to effectively provide different classes of QoR and QoP. In the differentiation of QoR, we 
focused on the pre-configuration of the protection building blocks, and proposed different protection 
approaches that provide different recovery performances, and require different spare capacity bud-
gets. We proposed three strategies to design protection schemes that are based on fully pre-cross 
connected, partially pre-cross connected, and dynamically cross connected protection structures. In 
the design of fully pre-cross connected schemes, we proposed two approaches using pre-defined shape 
p-cycles and unrestricted shape p-structures. In the p-cycle approach, the objective was to optimize 
the sharing of the protection capacity while keeping the fully pre-cross connectivity of the protection 
structures. The fully pre-cross connected p-structure based approach was proposed to overcome the 
limits related to the shapes of the p-cycles. In the design of dynamically cross connected schemes, 
we used p-structures as protection building blocks. In this approach, where the protection capacity 
is dynamically configured in case of a failure, the focus was more on how to reserve the protection 
capacity in order to provide protection with different constrained spare capacity budgets and traffic 
patterns. The partially pre-cross connected approach was proposed to strike a balance between the 
fully pre-cross connected and dynamically cross-connected protection schemes. In the design of par-
tially pre-cross connected schemes, we proposed a hybrid protection structure, called pre-configured 
extended-tree, consisting of a p-tree and a set of potential p-cycles, and adapted the fully pre-cross 
connected p-structure based approach by relaxing the cross connectivity on some switching nodes. 
In the partially pre-cross connected p-structure approach, the number of cross connects that require 
dynamic reconfiguration at switching nodes and along backup paths, are explicitly optimized. 
We used the three differently pre-configured protection approaches we proposed in this thesis in 
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the design of protection schemes that guarantee different QoR classes in the context of Protected 
Working Capacity Envelope (PWCE) paradigm and the classical protected working capacity. In 
PWCE, we proposed efficient and scalable optimization techniques based on Column Generation 
(CG), and compared the required spare capacity and the provided reliability of the simple and non 
simple p-cycle, p-etree, and p-structure based schemes. The flexibility of these schemes in providing 
protection with non uniform link spare capacity budgets were also evaluated. In addition to the 
required spare capacity, we studied the recovery delay in the p-etree based scheme as a function of 
the number of cross connects that require dynamic reconfiguration in case of a link failure. 
In the context of classical protected working capacity, we proposed optimization methods to 
explicitly optimize the number and distribution of dynamic cross connects at local nodes and along 
backup paths in the p-structure based schemes. By doing so, we limit the switching delay of light 
paths and the queuing delays of control messages, and though, can guarantee a short recovery delay 
independently of the shape of the protection structures. 
In QoP differentiation, we used pure p-cycles and p-structures in the design of protection schemes 
that provide different QoP classes. We proposed two CG based optimization methods to exactly 
compute the spare capacity budget in order to provide different QoP classes including single and 
dual link failures. The associated spare capacity budget to provide different levels of dual link failure 
recovery were computed within different arbitrary dual link failure models. In both the p-cycle and 
p-structure based schemes, we focused on the shapes of the optimal p-cycles and p-structures. We 
recorded the size of the optimal p-cycles in different experiments with different QoP classes in order 
to get an insight of the relation between the size of the p-cycles and their resiliency. In the p-
structure based scheme, we focused on the design of flexible protection structures to optimize the 
spare capacity, and looked at the shapes of those structures. We presented valuable information 
about the parameters defining the shapes of the protection structures in the designs of different 
protection schemes to provide different QoP classes. 
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10.2 Further Research 
Further research can be done on the following topics: 
10.2.1 Dynamic Provisioning within Different Shaped End-to-End PWCEs 
In Chapter 7, we proposed a design method to maximize the protected-flow circulation in survivable 
WDM networks with p-structures-based PWCE. The objective was to shape the PWCE in order 
to effectively meet a potential working capacity pattern in the network. However, to be more 
flexible and efficient in tracking the traffic fluctuations, we can further extend this approach to a 
multi-PWCE approach where different shaped PWCEs will be designed to adapt to different traffic 
variations in the network. This approach can be built on the one presented in this thesis,p-structures. 
by extending the solution space of the PWCEs to include different inter-related PWCEs. All what 
it will take is a strategy to construct the PWCEs solution space, and an activation mechanism to 
select the most appropriate and effective PWCEs at each time a reconfiguration is needed Another 
interesting research direction would be to develop dynamic provisioning strategies in PWCE based 
on the p-etree scheme. The scalability and flexibility of this approach and the existence of a variety 
of distributed algorithms for tree construction, are valuable assets that can be exploited to efficiently 
and quickly allocate protection capacity on-demand in survivable WDM networks. 
10o2o2 Pa th and Segment Based Protec t ion Using p-St rac tnres 
All the design methods of PWCE and classical protection in this thesis were link-oriented. Path 
and segment based protection are two other approaches that are more capacity efficient than link 
protection [RSM03, XXQ03]. An interesting research direction to follow would be to generalize the 
design of p-structures in segment and path based protection schemes in order to provide different QoR 
and QoP classes. The challenges will be to extend the work done in this thesis, and to establish how 
the different protection parameters vary in each piotection approach and according to each design 
objective. In the design of shaped PWCE. the segment and path based approaches will be of a great 
added value in saving the spare capacity required to maximize^ the PWCE size. In addition, in the 
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shaping of the PWCEs, in order to maximize the protection flow circulation, the path and segment 
oriented protection approaches are more oriented to effectively maximize the end-to-end protection 
than the hop-by-hop counterpart. 
10.3 Contributions of this Thesis Work 
10.3.1 Journal Papers 
1. Sebbah, S. Jaumard, B. Design of Survivable WDM Networks Using Pre-Configured Pro-
tection Structures with Unrestricted Shapes, Photonic Network Communications, Volume 19, 
Number 1 / February, 2010, pages=9-21 
2. Jaumard, B. Sebbah, S. Stidsen, T. A unified modeling and solution framework to pre-
planned protection in survivable WDM networks, International Journal On Communications 
(under review) 
3. Sebbah, S. Jaumard, B. Differentiated Quality-of-Recovery in Survivable WDM Mesh Net-
works with p-Structures, IEEE/ACM Journal on Networking (under review) 
4. Sebbah, S. Jaumard, B. Differentiated Quality-of-Protection in Survivable WDM Mesh Net-
works with p-Structures, IEEE/OSA Journal of Optical Communications and Networking 
(JOCN) (under review) 
10-3.2 Peer-Reviewed Conference Papers 
1. Sebbah, S. Jaumard,'B. A Global Approach to Fully Pre-cross Connected Protection Schemes 
Design using p-structures, IEEE International Workshop on Reliable Networks Design and 
Modeling, 2009. RNDM'09. St Petersburg, Russia. pages=l-6. 
2. Sebbah, S. Jaumard. B. Differentiated Quality-of-Service in Survivable WDM Mesh Net-
works, Global Telecommunications Conference. 2009. GLOBECOM 2009. Hawaii, USA. 
page(s): 1 -6 
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3. Jaumard, B. Sebbah, S. Rocha, C. Large Scale optimization in Survivable WDM Networks, 
Tutorial, IEEE Design of Reliable Communication Networks, 2009. (DRClNr09). Pittsburgh, 
USA. 
4. Sebbah, S. Jaumard, B. A Resilient Transparent Optical Network Design with a Pre-configured 
Extended-tree Protection, IEEE International Conference on Communications, 2009, (ICC'09) 
Dresden, Germany. pages=l-6. (Received the best paper award of the Optical Net-
works Symposium). 
5. Sebbah, S. Jaumard, B. Flexible protection plans design in survivable WDM networks: An 
application to PWCE, IEEE Sarnoff 2009. Princeton. NJ. USA. pages =1-5. 
6. Sebbah, S. Jaumard, B. PWCE design in survivable WDM Networks using unrestricted shape 
p-structure patterns, IEEE 22nd Canadian Conference on Electrical and Computer Engineering 
2009 (CCECE'09). pages = 279 - 282. 
7. Sebbah, S. Jaumard, B p-Cycle Based Dual Failure Recovery in WDM Mesh Networks. 
IFIP / IEEE 13 t / l Conference on Optical Network Design and Modeling 2009. (ONDMW). 
Braunschweig, Germany. pages=l-6. 
8. Sebbah, S. Jaumard, B. Survivable WDM networks design with non-simple p-cycle-based 
PWCE, IEEE Global Communications Conference, 2008. (GLOBECOM'08). New Orleans, 
LA, USA. pages=l-6. 
9. Sebbah, S. Jaumard, B. Efficient and Scalable Design of Protected Working Capacity En-
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